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Abstract
With an increasing number of hand-held electronics, gadgets, and other smart devices,
data is present in a large number of platforms, thereby increasing the risk of security,
privacy, and safety breach than ever before. Due to the extreme lightweight nature of these
devices, commonly referred to as IoT or ‘Internet of Things’, providing any kind of security
is prohibitive due to high overhead associated with any traditional and mathematically
robust cryptographic techniques.

Therefore, researchers have searched for alternative

intuitive solutions for such devices. Hardware security, unlike traditional cryptography, can
provide unique device-specific security solutions with little overhead, address vulnerability
in hardware and, therefore, are attractive in this domain.
As Moore’s law is almost at its end, different emerging devices are being explored
more by researchers as they present opportunities to build better application specific
devices along with their challenges compared to CMOS technology. In this work, we have
proposed emerging nanotechnology based hardware security as a security solution for resource
constrained IoT domain. Specifically, we have built two hardware security primitives i.e.
physical unclonable function (PUF) and true random number generator (TRNG) and used
these components as part of a security protocol proposed in this work as well. Both PUF
and TRNG are built from metal oxide memristors, an emerging nanoscale device and are
generally lightweight compared to their CMOS counterparts in terms of area, power, and
delay. Design challenges associated with designing these hardware security primitives and
with memristive devices are properly addressed. Finally, a complete security protocol is
proposed where all of these different pieces come together to provide a practical, robust, and
device-specific security for resource-limited IoT systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Motivation

Traditional cryptography has been providing security solution for decades and are mathematically robust but they introduce a large overhead to a system. For a large system, this
overhead may be negligible but with the emergence of smart devices and small embedded
systems i.e. Internet of Things (IoT), there is a growing need of providing security for these
extremely resource limited systems. As traditional cryptography or software based security is
impractical due to their heavy overhead, innovative solution using hardware based security
are becoming more and more important. Physical unclonable function (PUF) [53] is a
hardware security primitive that has been a highly researched topic in the past 20 years (since
2001). PUF can generate random, unique hardware-specific signatures that can be used in
many security applications and thus researchers have proposed hundreds of different PUFs.
On the other hand, with Moore’s law [50] neared to its end since early 2000s, several new
emerging technologies are being explored extensively. Among those, metal-oxide memristors
[63] are very promising because of their non-volatility, CMOS integration, low read/write
energy, high on-off ratio, usability in both logic and memory circuits. Thus the future is
going towards post-CMOS era where these novel nano-devices like memristors would be in
use in a lot of electronic designs and hardware based security solutions would be necessary
for these billions of smart small devices. Thus there is a growing need for development of
hardware security primitives like PUFs using emerging nano-devices like memristors. These
1

novel devices and hardware specific security measures introduce different forms of challenges
and thus the research scope is huge in this domain.

1.2

Research Goal and Summary

The goal of this work is to develop a very lightweight hardware security architecture for
resource constrained IoT domain leveraging the solutions and opportunities provided by
emerging nanoscale devices.
The research is specifically focused greatly on the design and analysis of a hardware
security primitive called the PUF. The PUF itself is built from memristors. The memristor
itself is an emerging nano-device with a high manufacturing variability which is used as
the source of entropy for the memristive PUF circuits that we have used in this work.
The initial work is focused on improving a practical model of HfO2 memristor by including
environmental effects and aging on its characteristics. Then a detailed device and circuit level
parameter exploration based on security and overhead performance of memristive PUF is
performed. A machine learning based modeling attack is also implemented on this PUF and
further circuit level modification is done to mitigate this vulnerability. Different peripheral
circuits, especially memristor’s read-write-form circuity and a practical sense amplifier for
memristor PUF is also designed. Besides, another hardware security primitive called true
random number generator (TRNG) is also designed from memristor and is shown to be robust
against environmental changes compared to existing designs. Finally, a complete security
architecture is built from memristor based PUF, TRNG, and RRAM (resistive random access
memory). Memristor PUF along with our designed reliability enhancement technique is used
to provide secret and unique key to a resource-limited embedded or IoT system to provide
robust security for its back-up data at the absence or scarcity of power.

1.3

Original Contributions

The original contributions of my doctoral work until now are listed below:
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• Environmental modeling of HfO2 memristors, specifically inclusion of temperature
change, aging, and also stochasticity in its characteristics
• Security analysis of memristor crossbar PUF against varying device parameters, size
and temperature
• Scalability and overhead analysis of memristor crossbar PUF
• Design of abstract model for memristor and memristor crossbar PUF and application
of machine learning based modeling attack on PUFs
• Successful demonstration of modeling attack on memristor crossbar PUF and circuit
redesign to improve robustness against machine learning based attacks
• Design of a practical sense amplifier for memristor based PUFs and read-write-form
circuitry for memristors
• Comprehensive theoretical analysis of memristor based true random number generator
(TRNG) and designing an improved twin memristor based TRNG
• Design and analysis of a run-time reliability enhancement technique for memristor
crossbar PUF
• A complete security protocol and transistor level architecture design for resourceconstrained IoT or embedded processors

1.4

Dissertation Overview

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 or this chapter provides some
context about the research and lists out original contributions of my doctoral work. Chapter
2 provides background on emerging nanoscale devices like memristors, and hardware security
primitive like PUF and TRNG. Chapter 3 introduces circuit design works for memristor
XbarPUF, different peripheral circuits (e.g. sense amplifier) for XbarPUF, the TRNG and
analyzed against manufacturing process variation and environmental changes.

Chapter

4 provides a thorough design analysis of XbarPUF and also analyzes its robustness or
3

vulnerability against machine learning based algorithms along with mitigation techniques
against these attacks. Chapter 5 uses all the designed components and knowledge so far to
provide a robust and lightweight hardware security protocol and architecture to secure the
non-volatile memory of an embedded processor or IoT device. Finally, chapter 6 provides a
summary of the works done for this dissertation and future work extensions are discussed.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Internet of Things (IoT)

The internet of things or IoT has been a buzzword for the past few years as the world has seen
a rapid growth in this domain. IoT generally refers to embedded devices, sensors etc. which
can gather data, send information via a channel or the internet to somewhere else to make a
decision based on its gathered data. Smart home appliances, smart medical devices, smart
automotive, sensor devices that can communicate, connected embedded processors. etc. all
can be considered as IoT. In most cases, IoT devices are interconnected in an environment
and share data with each other to ease making decisions. For example, in a smart home,
many different such devices like smart smart bulb, thermostats, refrigerator, microwave oven,
fans etc. can be controlled via a smartphone which ease the way of our life. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.1 [68, 58]. IoT is the fastest growing field in the world right now, with global
spending expected to cross 1.4 trillion by the end of this year (2020). In 2019, there were
more than 26 billions IoT devices worldwide and the number is expected to reach 75 billions
within the next 6 years, by 2025 [17].
With all the ease and comfort IoT brings to us, there are some serious potential risks
involved with it. IoT devices often store our data to help make decisions for ourselves but
that data might be sensitive if it leaks out. Since there are billions of IoT devices out there,
with our data being stored and processed on a number of such devices, with communication
via internet or other potentially less secure networks, IoT are posing a huge security, privacy,
5

Figure 2.1: The Internet of things (IoT) [68]

and safety risks. Specifically smart medical implants and automotive devices can cause safety
concerns while private data storage media and smartphones can create privacy risks. Among
all these, security could be the main concern as because of its fast growing nature along with
its very low cost production, security was not thought of as an essential feature. At the early
stages of IoT, many argue that maybe these devices may not need security at all since the
information they carry are so little or insignificant like someone’s preferred room temperature
or state of a fan or bulb. However, with the rapid increase of IoT, these devices find their
way into many applications in our everyday life and process our data. Now that billions
of these devices are everywhere with little to no security in them despite containing a huge
amount of data, makes them the main target for an attacker. Therefore, governments and
industries alike are concerned about the security of these devices and this is one of main
research topics now.
One of big difficulties applying security mechanism is the resource constrained nature
of such devices. Most of these devices are tiny with a very small silicon footprint, and

6

consuming a very little amount of power to run their operations. Some of these devices
are employed in places where it requires them to strengthen their life as much as possible
by draining as less energy as possible from their batteries. Pacemaker is one such example
where you don’t want it to run out of energy of often, requiring another tiresome and difficult
heart operation very soon to replace that device. Many sensor devices are employed in field
where they can be deployed for years and thus may depend on the harvested energy for most
of their life. Embedded processors in such devices often employ aggressive energy saving
techniques, going to a low power mode i.e. sleep or hibernation to save power. Employed
embedded processors might spend most of their life in such sleep or hibernation to extend
their battery life or to minimize the amount of power they harvest from different energy
sources like solar, WiFi, wind etc. Therefore, The processor usually shuts off power to most
of its components while using a little (or even zero) amount of energy to maintain its state.
Since IoT devices are often resource limited this way, this makes it very difficult to
employ any rigorous security since they might require a good amount of silicon area and
power that these devices can’t provide. Any traditional cryptographic solution are thus
often impractical for most devices in this domain. Lightweight cryptographic techniques
are being developed but even those can be very resource heavy for a low power embedded
processor or a small smart sensor. Moreover, employing the same security techniques with
billions of such devices out there might make all of them vulnerable at once on the event
of an attack, This are some of the main reasons why researchers are looking at alternative
techniques like hardware security which would provide the required practical level of security,
while complying with the limited resources of such devices.

2.2
2.2.1

Emerging Nanoscale Technology: Memristor
Emerging Devices

With the slow-down of Moore’s law as we are approaching the physical limit of CMOS,
researchers have developed a number of different post-CMOS devices. Among these, some
technologies like NAND or NOR flash are more mature and have already found real-world
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applications. However, there are a number of emerging devices especially nano-devices which
are being researched with the goal of replacing conventional CMOS. International Technology
Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS) has published and listed the most promising emerging
technologies in their report in 2013 [2] and in 2015 [3]. These devices offer various advantages
over traditional CMOS while but there is a need for a lot more research to overcome their
limitations and use them effectively in current infrastructure.
Memory based on ferroelectric properties of matters have been known for many years and
FeRAM (Ferroelectric RAM) is already being considered a mature technology. However, to
overcome the shortcomings of FeRAM like destructive read and low read stability, other
devices built from ferroelectric materials are being considered. Ferroelectric transistors or
FEFET [3, 14] is one such device which is very similar to conventional except the oxide layer
is replaced by a ferroelectric layer which helps to retain its state using residual polarization
even when the power is disconnected. The polarization of the ferroelectric can be controlled
by applying voltage at the metal gate contact. By applying voltage or electric field of
sufficient magnitude, the magnetization in the ferroelectric layer is altered. The current
or capacitance of the this ferroelectric FET shows a typical hysteresis loop if the applied
voltage at the gate terminal is swept through a range. Even if the electric field is removed, a
sufficient residual polarization remains in the ferroelectric and, therefore, this system can be
used as a non-volatile 1-bit memory. Doped HfOx is the most promising material that offers
ferroeletricity. FEFET offers high speed, low power, non-volatility, full CMOS compatibility
but has relatively high switching voltage and low endurance. Ferroelectric tunnel function or
FTJ is another emerging device built from ferroelectric layer sandwiched between two metal
layers which is ultra-thin and thus displays tunneling electroresistance (TER) even at room
temperature for some complex ferroelectric oxides [2].
Phase change memory (PCM) [19] is another emerging device which displays resistive
switching behavior. Its basic mechanism is Joule heating which transforms the internal state
of a matter between crystalline and amorphous states. The resistivity of a PCM is high when
the underlying material is in amorphous state and is low when it is in a crystalline state.
Chalcogenide materials display this phase change property at relatively low temperature of
around 6000 C. Both of these phases are stable at room temperature, thereby enabling them
8

to function as non-volatile memories. The physics of PCM is very well-understood compared
to many other emerging devices. It offers high speed, high on/off ratio, long endurance but
suffers from high switching current as well as limited scalability mainly due to the size of
the access device required.
Spin-transfer-toque RAM or STT-RAM is another promising emerging memory technology based on traditional MRAM (magnetoresistive RAM). The memory cell of an MRAM
consists of a magnetic tunnel junctions (MTJ) along with a regular MOSFET as the access
transistor. A thin tunnel insulator, such as MgO (magnesium oxide) is sandwiched between
two ferromagnetic layers to create an MTJ. One of the two layers has a fixed magnetic
polarization, called as the ‘fixed layer’. The other layer is called the ‘free layer’ and its
magnetization can be easily rotated. When the polarization of these two magnetic layers
are in the same direction i.e. parallel, the resistance of the cell is low and is considered a
binary value of ‘1’. When the magnetic orientation is anti-parallel between these two layers,
the resistance is higher. Write is performed by passing a current through both of these
layers to change the magnetization of the free with respect to the fixed layer. The writing
current and energy of a traditional MRAM is very high, thereby limiting their scalability.
STT-RAM tries to improves upon this problem by using a low energy spin-torque action
for write. It induces a spin-aligned current to control the magnetization of the free layer,
reducing the current density compared to MRAM. MRAMs have very high switching speed,
data retention, and endurance. However, STT-RAM suffers from small on/off resistance
ratio and sensitive to fabrication process.
Redox (reduction-oxidation) based RAM or resistive RAM (RRAM), also known as
memristors are a class of metal oxides which can display resistance switching among different
states [19]. The basic structure of a ReAM is a thin oxide film between two metal electrodes.
RRAM can be created from a variety of materials and composition. Perovskite oxides or
binary oxides both can work as RRAM. CB-RAM or conductive-bridge RAMs are another
class of RRAM where reative electrode supplies mobile ions to migrate across the dielectric
to form a conducting path during on state. However, typically considered RRAM operate
differently, by creating oxygen vacancies and in the oxide layer. They can be bipolar or nonpolar (current in both or one direction for switching). There are even volatile memristors
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which when programmed spontaneously reset back to its high resistance state. RRAM have
fast switching speed, low energy, good endurance, retention time but suffers from reliability
and larger process variation. Also, the device physics of RRAM is also not well-understood
yet. Many RRAMs require an initial forming step where an initial high electric field is applied
to initiate this switching behavior. Researchers are also trying to reduce this required forming
voltage and create ‘forming-free’ RRAM which would reduce the circuit design complexity.
Besides these technologies, there are carbon based memory memory devices like carbon
nanotubes and graphene based FET, Mott memory, molecular memory and so on [2]. All of
these different technologies provide some advantages over existing techniques while showing
some challenges in some others, thus there is a need for further research in device engineering,
infrastructure building, and finding suitable applications.

2.2.2

Memristor

Introduction
Memristor or RRAM is one of the most promising nanoscale devices of the last decade
or so that is being explored extensively due to its several advantages over traditional
CMOS. Although the term could mean a number of different resistance switching devices
as mentioned earlier, we would only mean metal-oxide memristors, specifically those from
transition metal-oxides (TMO) throughout this book when we use this term. Memristors are
usually non-volatile where the resistance of an insulating oxide can be altered between high
and low resistances states via the application of an external field. The physics of metal-oxide
memristors are different compared to its close counterpart like CBRAM (conductive-bridge
RAM) or phase-change memory. In a memristor, the number of oxygen vacancies created
inside the insulating dielectric oxide is the source of conduction. Memristors display typical
hysteresis in their I-V curve as shown in Figure 2.2 below along with its common symbol
notation. Researchers have shown the use of memristors in many different applications
ranging from memory devices, logic circuits [61, 20], neuromorphic computing, hardware
security [57, 26] and so on.
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Figure 2.2: Memristor symbol (left) and its IV curve showing hysteresis (right)

History
The term ‘memristor’ is coined by Professor Dr. Leon Chua in his 1971 paper [15] when he
predicted the presence of a fourth fundamental circuit element alongside resistor, capacitor,
and inductor. He predicted this from the relationship among voltage, current, flux, and
charge among the fundamental devices and later also projected some other characteristics of
memristors or memristor-like devices [16].
The relationship between the flux linkage δφ and δq is expressed as the memristance (M),
the property of a new fundamental circuit element, memristor. It can be implied that at
a certain time, the memristance defines a linear relationship between voltage and current
just like a resistor. Thus, memristor can actually be represented as a variable resistor. This
relationships are shown in these equations below:

∆φ
∆q
∆φ/∆t
∆v
=
=
∆q/∆t
∆i

M=

(2.1)
(2.2)

=⇒ ∆v = (M )∆i
Although, metal-oxide based switching devices are well-known for many years, memristors
only have gained attention after a research team from Hewlett-Packard lab published a paper
where the tie the characteristics of a TiO2 MIM (metal-oxide-metal) device to that of an
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Chua memristor in 2008 [63]. After that, memristors have gained a massive attention and
a lot of research effort is ongoing for its device engineering, fabrication techniques, and a
broad range of applications.
Memristor Characteristics
As mentioned earlier, we are considering transition metal-oxides which are non-volatile, and
bi-polar. They show different resistive or memristive states i.e. memristors show hysteresis
in their I-V characteristics as shown in Figure 2.2. Binary memristors have two stable
resistive states, called the high resistance state (HRS) and the low resistance state (LRS).
HRS and LRS are also known as OFF and ON states, respectively as well. Each of these two
states can be reached by applying a voltage of appropriate magnitude and duration across
a memristor. The minimum magnitude and duration of voltage applied across a memristor
to reach LRS from HRS are called the set voltage or positive threshold voltage (Vthp ), and
positive switching time (tswp ), respectively. On the other hand, the minimum magnitude
and duration of voltage required to go to HRS from LRS are called the reset voltage or
negative threshold voltage (Vthn ), and negative switching time (tswn ), respectively. These
six parameters HRS, LRS, Vthp , Vthn , tswp , and tswn define the high level characteristics of
a binary memristor.
Metal-oxide memristors are usually CMOS (complimentary metal-oxide semiconductor)
compatible, can be fabricated on the back-end of the silicon together with CMOS on front.
The size of a memristor is also very small (a few nanometers) which makes them an attractive
choice for many applications.
The physics of memristors are not fully understood yet as memristive properties vary a
lot depending on the type of oxide as well as the conductive materials used. The thickness
and area of these materials, current limiting devices etc. control the memristive parameters.
Thus different memristors reported in literature vary a quite a bit from each other in their
resistive states, operating voltages and speed of operation. TiOx , HfOx , TaOx are among
of the most promising memristor devices because of their high on/off ratio, speed, retention
time, endurance, and CMOS compatibility. Moreover, their switching process is stochastic
and thus, memristors display cycle-to-cycle variation in their characteristics which makes it
12

challenging for circuit designers. Techniques are being explored to confine the characteristics
of a memristor and make their switching operation much more consistent to reduce variability.

2.3

Hardware Security as IoT Security

Usually for any system, security choices can be divided into two broad categories, software
and hardware.

Software security usually refers to some algorithmic implementation of

mathematically rigorous encryption or hash functions. They algorithms are usually very
robust and hard to break, providing practically the best security for a system. However,
these algorithms usually take many clock cycles for their implementation and thus also
consume a larger amount of power. Therefore, implementing them for a small system where
area, power and delay are very limited, can be impractical. As these systems have limited
power budget, small in size and sometimes real-time in nature (and thus small delay), any
security add-on must have very low overhead but these rigorous algorithms fail to fulfill that
criteria. That’s where hardware security comes.

2.3.1

Traditional Security: Cryptography

Cryptography is the technique of securing a data communication in the presence of an
adversary. Usually using some kind of a key, cryptography allows a message to be encoded
in such a way that only the intended receiver with the correct key would be able to decode
the message. Cryptoghaphy has been used in human history for a long time including
Caesar cipher, polyalphabetic cipher, Vigenére cipher etc. In the computer era, modern
day cryptography is much more secure and based on rigorous mathematical analysis where
a brute force attack would take an incredibly huge amount of time which is not possible
in practice. Cryptography can be classified into two broad categories: symmetric key and
public key cryptography. In a symmetric key cryptography, the same key is used for both
encryption and decryption, easing the hardware implementation while being very secure.
AES (advanced encryption standard), DES (data encryption standard), triple DES are
examples of symmetric key cryptography. Public key or asymmetric key cryptography, on
the other hand, relies on two keys: one public key and one private key. One key is known
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to all and anyone can use to encrypt his/her message. The private key is only known to the
intended receiver and only he/she can decrypt that message using this key. RSA (RivestShamir-Adleman) is the most well-know public key cryotographic alogorith. While this is
very secure, main disadvantage is the associated huge resource overhead. Thus while AES are
used everywhere for secure data communication, RSA is only used for secure key exchange
or digital signature.
Besides securing data communication, cryptography is also used to verify the authenticity
of received data by means of a hash. A hash function is any algorithm can convert a large
message to a fixed-length token of that message. Simple hash includes checksum, parity check
etc. which can find bit-errors and thus verify the authenticity of the data. Cryotographic
hash functions are one-way functions that fulfills some crytographic requirements like: preimage and second pre-image resistance, collision resistance, despite the hash being easy to
computer. The basic idea is that it should be very difficult to find two messages with the
same hash given either the hash or the message and almost half of the bits of the hash should
change if just one bit of the data is changed. Popular cryptographic hash algorithms include
MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3 etc. All these hash algorithms are computationally expensive.
Algorithms like AES, RSA etc. are based on discrete mathematics with brute force
attack resistance in billions of years of computing resources. However, when these algorithms
are implemented on an embedded platform, the hardware can leak information like power
consumption, delay in different stages of the algorithm runs. In fact, researchers have
shown that these side-channels like power, timing, sound, EM (electromagnetic emission)
can be used to perform so-called side-channel attack to break the security of cryptographic
algorithms. For example, using simple (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) of
side channel power, security of AES implemented on an embedded microcontroller can be
broken [30, 31]. Fault injection is another very effective technique to attack otherwise secure
cryptographic implementations [5]. Probing attacks [76] or EM attacks [1] can also be
performed to read the stored secret keys to break a cryptographic algorithm as well.
Thus, although traditional cryptography is theoretically secure, their security can be
compromised using the vulnerability of the underlying hardware implementations. Moreover,
because these algorithms are mathematically rigorous, their resource requirement i.e. power,
14

area, and delay overhead are high.

Therefore, researchers have worked on lightweight

implementations of these algorithms as well as different new lightweight algorithms like
SIMON, Piccolo, KATAN, PRESENT etc. [43] to tackle this issue. However, in the era
of IoT, there are now billions of devices being produced each year and most of those are
extremely resource limited, running on a battery or harvested energy alone. Therefore,
traditional cryptographic algorithms would be either impractical or too resource hungry for
these of types of devices.

2.3.2

Introduction to Hardware Security

We now know that even mathematically secure algorithms can be broken by exploiting the
vulnerability in their hardware implementations. Moreover, IP piracy, reverse engineering,
counterfeit etc. cause losses on the order of billions of dollars each year. Software based
security solutions are not enough to prevent an adversary from copying a design and
reproduce illegally. Therefore, researchers have been working on different hardware level
modifications which improves the security of an IC and restrict overproduction, recycling,
or counterfeit products on the market. Hardware security refers to any such technique
that uses the hardware and modifies it to provide security solutions.

Usually these

techniques are specific to some particular security threat. For example, logic encryption and
IC camouflaging techniques significantly reduce an adversary’s ability to reverse-engineer
a design, thereby mitigating piracy and counterfeit.

Thus, hardware security provides

innovative solutions to improve security of a device which may otherwise be vulnerable.
Two very common hardware security primitives are physical unclonable function and true
random number generator. They can generate hardware specific truly random keys that is
otherwise impossible to generate from software alone.

2.3.3

Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)

Physically unclonable function or PUF is a hardware security primitive that exploit
tiny variations among the chips with same functional implementation and use that
variation to generate hardware specific signatures. These intrinsic variations originate from
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uncontrollable manufacturing process variation and PUFs try to enlarge these variations
to generate keys unique to that hardware only. Thus PUFs are usually represented as a
challenge-response system where the challenge (C) is the input to the PUF that is used to
extract process variation from a hardware and response (R) is the output key generated from
that hardware using that PUF.
In this sense, PUF is analogous to a mathematical one-way function. One-way function
is any function which is very easy to evaluate in one direction, but very hard to compute in
reverse. For example, multiplication of two large prime numbers to get a composite number
is easy, however factoring that composite number to get its prime factors is not straightforward and usually time-consuming. Thus applying a challenge to a PUF to generate its
response is easy but determining the tiniest process variations that cause a particular PUF
to generate a particular response is not very difficult to determine. Just like a software based
security like encryption or hash algorithms use mathematical one-way function to implement
the algorithms and thus ensure security, PUF based hardware security are essentially a low
cost and natural way of implementing the same concept. Pappu et.al . first demonstrated a
physical one-way function using variation in scattering pattern in [53] which later known as
physical unclonable function or PUF. A PUF has to fulfill these requirements: (1) the PUF
response must be raondom, (2) the process variation must not uncontrollable, and (3) PUF
functionality or underlying process variation is unclonable.
Previous Relevant Works on PUF
Traditional cryptographic algorithms depend on some mathematical one-way function to
provide security. However, most commonly used one-way functions are either based on
unproven conjectures or have practical vulnerabilities in their implementations. To overcome
these issues of algorithmic one-way functions, Pappu et.al . first proposed a physical one-way
function (POWF) in 2001 [53] which relies on simultaneous multiple scattering from inhomogeneous structure to implement the one-way function.
Later in 2002, Gassend et.al . proposed a silicon physical random function and coined the
term ‘PUF’ [21]. It was the first PUF implemented in silicon using electrical properties which
is path delay in this case. Since then, many researchers have worked on many variations
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and implementations of PUF. Arbiter PUF or APUF can be considered the first electrical
PUF and the most well-studied PUF [34, 35], proposed in early few years after the POWF
was established. APUF utilizes variation in propagation delay due to manufacturing process
variation of two identically laid out circuits to implement PUF functionality [66]. Figure 2.3
shows a high level block diagram of an arbiter PUF. Here, two-input/two-output switches
are chained together to create a circuit with two identical but separate path for a signal
to propagate through. Process variations dictate that a single input signal will propagate
through one path faster than the other. An arbiter or flip-flop is then used to compare that
delay differences and a response is generated.
For an n-challenge arbiter PUF, each path consists of n such identically laid out two
input/two output switches. Each switch has one selector input - one bit of the challenge.
If the challenge bit is 0, then the path is straight-through and if the challenge bit is 1, the
path is criss-crossed. Figure 2.4 (left two) shows the logical diagram of such a switch. This
switch can be implemented easily by a pair of multiplexers (MUXes) as shown in Figure 2.4
(right). The two multiplexers share the same selector signal which is one bit of the challenge
set. If it is 0, then input ‘a’ goes to output ‘y1’ and input ‘b’ to ‘y2’. If it is an 1, then ‘a’
goes to ‘y2’ and ‘b’ goes to ‘y1’, thus implementing this switch.
At the end of the signal propagation, an arbiter is used to determine which path is faster
compared to the other. A D latch or a D flip-flop can be used as the arbiter. The two arbiter
PUF paths are connected to the ‘D’ and ‘clock’ input. If the first path (‘D’) is faster, the
PUF response is 1, otherwise it is 0. Thus the arbiter converts the analog delay difference
into digital signatures.

Figure 2.3: Arbiter PUF
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Figure 2.4: Two input/two output switch (left two) and its simple implementation with
two MUXes (right)

Ring-oscillator PUF (RO-PUF) [65] is another very commonly used PUF, which can be
easily implemented in both ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) and FPGA (Field
Programmable Gate Array). A ring oscillator is a long chain of odd number of inverters
connected in a ring such that the output oscillates between high and low voltage level, as
shown in Figure 2.5. Thus a ring oscillator configuration can create a particular frequency
where the clock period is sum of all individual delays of the inverters in the chain. Due to
inherent process variation, the inverters would have slightly different delays and thus two
identically laid out ring oscillators would have slightly different frequencies. A counter and
comparator can be used to measure the difference between these two frequencies and convert
into digital signatures. An RO-PUF is shown in Figure 2.6.
Both the arbiter PUF and RO-PUF are delay based PUFs since they use electrical delay
as the property to implement PUF functionality. Any other electrical properties that are
subject to uncontrollable process variation can be used to build a PUF. In an SRAM (static
random access memory) PUF [22], random initial state of each SRAM cell during power-up
is used to generate PUF signatures. In each SRAM cell, there is a cross-coupled inverter
pair which are identical by design. During power-up when there are no externally exerted
signal to an SRAM cell, due to slight voltage difference arising from parametric variation of
these transistors would be amplified by cross-coupled inverter action and thus would show a
tendency towards logic ‘1’ (high) or ‘0’ (low). Thus all the SRAM cells in a memory would
give such random initial values during start-up which can be used as a signature of that chip.
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Figure 2.5: Ring oscillator: a chain of an odd number of inverters

Figure 2.6: A ring oscillator PUF

Since CMOS scaling has become very slow in recent years, researchers have been looking
for alternative technologies to provide application specific unique solutions. These emerging
devices display switching variations and can be exploited to implement different memory
based PUFs like memristor PUF [32], STT-MRAM (Spin transfer torque magnetic random
access memory) PUF [83], PCM (Phase change memory) based re-configurable PUF [84] etc.
Memristor based PUF
A simple PUF based on the stochastic switching time of a memristor is first proposed in Rose
et.al . in [60]. Memristors display stochastic switching behavior i.e. even if the same voltage,
greater than its threshold voltage is applied to a memristor, it may or may not switch. First
a mean switching time of a set of memristors are evaluated and then that a voltage is applied
equal to the duration of that mean switching time to have a 50% switching probability. This
is named as write-time based memristive PUF (WTMPUF) [59] which was later fabricated
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and demonstrated experimentally in [45]. Kavehei et.al . demonstrated a PUF which use
both memristors and ring oscillators, called the mrPUF [27].
Since WTMPUF uses absolute write-time of memristors as the source of entropy to
implement a PUF, it could be subject to errors due to environmental changes.

Since

relative nature of measurement of APUF and RO-PUF make them robust against such
environmental variations, a memristor PUF circuit built from a crossbar array of memristors
where relative write-time of a pair of memristors are compared to generate a PUF response
[57]. This memristor crossbar PUF or the XbarPUF [57] use a read-monitored-write approach
developed in [42] to implement a PUF challenge and thus gradually nudge the memristors
from one memristive state to another before one memristor column reaches to the other state
faster than its adjacent column of memristors. Just like an arbiter PUF, this XbarPUF also
uses an arbiter to determine which crossbar column of memristors were faster in its pair and
as soon as read-monitored-write approach completes a complete write (transition from one
state to another), a response is generated. Thus this PUF generates a complete response
when all the crossbar column pairs are resolved. This XbarPUF shows a huge improvement
in area in terms of transistor count compared to CMOS PUF (APUF) and its uniqueness
and uniformity are very close to the ideal value of 50%. However, the biggest concern about
PUF, the reliability metric wasn’t reported in this work and data to generate these other
results do not directly comply with any particular memristor. Therefore, my first work was
to gather data from a HfO2 memristor to build more a more realistic model and evaluate
the XbarPUF performance using this real data.
PUF Performance Metrics
In order to gauge the degree of security provided by a PUF and to be able to fairly compare
it with other PUF implementations, standardized performance metrics have been devised.
Maiti et al. [39] and Hori et al. [23] have discussed several metrics to quantify a PUF’s
performance. The major six metrics are: uniqueness, reliability, bit-aliasing, uniformity,
steadiness, and diffuseness. As shown in Figure 2.7, these metrics are used to quantify a
PUF’s performance across multiple device dimensions: inter-chip space, intra-chip space, and
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Figure 2.7: Standard metrics used for the evaluation of a PUF

time. They have become standards in hardware security research everywhere to quantify a
PUF’s performance.
1) Uniqueness: It is a measure of a PUF’s ability to produce a unique ID in terms of its
challenge-response pairs which are a specific function of its implementation on a given chip.
To be able to efficiently distinguish every IC chip (from other equivalent ones) with a PUF
circuit, the uniqueness must be tending to 50. That means, for a given challenge set, almost
half the responses produced by two PUFs should be different from each other. Uniqueness
or also known as inter-chip hamming distance is defined as:
2
U niqueness(%) = 100 ∗
Nchips .(Nchips − 1)

Nchips −1 Nchips

X

X

i=1

j=i+1

ri ⊕ rj ,

(2.3)

for each response bit and each challenge set, where Nchips is the number of PUFs or chips to
be measured, respi and respj are responses from the i-th and j-th chip respectively.
2) Uniformity: Another PUF performance metric which measures a PUF’s ability to
produce distinct responses across a set of challenges is the uniformity. With the flipping
of even a single bit of the challenge, nearly half of the response bits are expected to flip.
Effectively, uniformity is a measure of the ratio of 0’s and 1’s across the whole of the response
set of the PUF. A PUF with poor uniformity would allow the attacker to reduce the possible
response space and get a better prediction. This metric is defined as:
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U nif ormity(%) = 100 ∗

Nchallenges

1

X

Nchallenges

respc ,

(2.4)

c=1

for each response bit and each chip, where Nchallenges is the number of challenges applied to
a single PUF and rc is the response for c-th challenge.
3) Reliability: Also represented as intra-chip hamming distance, this metric quantifies a
PUF’s consistency over time. If a PUF is unable to produce the same response every time for
a given challenge, then the PUF is considered unreliable and may require error-correction.
Reliability, as a metric is defined as:

2
Reliability(%) = 100 − 100 ∗
Ncycles .(Ncycles − 1)

Ncycles −1 Ncycles

X

X

t=1

it=t+1

respt ⊕ respit ,

(2.5)

per response bit and chip, where Ncycles is the number of times of applying a challenge and
measuring a response.
4) Bit-Aliasing: Different PUFs might produce similar responses for certain challenges.
This would decrease the unpredictability of the PUF. Bit aliasing measures the average
hamming distance for the k-th response bit of different PUFs. This metric is defined as:

BitAliasingk (%) = 100 ∗

1

Nchips

Nchips

X

respk,m ,

(2.6)

m=1

for each bit k of a response.
5) Diffuseness: The same PUF should generate different uncorrelated responses if different
challenges are applied, especially for PUFs with large CRPs. Diffuseness measures this degree
of different among different responses generated from a single PUF for different challenges.
Diffuseness is evaluated by measuring the hamming distance among all different response
vectors generated by a single chip and is defined below:
Nbits Nchips
chips
X−1 NX
4 X
1
respi,bit ⊕ respj,bit
Dif f useness(%) =
2
Nbits Nchips
i=1
j=i+1
bit=0
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(2.7)

6) Steadiness: When the same challenge is applied to a PUF, the response should be the
same ideally. However, this is not the case for a practical PUF. Similar to the reliability
metric, steadiness measures if there is any bias of a PUF response bit towards a particular
binary value (0 or 1) over a certain number of evaluations. For Nchal different Nbits -bit PUF
response evaluated over Ncycles times each, the overall steadiness is defined as [23]:
N
bits
chal N
X
X
1
log2 max(pi,bit , 1 − pi,bit ))
Steadiness(%) = 100 ∗ (1 +
Nchal Nbits i=1 bit=1

(2.8)

where the term pi,j represents the percentage of bias of a particular bit towards 1 over of
a response vector evaluated many times using the same challenge. This is defined as:

pi,bit =

1

N
chal
X

Nchal

t=1

respi,t,bit

(2.9)

Another important metric when PUF is being used for authentication purposes is the
probability of misidentification as defined in [64, 39]. Since we’ll be using our PUF mainly
as a key generator which requires more reliable PUF, this metric is omitted here and bit-error
rate is measured instead.
Modeling Attack Resistance
Robustness against machine learning based modeling attack PUF provides an unique way
of generating signature from the hardware itself utilizing manufacturing process variation.
Although complex, PUF, especially delay based PUFs can be expressed as a sum of individual
delays of many smaller circuit blocks along the path of the response generation unit of
the PUF. Thus researchers have argued that any PUF is potentially vulnerable to machine
learning based modeling attacks [62, 36, 78]. Specifically, an adversary can collect a subset of
all the challenge-response pairs of a PUF and can build a numerical model using a machine
learning algorithm to predict the binary outcome of the response bit(s). Rühmair et al.
showed in [62] that an arbiter PUF (APUF) [66] and its variants could be broken with
more than 99% accuracy using algorithms like logistic regression and evolution strategies.
While different variants of APUF could take more time to train, they are still breakable
with an increased number of CRPs. In this work, we have collected a small subset of all
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possible CRPs of an XbarPUF and developed algorithms to perform machine learning based
modeling attacks. Our implemented attack model is also found to be roughly 99% successful
in predicting an XbarPUF outcome, although the modified XbarPUF architecture shows
resistance against the same attack model with accuracy being around 50-60% only.

2.3.4

True Random Number Generator (TRNG)

Introduction to TRNG
TRNG is a very important hardware security primitive which is the only way a device can
get truly random numbers as the name suggests. In most cryptographic applications, there
is a need for secret key. Usually these keys are generated from the software using from some
complex algorithms. However, software generated keys can be at best pseudo-random in
nature and in some applications, there is needs for truly random numbers as well. TRNG
can produce a stream of completely random bits, using some naturally occurring random
phenomena. In our IoT security architecture, during each encryption operation, we need to
provide the XbarPUF with a truly random key. TRNG usually harness randomness from a
random and stochastic physical phenomena from the hardware or the circuit itself.
PRNG vs. TRNG
PRNG or pseudo random number generator produces a random sequence of numbers from
the software itself. It usually requires an initial seed which dictates the output. If the
seed is the same, PRNG produces the same sequence of numbers. Cryptographically secure
TRNGs are useful for many cryptographic applications where a pseudo random number is
good enough and also there is a need to regenerate the same sequence of random numbers.
A TRNG, on the other hand, are not suitable for such applications because it is not possible
to regenerate the same sequence of output. Thus PRNG and TRNG serve two different
purposes and their application space is, therefore, different as well.
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TRNG Sources
TRNG output must be free from the influence of environmental variation and process
variation. The source of randomness or entropy for a TRNG should be a truly random
phenomenon i.e. the probability or producing a ‘0’ or ‘1’ should be equal. Any temperature
or supply voltage variation shouldn’t affect the output. Process variation should also have a
minimal effect as to have a better yield from the design as well. Many naturally stochastic
phenomena like clock jitter, random telegraph noise (RTN), thermal noise, metastable state,
quantum state etc. can be harnessed to build a TRNG. Figure 2.8 shows some of these
sources that are available in an electrical circuit.
Memristor based TRNG
Memristor’s switching is intrinsically a stochastic process. Researchers have thus explored
different memristive devices too to build good TRNGs as found in literature [79, 26]. Due to
probabilistic switching behavior, memrsitors display variation in its memristive states from
from one clock cycle to another [52]. This variation is useful to build other hardware security
primitives [79, 40, 71] as well. In [79], random distribution of memristors’s high and low
resistive states based on the switching time is used to design the MTRNG (memristor-based
TRNG). Researchers have also utilized a differential readout scheme to harvest the random
telegraph noise or RTN in a memristor along with LFSR (linear feedback shift register) to
implement a TRNG in [28]. The differential nature of this circuit design improves resilience
against temperature and supply voltage variation. Switching variability in memristor’s
set process is extracted to generate true random numbers in [4]. In [26], authors have
designed an improved TRNG utilizing the random switching time of a diffusive memristor
as the source of entropy and is shown to be able to produce true random numbers without
any post-processing. This diffusive memristor is different than regular metal-oxide nonvolatile memristors, does not require forming and reverts to its high resistance state from
low resistance state spontaneously. However, this self-OFF switching (≈ 1ms) makes the
switching processing slow and thus these memristors are volatile.
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Figure 2.8: TRNG sources: clock jitter, noise, metastability
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Chapter 3
Design and Analysis of Fundamental
Hardware Security Components
3.1
3.1.1

Memristor Crossbar PUF
Introduction to HfO2 Memristor

The HfO2 memristor technology considered for this research was designed and fabricated
at the SUNY Polytechnic Institue, Center for Semiconductor Research (CSR) [8].

A

cross-section of this device is shown in Figure 3.1. Memristors were integrated with IBM
65nm 10Lpe CMOS process on a 300mm wafer platform with CMOS at the front-end and
memristive metal layers at the back-end. Memristors are places between metal-1 (M1) and
metal-2 (M2) layers. Here, standard copper M1 layer was replaced by tungsten (W) layer
because of its high boiling point to withstand high temperature during back-end CMOS
process and an additional via (W-V1) was used between the memristive oxide layer and
the M1 tungsten layer. M2 is still copper (Cu). A thin film of hafnium oxide (HfO2 ) layer
was deposited between these two metal layers using a precise atomic layer deposition (ALD)
technique by using front-end-of-the-line (FEOL) tools before altering the composition of M2
and V1 layers. This metal-oxide is the active switching layer for the memristive device. A Ti
(titanium) is just on top of the oxide layer, works as a oxygen-getter while an TiN (titanium
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Figure 3.1: Illustration (left) and TEM (transmission electron microscopy) image (right)
of a hafnium-oxide memristor embedded between the M1 and M2 layers. In addition, the
Illustration depicts a seamless integrated 1 memristor 1 transistor (1M1T) structure where
the transistor acts as the current limiting device [8, 69].

nitride) layer is used as the inert top electrode with via V2 and M2 layers (both Cu) work
as the top contact.

3.1.2

Environmental Modeling of a HfO2 Memristor

Existing Model with Variability Taken into Account
The memristor model used for all the simulation works in this research was adapted from the
model proposed by McDonald et. al. in [47]. Although this original model is more generic
and could represent a wide variety of memristors, in our work, we are specifically concerned
with bipolar memristor. Mostly binary metal oxide memristors are bipolar and although
there are many different types of memristors, in throughout this work, we only mean bipolar
binary or transition metal-oxide (TMO) when we use the word ‘memristor’.
As discussed in last chapter, the binary memristor has two stable resistive states: LRS
(low resistance state) and HRS (high resistance state). These two states can be reached by
applying voltage greater than the corresponding positive or negative threshold voltages with
duration greater than the corresponding positive or negative switching times. This model
increments or decrements the memristance gradually when the applied voltage is greater
than the threshold voltage. According to the model, when the voltage applied across a
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memristor is greater than the positive threshold, the memristor starts to transition to LRS
from HRS in each step using this equation:

M (ti+1 ) = M (ti ) −

∆r∆t V (ti+1 )
,
tswp Vtp

(3.1)

which is the set (HRS to LRS) operation. During the reset (LRS to HRS) operation, the
memristance is changed using this equation:
M (ti+1 ) = M (ti ) +

∆r∆t V (ti+1 )
,
tswn Vtn

(3.2)

where Mt i is the memristance at time instant ti , V (t) is the applied voltage across the
memristor at time instant ti , ∆r is the absolute resistance difference between HRS and LRS,
∆t is the simulation step-size, Vtp (Vtn ) is the minimum threshold voltages needed to switch
the memristor’s state, where tswp and tswn are the minimum time for a full set or reset,
respectively, when bias voltage is equal to the respective threshold voltage. Figure 3.2 shows
IV plot of a HfO2 memristor fabricated on the SUNY-Poly and a simulated IV plot using
this model. It is worth noting that the bend at the top right side of the actual data plot in
Figure 3.2 (left figure) is due to a current limiting transistor used during SET operation to
prevent the device from destroying itself which is not used in simulation plot (right).
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the IV plot doesn’t follow a single path, but instead
show a lot of variation from one cycle to another cycle because of the inherent stochastic
switching mechanism of a memristor. Therefore, to have a realistic memristor model, this
stochasticity must be incorporated in that model. This is done by considering the memristor’s
parameters as Gaussian random variable with mean and standard deviation coming from
device statistics. We have used different sets of cycle-to-cycle variation (2%, 5%, 10% etc.)
to incorporate these randomness into our model.
As an emerging technology, memristors also display a large amount of process variation
from one device to another. The OFF resistance or HRS and the on resistance or the LRS
are the parameters that show large variation [55] and we have considered larger standard
deviation for them. Other parameters like threshold voltage, Vtp and Vtn , and switching
times, tswp and tswn show smaller variation compared to resistive states. The mean and
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Figure 3.2: IV measurements of a memristor (left) and simulated IV characteristics using
our memristor model (right) [69].

standard deviation considered for this work are listed in Table 3.1, taken from data generated
at SUNY-Poly and also from literature [8, 55]. These values are not exhaustive and they
depend heavily on a particular process for a particular memristor material and there are
hundred sets of different values reported in literature.
Inclusion of Temperature Dependence
To realize any device in a electrical circuit, its dependence on temperature and other
environmental variation must be taken into account to ensure reliable operations. For
a transition metal-oxide, the LRS acts much like metal and shows positive temperature
coefficient i.e.

its resistance increases with increasing temperature [8].

The HRS, on

the other hand behaves much like a semiconductor and thus its value decreases with
increasing temperature [11].

Moreover, HRS decreases faster than LRS increases with

temperature. Since HRS decreases and LRS increases with increasing temperature, the
margin of separation between them decreases which may result in a reduced read/write
margin in circuit level. Threshold voltage either change slowly with temperature [75] or do
not show any noticeable change [11]. These changes are either linear or can be approximated
as linear changes with temperature in the range (00 C - 1000 C) of temperature that we
considered for this work. Equation 3.3 shows this relationship [69].
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Table 3.1: Mean and standard deviation for device level parameters of a HfO2 memristor
considered in this work [69]
Parameters
HRS
Mean
300KΩ
Standard deviation
20%

LRS
30KΩ
10%

Vtp
0.7V
5%

Vtn
-1.0V
5%

tswp
1µs
5%

tswn
1µs
5%

Table 3.2: Temperature coefficients for different memristor parameters [69]
αLRS
0.004

αHRS
-0.008

αV tp
-0.001

αV tn
0.0008

Xθ = Xref [1 + αX (Tθ − Tref )],

(3.3)

where ‘X’ represents any of the four parameters: HRS, LRS, Vtp or Vtn , αX is the
temperature coefficient (per 0 C) of that parameter and ‘T’ represents temperature. Room
temperature (300K) has been considered as the reference temperature.

The values of

temperature coefficients that we calculated using data from literature are listed in Table
3.2.

The negative value of temperature coefficient indicates that parameter decreases

with increasing temperature and higher absolute value of that parameter indicates stronger
temperature dependence. Since we have found any data connecting the switching times with
the temperature change directly and thus haven’t included any dependence of switching time
with temperature in our memristor switching model.
Inclusion of Aging
Another important device non-ideal characteristics is aging or limited endurance. Many
different types of aging is observed in literature [55, 7, 9]. In case of worst case aging for
memristors, both HRS and LRS display aging where distribution of HRS increases with
time and LRS distribution increases with time. Thus the effect result of aging is reduced
HRS/LRS or OFF/ON ratio. We approximated linear aging rate, with HRS being aged
faster than LRS. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.3. It should be noted that this aging rate
can also vary a lot across different processes and materials.
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Figure 3.3: Simulated effect of (worst case) aging on both HRS and LRS of a memristor
over time [69].

3.1.3

Working Principle of XbarPUF

The memristor crossbar PUF or the XbarPUF proposed in [57] uses a dense 2-D array of
memristors to implement a strong PUF with potentially arbitrary number of challenges and
responses. A circuit diagram of such an XbarPUF is shown in Figure 3.4 [72]. This is an
updated version of XbarPUF from [57] with XORing included. In an XbarPUF, challenges
are applied on the rows while responses are taken from the columns. For an N×M XbarPUF
i.e. an XbarPUF with N challenges and M responses, its memristor crossbar size would be
2N×2M. For each challenge bit, there are two crossbar rows while for each response bit,
there are two columns.
Before apply any challenges to the XbarPUF, a negative write voltage, Vreset , greater than
the memristor’s negative threshold voltage, Vtn is applied for a sufficient amount of time (at
least more than tswn ) to reset all the memristors in the crossbar to HRS. Then depending on
each challenge bit, a true challenge voltage is applied on each row while an inverted challenge
voltage is applied on the corresponding adjacent row. If the challenge bit is high, then it
drives all the memristors of that row towards LRS from HRS while the memristors with the
inverted challenge remain at HRS. The opposite scenario happens if the challenge bit is low.
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Figure 3.4: Schematic of a N × M XbarPUF circuit (with XORing) [72, 71].
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The challenge or set voltage, Vset is at least as large as the positive threshold voltage, Vtp of
the memristors in that crossbar. In a read-monitored-write approach, the challenge voltage
is applied for a very short amount of time (<<tswp ) to nudge the memristors towards LRS.
Then a small read voltage, Vread , less than the memristor’s threshold voltages is applied to
check which memristor reaches to LRS first between a pair of memristors in the same row
and adjacent columns. As soon as one of these two memristors reach LRS, the load voltage
of that particular memristor column goes to high, creating a low to high transition at one
of the inputs of a D flip-flop attaching at the end of each pairs of crossbar columns. The
arbiter or D flip-flop thus decides the winner and generates a response of ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending
on which crossbar column in a particular pair was faster. When all the column pairs of
the XbarPUF are resolved to generate valid responses, a ‘Dne’ (done) signal is generated to
indicate the end of one PUF cycle. A load resistor of appropriate magnitude is connected at
the end of each crossbar column in the read path while the load voltages of a pair of crossbar
columns are connected to the arbiter in the read path as well. For an XORed XbarPUF,
like in Figure 3.4, outputs from two arbiters are XORed to generate one final response thus
effectively taking four crossbar columns to generate one bit response. As we will see in later
chapters, XORing adds a non-linearity in the XbarPUF circuit which improves its robustness
and also reliability as seen in [72].
We have evaluated and analyzed our XbarPUF by tweaking different circuit level and
device level parameters to find the optimal optimal parameters for this circuit and to also
discuss noise margin, scalability and security and overhead of the XbarPUF.

3.1.4

Clock Frequency and Other Parameter Selection

In this read-monitored-write approach [42] , we apply a ‘read’ voltage to evaluate the states
of the memristor and a ‘write’ (challenge) voltage to push the memristors towards LRS from
HRS. Thus the equivalent memristance of a column is decreased with each write pulse until
it generates a sufficiently high voltage at the load resistance to determine a ‘winner’ by the
arbiter. A write voltage with small pulse width i.e. of high frequency would help to change
the memristance slowly and reliably from HRS to LRS. If the clock frequency is not high
enough, then a single or a few write pulses might set both the memristors effectively at
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the same time, making the response invalid. Therefore, we should choose a clock frequency
which wouldn’t create this situation while not being impractically high and that the circuit
becomes too slow. For a memristor with 1µs switching time, a write pulse width of 100ns or
lower or clock frequency of 10MHz should work and we choose this clock frequency for the
remainder of this chapter.
The threshold voltages of memristors strongly dominate the choice of supply voltage as
this voltage must be higher than the magnitude of both positive and negative threshold voltages of a memristor. Higher supply voltage contribute to power consumption quadratically
and, therefore, it is chosen to be as low as possible. For example, for an HfO2 memrisor with
0.7V and -1V threshold voltages, the supply voltage chosen is 1.2V.

3.1.5

Choice of Load Resistance

By performing a noise margin analysis, we have evaluated the optimum load resistance for
our XbarPUF circuit. The load resistance should be chosen such that it maximizes the
difference between two memristive states of a pair of crossbar columns. After RESET, all
the memristors of the crossbar are in HRS while at the end of challenge phase, one half of
the memristors are in HRS while other half change to LRS. The difference in load voltage
during these two situation can be referred to as the noise margin (NM) for this circuit. Since
the load resistance is in series with the memristive column, to reliably differentiate between
logic ‘1’ and logic ‘0’, the load resistance has to be such that the voltage drop across the
load is maximum just after reset (all HRS) and minimum just after challenge (half LRS, half
HRS). For a crossbar with ‘N’ challenges (and thus 2N rows), the equivalent memristance in
these two time (R1 and R2 , respectively) are shown in equation 3.4 below.

R1 =

HRS
HRS LRS
, R2 =
k
.
2N
N
N

(3.4)

The load resistance is in series with either this R1 or R2 and the situation is illustrated
in Figure 3.5. The corresponding voltage drop with both cases is shown in equations 3.5 and
3.6, respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Two resistance in series, one is the equivalent memristance of a crossbar column
and another is the load resistance [69].

Veq,R1 =

Rld
∗ Vread
R1 + Rld

(3.5)

Veq,R2 =

Rld
∗ Vread
R2 + Rld

(3.6)

, where Rld is the series load resistance.
The difference between these two voltage levels, Veq,R1 and Veq,R2 is the noise margin,
∆VR as shown in equation 3.7. In order to maximize this difference and thus to get optimal
load resistance, we need to differentiate equation 3.7 with respect to load resistance, Rld and
set to zero. Then we find a closed-form expression (equation 3.8) for the best Rld for this
crossbar circuit.

∆VR = Veq,R2 − Veq,R1
r
Rld,best =

3.1.6

p

R1 .R2 =

HRS
HRS LRS
∗(
k
)
2N
N
N

(3.7)

(3.8)

Shift Back to Fixed Challenge Scheme

As can be seen in [57, 72, 69], challenges are applied for a very short period of time, much
smaller than the actual switching time of a memristor, to nudge the memristance towards
HRS or LRS depending on the magnitude and direction of applied challenge voltage. Then
a small read voltage pulse is applied to read the memristance of both crossbar column
memristors. This whole process is repeated until one of the columns reach to either HRS or
LRS first and thus declared the winner. This is the so-called read-monitored-write approach
[42] and is shown in Figure 3.6. This is very useful when there is little knowledge of actual
memristor switching time and/or switching time has a very wide distributions.
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Figure 3.6: Read-monitored write approach to gradually check memristance of a pair of
memristors until one finishes switching.

There are, however, practical problems associated with this approach when we try to
implement. First, if the switching time of a memristor is very fast, then to perform readmonitored-write, it’d need a lot faster clock. For example for an TaOx memristor, switching
time can be around 100-150ps and thus, to perform read-monitored-write, the clock has to
be as fast as 1-5ps which is impractical for a low cost system. Second, there is no prior
knowledge how many cycles it takes for an XbarPUF to perform read-monitored-write once
i.e. we can not determine the exact time when to sample the response. This asynchronous
nature would make it very difficult to implement the PUF as an IP (intellectual property)
within a bigger SoC (system-on-chip). Therefore, it is also impractical to use this approach
in any processor based system.
To overcome these issues, we have returned to be the fixed-challenge approach used by
Rose et.al in [60, 59]. Although, it requires prior knowledge of exact switching time of
memristors, it makes the input-to-output sample time fixed and predictable and thus useful
to incorporate in any system. The memristor switching time can be determined beforehand
from fab or we can change the clock period to try with different frequencies and select
whichever gives the most stable output. We choose the clock period to be around half the
switching time of the memristor. Although, theoretically the clock period should work for
any value from less than switching time to ultra-high frequencies, we choose this value which
would give the most separation between the states of two memristive columns. Choosing a
fixed low frequency could make both the column memristors reach to either LRS or HRS and
thus eventually having little difference between them. Choosing very high frequency could
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make the change in memristance very small and thus could be impractical to differentiate
in a circuit. For our HfOx memristor, where the switching time is on the range of 50-100ns,
we have chosen the clock period to be 25ns.

3.1.7

Reverse Read Scheme

To improve the reliability of any circuit component, any opportunity of minor modification
which doesn’t add any overhead, should be considered. As measured in the lab in SUNY
Poly Institute, HfO2 memristor has positive (HRS to LRS) and negative (LRS to HRS)
threshold of around 0.7V and -1.0V respectively. In our previous designs, we have been
using a READ voltage of around 0.5V in positive threshold direction to read the state of a
memristor. However, it is also found from experiment that memristors can actually switch
or lose its state over 0.2V voltage applied across it.
Thus even if a voltage less than the threshold is applied across a memristor, the memristor
can lose its state over time. To improve this situation by increasing the retention time of the
memristor is to apply a READ voltage in a direction where the separation between READ
voltage and memristor’s threshold voltage in that direction is higher. Since for our HfO2
memristor, negative threshold is larger in magnitude than positive threshold, it’s better to
apply read voltage in that direction. Thus we setup the memristors in the crossbar in such a
way that the direction of RESET and READ voltage are the same. This is called reverse read
scheme since read voltage is actually in reverse compared to the positive voltage direction.

3.1.8

Sense Amplifier

For read-monitored-write approach a series of inverters or a buffer is used to sample the
load voltages of each memristive crossbar columns. For that approach, whenever one of the
column reaches a load voltage of at least VDD/2, the buffer starts to operate and rises to
VDD first. Both column buffers are connected with an arbiter (i.e. a D latch). The arbiter
outputs a ‘1’ or a ‘0’ depending on whichever crossbar column rises to VDD first.
Our new PUF won’t work this way now that the read voltage is only 0.4V and, therefore,
the buffers would never get VDD/2 from load resistances and thus won’t be able to produce
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a rising edge to arbiter input. A READ voltage of 0.4V also means the absolute difference
between two column load resistances is also small and more precise measurement is needed.
For that purpose, we have replaced the system of buffer chain and an arbiter with a sense
amplifier. A voltage latched sense amplifier (VLSA) is used instead which takes the two
column load voltages as its two bit-line inputs.

It then produces a full-swing output

depending on whichever column voltage is higher. Additional buffers may be added to these
outputs for separation. Our implemented sense amplifier is able to differentiate voltage
differences of around 1mV and thus increase stability.
Since the magnitude of reset voltage is usually greater than the magnitude of set voltage,
with a fixed read voltage, the error probability, due to unintended set or reset during read
is lower if we the direction of read voltage is in the same direction as reset.

3.2

Specialized Peripherals for Memristor based Circuits

3.2.1

Current Compliance

The SET operation of a memristor is destructive. As described earlier, during SET, the
memristance of a memristor starts to decrease towards LRS if the the magnitude and
duration of applied voltage are greater than memristor’s threshold voltage and switching
time, respectively. However, the problem is that if the applied voltage pulse is not removed,
the memristance continues to reduce even after reaching LRS and large current flows through
the device and thus it could destroy itself completely. To prevent this from happening, an
upper limit of current must be imposed in the SET path of the memristor. Usually an
NMOS transistor could be used with a reference gate voltage to implement current-limiting
condition. The RESET circuity, however, does not need such current limiting condition,
because memristance increases and thus current decreases during RESET and it stops at
HRS naturally. Thus there is an asymmetry between SET and RESET paths of a memristor.
We, therefore, separate out these two paths in our implemented PUF along with tunable
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Figure 3.7: An NMOS transistor with appropriate gate voltage to control the current
through a memristor during set.

current compliance in the SET direction. The SET current compliance circuitry is shown in
Figure 3.7.

3.2.2

Forming Circuitry

Many memristors require an forming step before they can be used as a multi-level resistor
i.e. as a memristor. This forming step requires applying a voltage of much higher magnitude
to perform the first SET of the memristor. Without forming, the memristor acts like a
resistor with resistance on the range of MΩ. For our HfOx memristor, forming voltage is
≈3.3V whereas SET and RESET voltages are ≈1V. The regular MOSFET of IBM 65nm
can only sustain voltages up to 1.4V. Therefore, a different and high voltage transistors
are needed for the forming circuitry. We have used DGXFET for this purpose. These
DGXFETs have high resistance and, therefore, can not be used in circuits where the VDD
is near 1V. Since forming is another special SET operation of the memristor, it also requires
current compliance control. Thus forming necessitates another separate path for a memristor
circuit. The current compliance transistor should be a DGXFET in this case to handle
high voltage (≈3.3V). The forming circuitry is shown in Figure 3.8. A current compliance
transistor is needed as well during the forming to limit the current and set the memristor
to a good high LRS value. This forming path is only used once and then never used again.
Therefore, multiple memristors can be formed together by sharing this forming circuitry
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Figure 3.8: Forming circuitry of a HfO2 memristor with 65nm CMOS technology

which would reduce the area overhead. Moreover, if the forming voltage can be reduced
further so that similar transistors can be used for both regular read-write and form, then
they all can share the same control circuitry and significantly reduce the design effort and
resource overhead. Researchers are working with forming-free memristors to totally eliminate
this design overhead.

3.2.3

Memristor Read-Write-Form Circuitry

Circuit Design
We have implemented a memristor read-write-form circuitry to ensure that the memristor
can be formed correctly and it can be written and read with confidence. The schematic and
layout for this read-write-form circuitry are shown in Figure 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. The
transistor widths are chosen to reduce voltage drop across them and to facilitate enough
current to flow through the memristor. Forming path requires higher voltage (3.3V in this
technology), uses high voltage DGX transistors and thus forming path is separate from
regular 1.2V transistors to prevent any damage to these transistors. A current compliance
transistor is used in both forming and set path to prevent overflow of current through this
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Figure 3.9: Schematic of the the read, write and forming circuitry for the HfO2 memristor
used in this work

memristor. In this circuit, the gate voltages of these compliance transistors are chosen in
such a way that a maximum of 100µA current can flow the memristor, which is the safe limit
of operation for these memristors. This read-write-form is an essential part of the memristor
PUF circuit.
On-Chip Testing
We have designed and done layout of this memristor read, write, and form circuitry as a
stand-alone test structure with 65nm CMOS technology. We have initially have performed
forming test which is vital for proper operation of a memristor based circuit.
Details about the test setup can be found in Appendix D. The chip lies inside a probe
station and circuit connections can be established by connecting probe pads to the test
structures in the chip. Using a PSOC microcontroller, we have applied different control
input voltages to this test structure while we have used a source meter to apply precise
forming voltage and current compliance control voltage to this circuit. We are able to
successfully form several memristors and the I-V plots are shown in Figure 3.11. Sudden
spikes in current reflect the situation when the forming occurs. Figure 3.12 presents this more
clearly as it shows the current measured through the memristor before and after forming is
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Figure 3.10: Layout of the designed read, write and forming circuitry for the HfO2
memristor (18.31µm × 22.60µm)

performed using the read control available in the circuit. Before forming, memristor acts
as an insulator which is confirmed by the very small current and very high resistance of
the left plot in Figure 3.12. After forming, the memristor sets to its LRS for the first time
and displays a much larger current as the plot on the right confirms. For this particular
memristor, the resistance measured before and after forming is found to be on the range of
12MΩ and 12KΩ, respectively.
I have also performed some additional small experiments to test the functionality and
characteristics of these memristors. Figure 3.13 shows a successful reset of a memristor
which verifies the ability to reset using our designed circuit. From the figure, the reset
voltage can be estimated as -0.5V. Figure 3.14 shows forming current vs. reference voltage
for the current compliance transistor during the forming step. By changing this forming
voltage, the forming current can be controlled to set the memristor at different resistance
levels. The linear relationship indicates the ability to control this forming step very precisely
by controlling this reference voltage.
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Figure 3.11: Successful forming of three different memristors with our designed memristor
read-write-form circuitry. The forming can be easily identified by the presence of a sudden
increase in current in the IV plots. The gate voltage to control the current compliance
transistor is also varied to demonstrate forming at different levels which is why there are
multiple forming-like spikes in these plots

Figure 3.12: The current before (left figure) and after forming (right figure) is performed.
The current is very low (∼pA) before forming but was high (∼50-70µA) after forming.
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Figure 3.13: This plot shows a successful reset of a memristor with our read-write-form
circuitry. The plot clearly shows how current increases linearly with increasing reset voltage
voltage i.e. there is no change in memristance or resistance. After when reset voltage (0.5V) is reached, memristors finally resets to a high resistance where there is a sudden and
noticeable drop in current.

Figure 3.14: Plot shows the stable current through the memristor when formed using
several different current compliance control voltage (Vref). These several different current
levels prove the ability to form these memristors at different LRS values with confidence.
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3.2.4

Sense Amplifier for Memristor Crossbar Circuits

Sense amplifier (SA) is one of the essential components of fast and dense memory
architectures. A sense amplifier can sense or detect small voltage difference between its
input voltages and produce a rail-to-rail output. The input voltage with higher value goes
up to VDD (supply voltage) and the other input voltage goes down to GND (ground). In case
of memory circuits, SA detects small difference between two bit-line voltages and produces a
full digital output during a read operation. As we have mentioned in previous sections
that we have shifted away from read-monitored-write approach and now the XbarPUF
response is determined by comparing the voltage difference at the load due to the memristor’s
HRS/LRS variation, not the switching speed. Arbiter is thus no longer useful at making this
decision and we need some kind of a voltage comparator instead. Although our XbarPUF
isn’t exactly a memory circuit, but it has a crossbar of memory elements i.e. memristors
and can help measure the load voltage difference between each pair of crossbar columns
during read operation. Due to unavoidable manufacturing process variation, memristors
display variations in their memristive states and other electrical properties. Therefore, two
memristor crossbar columns would have slightly different equivalent memristancs and thus
the voltage drop at the load resistor, attached at the end of each crossbar column, would
be slightly different as well. The SA would be able to measure these tiniest differences to
provide a digital response for the XbarPUF.
Initially we have looked in the literature for established SA circuit designs. First, we have
narrowed our design topology choices based on the strict design requirements for our designed
XbarPUF. Then we have analyzed representative circuits of those selected topology in terms
of performance, reliability of operation, and overhead. We have picked a topology which is
best compatible with our design requirements. Then we have worked on that topology to
suit to our design needs. We have also performed Monte Carlo analysis to choose optimal or
near optimal set of circuit parameters e.g. lengths and widths of different transistors, supply
voltage in terms of speed, energy, reliability, and yield. This also helps us to gain insight
about the quality of our design in a real hardware.
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Previous Sense Amplifier Design
We have considered several SA design topology and built and simulated their representative
circuits to make a fair comparison among them. We have analyzed each of these circuits
using our design parameters to understand their strengths and weaknesses with respect to
our XbarPUF application. The two primary broad classes of SA topology are current-mode
and voltage-mode [49] while hundreds of their variations exist in literature for different
applications. By doing some design and parameter tuning, we expect some of these designs
to meet our design requirements.
Current latched SA or CLSA have been widely used in many memory designs for their
reliability and speed of operation [29]. A CLSA circuit can detect voltage difference between
two pre-charged bit-lines of a memory. The input voltages are connected to the gate inputs of
a pair of differential NMOS transistors and depending on which of the input voltage is lower,
that branch discharges to GND while the other remains at VDD. CLAS requires the bit-lines
to be pre-charged (close to VDD) to ensure their transistors operate in saturation region.
Thus their speed of operation of a CLSA decreases significantly with decreasing supply
voltage and when the bit-lines are not pre-charged, thus making the transistors operate out
of saturation region.
Voltage latched SA or VLSA are another category of popular SA topology [49]. In most
typical memory applications (e.g. SRAM), CLSA circuits usually outperform or on par with
VLSA circuits. However, VLSA design is more resilient against threshold voltage or Vt
mismatch and transistor size or β mismatch compared to most other SA designs. Similar
to CLSA, the performance of a VLSA circuit decreases when the input bit-lines are not
pre-charged and close to GND.
Researchers have proposed offset cancellation techniques to improve the resolution of
SA circuits [33, 13]. However, some of these techniques involve adding capacitors which
leads to a significant increase in area and not suitable for very lightweight application. Plus
capacitors have mismatch problems themselves.
Researchers have also designed SA circuits suitable for other emerging devices like MTJ
or magnetic tunnel junction based memory [85, 82]. They have worked on making their SA
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circuit, named as pre-charge SA or PCSA [85] suitable for MTJ based circuits specifically.
Their design is fast despite being simple which is what we need for our application here too.
However, unlike MTJ, memristors have a hard limit on the allowable read voltage being
applied across them as higher voltage increase the chance of unintentional switching. PCSA
also does not provide full swing output unless additional buffer stages are employed. The
design also looks prone to be affected heavily by mismatch variation.
We have considered a few other popular and promising SA designs as well. However, as we
will see, due to the strict requirements imposed by memristor based circuits, only a handful
of SA designs could be considered promising for our application. We have built those circuits
alongside ours in Cadence Virtuoso with 65nm technology and compared against each other
to decide on the final design.
Design Requirements
Memristors’ read voltage should be low enough so that the applied voltage doesn’t cause
a switch. The suggested voltage for a reliable read of HfO2 memristors considered for our
work (fabricated at SUNY-Poly [8] is only 0.2V. With sufficient time, the memristor device
might switch to either LRS or HRS if the read voltage is greater than 0.2V depending on
its polarity. In our XbarPUF circuit, the read voltage is chosen to be 0.4V with careful
choice of load resistance so that the voltage drop across a memristor never exceeds 0.2V.
Another thing to consider is the variation of the load resistance themselves, especially since
they are on-chip and thus have high variation. For example, n-well resistors of the 65nm
technology that we have used can have 20% mismatch. Thus if their mismatch dominates
over the mismatch of the memristor crossbar itself, then it would result in a very unreliable
read of the memristive states. Thus we have to ensure a very low mismatch between two
load resistors in a pair of crossbar columns and should choose their value so that they can
translate the variation in memristive states into a noticeable load voltage difference between
each pairs of crossbar columns. These two load voltages would be the input bit-line voltages
to each SA. Lowering the supply voltage than read voltage further makes the circuit slower,
leaky and thus not useful. For our particular XbarPUF circuits [69], the load voltage inputs
to the SA would be on the range of 100-300mV. Memristor’s switching speed also determine
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the clock frequency of the XbarPUF as well as the SA while also setting the upper limit
on acceptable delay. In this particular work, clock frequency of 2µs is used. While trying
with different supply voltage levels, only available on-chip voltages are considered i.e. which
would be already available for an XbarPUF. The area and energy overhead of the SA should
be kept as low as possible since for each response bit of an XbarPUF we need an SA and
the overall design should be as lightweight as possible. All of these are hard requirements
and they limit and shape our choice for a SA design. Thus we need a SA that can work
reasonably fast with high resolution and low overhead despite having low or near-to-GND
input voltages.
There are several things to consider to improve an SA circuit. Any mismatch among
the transistors in an SA should be negligible compared to the expected difference between
the two differential input voltages. For example, the impact of Vt and β mismatch between
drive transistors should be minimized. These two mismatches affect CLSA designs more
than VLSA designs as found in literature [49]. Another thing to consider is that the sensing
speed would be slower if the bit-line voltages are applied directly to the gates of transistors
since near-to-GND gate voltages would drive those transistors out of saturation. On another
note, because each memristor has a very low capacitance while having large resistance, the
whole memristor crossbar can be considered a big resistive network with load resistors at
the end of each column. Therefore, the inputs to the SA can be considered to come from
a resistor division circuit with only wire capacitance. We have considered all of these while
choosing and designing our own SA circuit.
Our Sense Amplifier Design
As we just mentioned earlier in this section, the factors behind selecting and designing our
particular SA are a low overhead design with fast operating speed, with input bit-line voltages
near to GND, capable of differentiating input voltage pair with small differences. The
available choice of clock frequencies and supply voltages are also limited. As we discovered,
VLSA topology based designs work better with small (sub-threshold) VDD and when bitline voltages are close to GND, rather than VDD. Thus we choose our own SA design to be
based on VLSA. Researchers have also shown that the effect of Vt and β mismatch is also
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low in VLSA compared to CLSA [49, 81] while this effect can be reduced further easily by
increasing the transistor size. Lower mismatch is very important to have a higher resolution
sensing capability. Therefore, we have designed our SA based on VLSA while also modifying
it further to meet our design requirements. The schematic of our designed SA is shown in
Figure 3.15.
Four transistors, M5-M8, in Figure 3.15 are access transistors which allow the input
voltages to be latched into the internal nodes of the circuit. Since the inputs are applied at
the diffusion terminals of these four transistors, this SA circuit offers low input resistance.
These two inputs are voltage drops across load resistors of a pair of XbarPUF columns. The
equivalent memristance of each column and the load resistor act as a voltage divider and this
voltage is one input to the SA. Therefore, it is important to remember that the inputs do not
have very high drive strength. The four transistors, M1-M4, form a cross-coupled inverters
which decide the final state of the SA with their positive feedback action. Their high voltage
is connected to the sense enable signal ‘SE’, instead of VDD. A constant positive voltage,
VDD can affect and change the internal nodes ‘O’ and ‘Ob’ by leaking voltage through the
PMOS transistors, M1 and M2 when the input voltages are sampled through the access
transistors. Therefore, this is a very modification that a digital signal is used as the power
source for this circuit. When the SA is in sampling phase, the ‘SE’ signal is low, meaning the
power supply is disconnected to allow proper latching or sampling of inputs into the internal
nodes. No current path is formed through M1 and M2 and thus they do not interfere with
the sensing nor change the latched voltages at nodes ‘O’ and ‘Ob’. During sensing, ‘SE’
rises to VDD or logic ‘1’ and act as the power source for resolving these two nodes. This
SA is used at the end of each pair of XbarPUF columns to help determine which column
has higher voltage drop across its load resistor to generate a one-bit response as shown in
Figure 3.16. The equivalent input-output circuit for each SA in the XbarPUF is shown
in Figure 3.17 when the XbarPUF is in read or response generation phase. As mentioned
earlier, the voltage division formed by the load resistor and equivalent memristors in two
adjacent columns in the crossbar provide the two inputs to each SA. SA then compares these
voltages and generate a full-swing output of either logic ‘1’ or ‘0’ depending on which of the
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Figure 3.15: Schematic diagram of the our designed sense amplifier circuit suitable for
memristor based crossbar architectures [73]

two column load voltages is higher. Buffers can be added to isolate these internal output
nodes from other parts of the circuit.
If the magnitude of the supply voltage used is low, latching delay of inputs to internal
nodes of our SA becomes large and thus can dominate over the sensing delay. We have used
both NMOS and PMOS as transmission gates to work as the access transistors for this SA.
This increases the range of analog input voltage that can be reliably sampled or latched
into the SA nodes. However, since we know our input voltages would be close to GND, the
NMOS transistors are made stronger than PMOS ones.
In Figure 3.15, there are two additional (and optional) transistors, M10 and M11 which
we call discharge transistors. After a sensing operation, these two transistors can help to
discharge nodes ‘O’ and ‘Ob’ so what the result from one cycle doesn’t interfere the latching
operation of the next cycle, thereby potentially affecting the outcome on that cycle. However,
a PUF circuit is usually a part of a security block that we only need to use once or twice
during start-up of a chip. Also we can also discharge the internal nodes ‘O’ and ‘Ob’ by
latching zero-valued inputs to reset them (zero-ing the nodes). Therefore, for our XbarPUF
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Figure 3.16: Application of the our designed sense amplifier for the XbarPUF [73]

Figure 3.17: An equivalent input-output circuit for our sense amplifier circuit when used
in an XbarPUF [73]
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circuit, discharge transistors can be omitted to save power, area, and delay. We still keep
these transistors in our generic SA design as they would be useful for memristor crossbar
based memory applications.
As we have mentioned before, we are designing everything with 65nm CMOS technology
and the minimum transistor length, Lunit is 60nm. Transistors with more larger than
minimum size are used to ensure low percentage of mismatch in analog circuits which
can be found from the datasheet of this particular technology. Thus we choose the base
minimum width, Wunit for this SA to be 1.2µm. Each of the four access transistors, M5-M8
in Figure 3.15 are sized to be of 1.2µm width. With equal size, NMOS transistors would
be stronger than their PMOS counterpart, thereby facilitating the latching of near-to-GND
input voltages. They also have very small voltage drop across them. M1-M4 are the four
sensing transistors in this design. Two PMOS transistors, M1-M2 are sized to have 1.2µm
width each while the two NMOS sensing transistors are sized 2.4µm each. The NMOS
are thus four times stronger than their PMOS counterpart, similar to the cross-coupled
inverters in an SRAM cell. Two discharge transistors, M10 and M11 are sized of 2.4µm
width each to have a balance between quick discharge time vs. quick recharge of internal
nodes. The bottom NMOS, M9 is sized 3.6µm, larger than the sensing transistors, to create
a fast discharging path when the SA is in sensing or evaluation phase. The single inverter
in Figure 3.15 and other buffers which might be needed as the output stage of this SA
to comply with the load demand are also sized properly to ensure fast reliable operation,
reduce mismatch, and improve yield. It is important to note that all these transistor sizes
are the minimum size that we have worked with and later we have analyzed to find the best
transistor size for our design.
This SA circuit works in three states: latching phase, sensing phase, and discharge phase.
As we have discussed before, the discharge phase and the discharge transistors are optional
for our SA when used as part of the XbarPUF. During read or latching phase, the sense
enable signal, ‘SE’ is kept low and thus the access transistors are turned on. Thus the input
voltages, ‘B’ and ‘Bbar’, which are basically load voltages from a pair of crossbar columns,
are latched or sampled into internal nodes ‘O’ and ‘Ob’, respectively. These initial voltage act
as seed values during the next phase. After inputs are sampled properly, ‘SE’ is turned high
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in the sensing or evaluation phase, thereby shutting off the access transistors and turning on
transistor M9 to create a path to ground. Depending on which of the two nodes, ‘O’ or ‘Ob’
is higher, the other node discharges through M9 to ground while the node with the higher
voltage recharges to VDD through the PMOS transistors by the positive feedback action
of cross-coupled inverters formed by M1-M4. The signal ‘SE’ should be kept high during
this whole time as it also provides power for this recharge besides controlling most of the
transistors. In the next phase, these internal nodes are discharged through M10 and M11
to ground to be ready for another sensing operation. This phase is only needed when these
discharge transistors are used in the SA design. A small short pulse of around 50ns can be
applied to discharge both the nodes in short time. We also add buffers to both output ‘O’
and ‘Ob’ when we integrate this SA circuit into our XbarPUF to be able to drive larger load.
Buffers add negligible or even zero delay to our circuit due to relatively fast rising/falling
delay of inverters compared to the SA internal output nodes.
The layout of the SA should be symmetric to both inputs as well as for the cross-coupled
inverters to avoid creating any bias to any of the two inputs. Wire lengths, widths, and
other internal connections are routed in such a way that output nodes see equal amount of
load. We have learned that finger widths or the number of fingers do not affect the design
for VLSA based designs [81]. Thus our choice of the number of fingers is only determined
by the motivation of maintaining a low aspect ratio, low resistance path, low area and also
not to increase the pitch of the memristor crossbar circuit.
Results and Analyses of the Proposed Design
As we have argued already, capability of driving near-to-GND bitline voltages with high
speed, able to detect small voltage difference, and compatibility with memristor based
crossbar architectures are some of the factors behind choosing this SA design. We have
built and experimented with the comparable SA circuit topology ourselves. Table 3.3 lists
the results of comparison among all these different circuits. The supply voltage used for
this simulation is 0.4V and differential input voltages are 150mV and 155mV. For a fair
comparison, same unit length (60nm) and width (1.2µm) are used to each of these circuits.
Our designed SA is easily found to be the fastest among these designs. SA circuits based
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Table 3.3: Comparison of our designed SA with different circuits from different topology
[73]
Topology
Precharge needed
Worst delay (µs)
Avg. power (nW)

CLSA [29]
yes/no
2.75
0.48

VLSA [56]
yes
3.51
0.77

PCSA [85] Ours [73]
no
no
0.62
0.27
0.42
0.63 / 0.19

on CLSA [29] and VLSA [56] are slow when the input voltages are close to GND and no
pre-charging available. The PCSA in [85] is found to consume small power with relatively
high speed. Our design, on the other hand, has comparatively higher power consumption
when discharge transistors are used. However, these are not used when we use this SA to
build PUF circuits, thereby making our design to also have the lowest power consumption.
The power consumption of Table 3.3 includes power consumption by an inverter and also
power consumption during all phases of the SA. Another thing to note is that because of
the high delay of some of these designs, the results of Table 3.3 are generated using a lower
frequency input with clock period of 12µs instead of the required maximum of 2µs to make
sure they all converge to a valid output within the time frame. Therefore, actual power
consumption would be higher than this if higher clock frequency is used.
Figure 3.18 displays the waveform for our implemented SA design at 0.4V VDD with
bit-line voltages of 150mV and 155mV (‘B’ and ‘Bbar’ in Figure 3.15). The sense enable
signal, ‘SE’ has a clock period of 2µs. The analog voltages of two input signals ‘B’ and
‘Bbar’ are flipped on each clock cycle to make the output flip on every cycle as well to see
if our design can resolve to opposite output voltages quickly. A pulse signal of 50ns duty
cycle with the same 2µs period is used to discharge the output nodes ‘O’ and ‘Ob’ at the
end of each sensing/decision phase. During this sensing phase, ‘O’ and ‘Ob’ resolves either
high (VDD) or low (GND), based on which of the input signals is higher than the other.
The output is valid before discharge signal is high and a sufficient delay after ‘SE’ goes high.
Outputs, ‘O’ and ‘Ob’ should be alternating on each cycle with because of the input pattern
which is evident from Figure 3.18.
We have run several Monte Carlo simulations to determine the yield of our designed
SA circuit and the results are displayed in Table 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. For each Monte Carlo
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Figure 3.18: Waveform for transient simulation of proposed SA for input bit-line voltages
of 150mV and 155mV with VDD = 0.4V [73]

simulation, we have applied two sets of input patterns, one where output should be a ‘1’ and
one where output is a ‘0’. The clock period (of signal ‘SE’) is chosen to be 2µs with 50%
duty cycle, compatible with the XbarPUF. Thus 1µs is being allotted for for the SA to make
a decision plus an additional 50ns discharge phase. The input voltages are again chosen to
be 150mV and 155mV initially, flipped on each second cycle to get both a ‘1’ and ‘0’ output
on consecutive cycles. The supply voltage (VDD) and transistor widths (W) and lengths (L)
are also varied in different Monte Carlo simulations. To determine the best/near optimal W,
H and VDD for the SA, we have run Monte Carlo analysis for 500 chips for our designed SA
with different (W/L) ratios and different VDD. Here in these tables, W = Wunit = 1.2µm and
L = Lunit = 60nm (min. transistor length of this 65nm technology). As expected, increasing
the L as well as the (W/L) ratio increase transistor area and thus reduce mismatch, thereby
considerably improving the yield of the design. It can also be noticed from Table 3.4 that
with increasing VDD, the percent of yield decreases. It can be explained by the fact that
input voltages are close to GND rather than VDD and, therefore, with higher VDD, there
is a higher amount of leakage from it which corrupts internal nodes of SA just after SE goes
high to start the sensing phase, thereby reducing yield. However, with a VDD lower than the
threshold voltage (at 0.4V VDD where for this technology, threshold voltage, Vth is around
500-550mV), the delay is longer but the frequency is still the same and, therefore, it may not
resolve for all cases due to additional delay arising from mismatch making the input voltage
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Table 3.4: Percent yield of our designed SA for different transistor sizes and supply voltage
[73]
Transistor sizes

(W
)
L

W
( 3L
)

( 3W
)
3L

( 2W
)
5L

( 5W
)
5L

VDD = 0.4V

67.35

72.45

78.55

83.25

87.20

VDD = 0.6V

64.20

77.20

89.70

90.70

98.50

VDD = 0.9V

61.10

73.10

84.70

87.00

95.50

VDD = 1.2V

60.50

72.70

84.30

87.20

95.40

Table 3.5: Sensing delay (nS) of our designed SA for different transistor sizes and supply
voltage [73]
Transistor sizes

( 3W
)
3L

( 2W
)
5L

( 5W
)
5L

VDD = 0.4V

712

625

627

VDD = 0.6V

19.63

16.7

16.7

VDD = 0.9V

1.02

1.524

1.523

difference almost indistinguishable. Thus, at 0.4V VDD, this design has the lowest yield
compared to higher, over the threshold VDD as in many cases the SA doesn’t resolve fast
enough to a full-swing output. Although for the leftmost column of transistors in Table 3.4
with unit length (60nm), yield is actually the highest for 0.4V VDD. The reason behind this
is that the SA operates very fast with the transistor length is smaller and thus the decreasing
effect of extra delay due to mismatch is less than the yield improvement achieved by a lower
VDD. Thus it can be concluded that to achieve an overall better yield (≥80-85%), larger
transistors (rightmost three columns of Table 3.4) should be considered.

Table 3.6: Energy(Joule) per cycle of our designed SA for different transistor sizes and
supply voltage [73]
Transistor sizes

( 3W
)
3L

( 2W
)
5L

( 5W
)
5L

VDD = 0.4V

20.66f

16.79f

41.79f

VDD = 0.6V

0.80p

0.50p

1.26p

VDD = 0.9V

11.08p

5.54p

13.65p
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Larger transistor sizes reduce variation due to mismatch and thus improve yield, but they
also contribute to larger area, delay and energy overhead. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between yield vs. delay and energy overhead of the circuit. To find system delay and energy
consumption, we have experimented with the transistor sizes listed in Table 3.4, except for
the (W/L) and (W/3L) as their yield are too low and thus are left out from further analysis.
1.2V VDD is also not considered anymore as it increases the power consumption considerably,
without improving the yield. Table 3.5 lists the sensing delay for the selected three transistor
sizes with comparatively better yield. Table 3.6 lists the total energy consumption per cycle
of the designed SA for the same transistor sizes. From these two tables, it can be found that
transistor size of (2W/5L) i.e. 240µm width and 300nm length is a good trade-off offering
much lower sensing delay as well as low conversion energy at 0.6V VDD, compared to other.
Area and leakage power should also be lower compared to the other two sizes as W and
(W/L) ratio are smaller. However, depending on the design requirements and application,
a trade-off among yield, delay, total area and energy overhead can be easily made from our
detailed analysis.
We have also measured the reliability of our design for different differential voltage
between the two input voltage and for different temperature. The reliability is calculated
as the percent of time our design produces a correct output out of 500 evaluations while
temperature is being varied. The detailed result is presented in Figure 3.19. The results are
obtained from SPICE simulation as well using Monte Carlo analysis by varying temperature
from 00 C to 1000 C for different transistor sizes and input voltage differences. As expected,
the reliability increases quickly as the difference between two input voltage increases. An
increase in transistor area also displays a linear increase in reliability of operation.
On-Chip Design and Testing
We have designed a unit size sense amplifier as a stand-alone test structure using a 65nm
CMOS technology. The schematic and layout of this designed sense amplifier are shown
below in Figure 3.15 and 3.20, respectively. The layout dimension is 8.039µm × 13.035 µm.
Metal layers are made larger than minimum to help reduce any drops in analog circuit path.
Every gaps between any layers are kept at minimum distance.
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Figure 3.19: Reliability across multiple evaluations of our sense amplifier for different
transistor size and differential voltage

After fabrication, I have also performed an initial functionality test of this sense amplifier.
Using PSOC (programming system on chip) microcontroller, different input voltages are
applied to get corresponding outputs, as shown in Figure 3.21. One input is at a fixed
DC voltage while the other input is varied between two DC voltage levels such that it is
higher than the first input in half of the times and lower in other times. This means the
output would toggle between high and low voltage alternately when ‘sense enable’ signal is
asserted. Even with the presence of noise, it is clearly visible that the output is correct i.e.
when ‘sense enable’ signal is high, the output shows a logic high when the first input (B0)
is higher than the second input (B1) and output is low when B1 is larger than B0. I have
tested several such sense amplifier test structures and all display correct functionality. The
data are collected from an oscilloscope after getting the output from our chip located inside
of a probe station. More details about this testing can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 3.20: Layout of the designed sense amplifier (8.049µm×13.03µm)
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Figure 3.21: On-chip test results from our designed sense amplifier
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3.3
3.3.1

Design of Twin Memristor TRNG
Motivation

The main purpose of this part of our work is to analyze existing memristor based TRNGs
from their underlying theory and mathematical basis. We have analyzed a very recent and
popular memristor based TRNG circuit and formulated how a change in supply voltage
and temperature or process variation can affect the performance of a TRNG. To improve
resiliency against environmental effects and process variation, we have suggested a TRNG
design that leverages the variability in HRS (high resistance state) of a memristor. This core
idea is to utilize relative nature of measurements, i.e. the HRS of one memristor is compared
with the HRS of another to generate a single random bit. Since HRS usually has shown
higher variability compared to other parameters of a memristor [69], we have chosen HRS as
the source of randomness for our design. The differential nature of our TRNG design should
make it robust against process variation and environmental changes.

3.3.2

Our Design

Process variation, temperature and supply voltage variation can shift the switching time
distribution of a memristor. Therefore, any TRNG design based on an initial estimated
distribution of C2C (cycle to cycle) switching rate would be biased towards either ‘1’ or ‘0’
and thus could degrade the TRNG performance. In this particular work, we are instead
designing the TRNG based on relative distribution of two HRS of two memristors. In this
design, the main source of entropy is the C2C HRS variation of a pair of memristors. After
applying the same voltage for a fixed duration of time across a pair of memristors, their states
are compared to generate a random stream of bits. Figure 3.22 shows the circuit diagram
of the existing switching time based single memristor TRNG [26] and our designed twin
memristor TRNG based on relative HRS difference. Temperature, supply voltage change
and process variation all have smaller effect on this TRNG performance as we analyze below.
We consider two memristors in a chip which are physically close to each other. Because
they’re physically close, we can assume that their mean HRS are much closer to each other
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Figure 3.22: Conceptual circuit diagram of (left) existing switching time based single
memristor TRNG [26], and (right) our designed twin memristor TRNG based on HRS
difference [67].

than the usual chip-to-chip process variation. Suppose the mismatch variation between
the HRS of these two memristors is 1σ = 1%. Each memristor’s HRS has a C2C normal
(gaussian) distribution of mean µHRS and standard deviation σ HRS = 10% of µHRS .

HRS1 = N (µHRS1 , σHRS1 )

(3.9)

HRS2 = N (µHRS2 , σHRS2 )
Since in our design, we compare these two HRS states, the result of comparison can be
expressed as another Normal random variable as:

Z = HRS1 − HRS2
q
2
2
+ σHRS2
)
= N ((µHRS1 ∼ µHRS2 ), σHRS1

(3.10)

If µHRS2 is greater than µHRS1 and thus µHRS2 = 1.01*µHRS1 (1% larger) and σHRS1 =
0.1*µHRS1 , σHRS2 = 0.1*µHRS2 (10% standard deviation), then equation 3.10 becomes:

p
Z = N (.01 ∗ µHRS1 , (0.1 ∗ µHRS1 )2 + (0.1 ∗ 1.01µHRS1 )2 )
√
≈ N (.01 ∗ µHRS1 , 0.1 ∗ 2 ∗ µHRS1 )
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(3.11)

The distribution, Z doesn’t have a zero mean, thus the ratio of ones and zeros in the
output wouldn’t be the same if we build a TRNG using this distribution. However, the
mean should be close to zero as which can be easily found from a Z-table. The z-score of
this normal distribution which is equal to finding the probability of a randomly chosen value
to be less than 0 is:
z=

x−µ
0 − 0.01 ∗ µHRS1
√
=
σ
0.1 ∗ 2 ∗ µHRS1

(3.12)

= −0.0707
where, z represents a Normal random distribution of mean 0 and standard deviation 1,
transformed from the distribution, Z to calculate the probability using a z-table.
From z-table, the probability of getting a ‘0’ value i.e. the area on the left side of the
distribution from the center for a z score of above-calculated -0.0707 is:
P(x ∈ Z ≤ 0) = 0.4718

(3.13)

It should be noted that if the difference in means of two HRS values of two memristors are
less than 1σ, then the the probability number in equation 3.13 would be closer to the ideal of
0.5, i.e. the center of distribution would more close to 0. Our design thus inherently has some
degree of bias. But this provides this design with a better resilience against environmental
changes compared to existing designs as we analyze next.

3.3.3

Effect of Environmental and Process variation on Existing
Single Memristor TRNG

As mentioned earlier in this section, most of the existing single memristor TRNG designs are
based on the stochastic switching time (or the RTN). We already know memristors display
C2C variation in its switching characteristics. The switching time (towards either LRS or
HRS) of a single memristor can be approximated to also have a normal distribution over
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many cycles. This can be formulated as:
tswn = N (µtswn , σtswn )

(3.14)

P(t ≤ µtswn ) = P(t > µtswn ) = 0.5

(3.15)

and,

To reiterate, equation 3.14 describes that the switching time of a memristor over different
cycles is a Normal random distribution with mean of µtswn and standard deviation of σ tswn .
Therefore, 3.15 expresses the probability that the switching time at any random cycle, t 
ttswn to be less than or equal to the mean switching time is 0.5 or 50%. Thus if we determine
the mean, (µtswn ) of that switching time over many cycles and apply a voltage greater than
the threshold voltage of that memristor repeatedly for many cycles, then half of the time,
that memristor would switch and the other half of the time, it would retain its state. This is
the basis for most memristor based TRNG designs where memristors’s stochastic switching
time is the source of randomness.
This method requires an application of a voltage pulse of pulse width approximately equal
to the mean switching time of that memristor. Clock jitters, skews or other noise could
slightly change this pulse width which may change the switching probability drastically.
The switching time also depends heavily on the magnitude of applied voltage pulse. Thus,
any power supply noise (change in magnitude) would also strongly affect this switching
time. Since a memristor’s resistive states and threshold voltages are strong functions of
temperature, a change in temperature would also change the switching rate and thus the
switching probability overall. Thus any change in any of these factors would change the
switching probability and thus equation 3.15 would not hold for the new changed distribution.
Then the bit stream produced from that memristor based TRNG could be heavily biased
towards either ‘1’ or ‘0’. Next we are going to formulate how these environmental changes
cause a change in the switching time distribution.
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Supply Voltage Variation
We have used the improved McDonald model from [46, 69] as a memristor’s switching model.
Then we have used the switching equation to analyze the impact of voltage variation. The
switching from LRS to HRS (or reset) of a memristor is governed by this equation [72]:
M (ti+1 ) = M (ti ) +

Rdif f ∆tV (ti+1 )
,
tswn Vtn

(3.16)

where, Vtn and tswn are negative threshold voltage and negative switching time (during reset)
of a memristor, respectively. Rdif f is the resistance difference between HRS and LRS. M (t)
presents the memristance and V (t) is the voltage applied across the memristor at a particular
time instant, t. Equation 3.16 can be rearranged as:
∆M =

Rdif f
∗ ∆t,
tswn Vtn

(3.17)

If we integrate equation 3.17 over the total switching time, we can establish a relationship
between applied voltage and switching time. We assume that the magnitude of applied
voltage remains fixed for one switching cycle. Now from equation 3.17, we can estimate the
actual switching time for any applied voltage:
Z

HRS

LRS

Rdif f Vapplied
dM =
∗
tswn Vtn

=⇒ tsw,actual = tswn ∗

Z

tsw,actual

dt

(3.18)

0

Vtn
Vapplied

(3.19)

The resulting relationship between voltage applied across a memristor and actual time
to switch is found to be proportional which is what we expect from a linear switching model
[47]. If the change in applied voltage is constrained (±10% ), then a linear equation should
provide reasonable accuracy in this window. If Vapplied is equal to the threshold voltage, Vtn ,
then the actual switching time is equal to the minimum switching time. Otherwise, from
equation 3.19, we can find out that a ±10% change in Vapplied from Vtn would result in a (≈
-9%,+11%) change in actual switching time.
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Temperature Variation
Temperature directly affects states and threshold voltages of a memristor and thus in
turn affect the actual switching time. From [11, 18], we can find that the magnitude of
threshold voltage decreases as temperature increases within the range ≈ [0, 100]0 C and we
can approximate this change using a linear equation as:
Vtn (θ) = Vtn0 [1 + αV tn (θ − θ0 )],

(3.20)

where, Vtn0 is the threshold voltage at room temperature, θ0 =250 C. We have calculated the
temperature coefficient for negative threshold voltage from [18] as ≈-0.007/0 C. Therefore,
for a temperature change of ∆θ, the new Vtn would be:
Vtn (θ) = [1 − 0.007 ∗ ∆θ] ∗ Vtn0 ,

(3.21)

The modified switching time is thus found to be:
tsw,actual = tswn ∗

[1 − 0.007 ∗ ∆θ] ∗ Vtn0
Vapplied

(3.22)

Process Variation
Emerging devices like memristor usually have a large process variation as the technology,
fabrication technique etc. are not mature. All major parameters of a memristor show
a relatively larger variation from chip to chip. For switching time based existing TRNG
circuits, we are only interested in the variation of switching time. For our purpose, we have
considered a 5% standard deviation (σ tswn ) on negative switching time, tswn .
tswn = N (µtswn , σtswn ), die − to − die
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(3.23)

where σtswn = 0.05*µtswn . Thus for a 1σ variation of this switching time, the shifted
mean of the new distribution would be:

tsw,actual =

3.3.4






1.05 ∗ µtswn ,

1σ above mean



0.95 ∗ µtswn ,

1σ below mean

.

(3.24)

Variation Modeling for Our Designed TRNG

Supply Voltage Variation
Changing the magnitude and duration of a voltage applied across a memristor would
change its switching rate. However, there is no one-to-one relationship between this voltage
magnitude (±10% variation) with final HRS. In our design, we make the switching time
large enough so that a memristor would always switch as we are only interested in the final
randomized HRS values, not the probabilistic switching itself. Therefore, due to supply
voltage variation, the time to generate a valid bit from our designed TRNG changes slightly,
but the value of that bit itself is considered to be unaffected here.
Temperature Variation
Temperature can change the HRS of both memristors in our TRNG. For a relatively narrow
temperature window of [0 − 100]0 C, this change is approximated by a linear equation, similar
to threshold voltage change [69]. Suppose, we increase the temperature by an amount of ∆θ.
From equation 3.20, we can find expressions for the two modified HRS as:
HRS10 (θ) = HRS1[1 + αHRS ∗ ∆θ]

(3.25)

0

HRS2 (θ) = HRS2[1 + αHRS ∗ ∆θ]
where, HRS0 represent HRS at room temperature and αHRS is the temperature coefficient
(linear) of HRS and approximated as -0.008/0 C. The chip-to-chip or more specifically dieto-die standard deviation of HRS considered here is σHRS = 0.1*µHRS (10% of HRS).
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Now, we define the term C∆θ = 1 + αHRS ∗ ∆θ. Thus we can rewrite equations 3.9. We
assume that the standard deviation (and variance) of both HRS stays the same.
HRS0 1 = N (µHRS10 , σHRS10 )
= N (µHRS1 ∗ C∆θ , σHRS1 )
0

HRS 2 = N (µ

HRS20

,σ

HRS20

(3.26)

)

= N (µHRS2 ∗ C∆θ , σHRS2 )
and
Z0 = HRS01 − HRS02
= N (C∆θ ∗ (µHRS1

q
2
2
+ σHRS2
)
∼ µHRS2 ), σHRS1

(3.27)

Thus equation 3.26 and 3.27 represents scaled versions of the normal distribution for
HRS of equation 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. Now we can derive the new distribution of our
designed TRNG by using equation 3.26 with equations 3.10 and 3.11. The z-score of this
scaled normal random distribution is:
z=

x−µ
0 − C∆θ ∗ 0.01 ∗ µHRS1
√
=
σ
0.1 ∗ 2 ∗ µHRS1

(3.28)

= −C∆θ ∗ 0.0707
For a 500 C temperature increase, C∆θ = (1-.008*50) = 0.6 and thus the z-score would be
z = 0.0424. The probability of getting 0 is:
P(x ∈ Z ≤ 0) = 0.4831

(3.29)

This z-value is very close to the value derived in equation 3.13. Thus a change in
temperature does not cause a significant change on the ratio of 1’s to 0’s and the TRNG
performance does not degrade too much with changing temperature.
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Process Variation
We have already observed that a change in temperature creates a HRS distribution which is
a scaled version of the original distribution. Process variation would make the HRS values to
be different from their die-to-die mean HRS, causing a shifted distribution profile. However,
since we are using the difference in states between two memristors, the result would just be
a random distribution with scaled mean and standard deviation of the original distribution.
Z = HRS001 − HRS002
q
2
2
= N ((µHRS100 ∼ µHRS200 ), σHRS1
00 + σHRS200 )
√
≈ N (.01 ∗ µHRS100 , 0.1 ∗ 2 ∗ µHRS100 )

(3.30)

Suppose, µHRS100 is 1σ larger than the mean µHRS1 . Thus µHRS100 = 1.1*µHRS1 and the
z-score of this would again be:
z=

x−µ
0 − 0.01 ∗ µHRS100
√
=
σ
0.1 ∗ 2 ∗ µHRS1
0 − 0.01 ∗ 1.1 ∗ µHRS1
√
=
0.1 ∗ 2 ∗ µHRS1

(3.31)

= −0.0778
The probability of getting 0 for 1σ variation of HRS is thus:
P(x ∈ Z ≤ 0) = 0.469

(3.32)

Thus the relative probability of getting 1’s and 0’s change by a small amount with process
variation for our design. This is an excellent property since it means that it does not require
changing any design parameters even if memristors have large variations across different die
as the TRNG performance should remain close to its ideal operating condition.

3.3.5

Results and Analyses of Designed Twin-Memristor TRNG

First, we have analyzed both the existing single memristor TRNG and our new twin
memristor TRNG design in terms of the probability of producing 1’s and 0’s with respect to
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varying operating conditions. We have used MATLAB platform to simulate both designs. We
calculate the percentage of 0’s with the sum of 0’s and 1’s in normal operating condition, when
temperature changes ±500 C from room temperature, with ±10% variation in applied voltage
and 1σ process variation. This 1σ process variation corresponds to switching time variation
for single memristor TRNG and is assumed to be 5%. For our TRNG design, this variation
is of HRS and assumed to be 10% as HRS shows higher variation than switching time or
other memristor parameters. Table 3.7 lists the performance of both TRNGs for different
operating conditions. As expected, since both process variation and environmental variation
strongly affect switching time, single memristor TRNG shows a large bias towards either 1’s
or 0’s except for ideal condition. Our TRNG is based on relative measurement of HRS and
because of difference due to mismatch, inherently has a small bias i.e. the proportion of 0
is not 50% ideally, as can be seen from Table 3.7. However, due to the relative nature of
measurement, our TRNG design only shows negligible change in performance with changing
temperature or voltage. Thus our design is found to be robust against both environmental
changes and process variation. As expected, performance of our designed TRNG doesn’t
show any big deviation from ideal condition where single memristor TRNG performance
could be heavily affected.
To better understand the effect of process variation on both TRNG designs, we have run
Monte Carlo simulation with 10000 different chips and generated 5000 random bits from
each chip. Figure 3.23 shows the percent of 1’s for different chips for both single and twin
memristor TRNGs. A TRNG should ideally has a 50% probability of producing 1’s i.e.
the center of the distribution should be at 0.5. As expected from our detailed theoretical
analysis, switching time based single memristor TRNG design displays a wider distribution
with a standard deviation of 0.1805 when we consider this process variation. On the other
hand, our twin memristor TRNG only has a narrow and much tighter distribution over
process variation with a standard deviation of only 0.0322. This result shows our TRNG
design is robust against process variation and eases circuit design work by eliminating the
need to redesign for every different chip.
We have also run Monte Carlo simulation to show how the probability distribution of
TRNG output changes from ideal for a ±100 C change in temperature and for a ±10% change
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Table 3.7: Percentage of 0’s to the sum of 0’s and 1‘s for different operating conditions [67]
Design with
Ideal/No Temperature
Voltage
Process
0
0
varying conditions
change
+25 C -25 C +10% -10% +1 σ -1 σ
Single-memristor
50
4.01
95.99
18.16 86.67 69.15 30.85
Our Twin-memristor
47.18
47.76
46.62
47.18 47.18 46.90 47.46

in supply voltage. This result is shown in Figure 3.24. Single memristor TRNG shows a
large deviation from ideal distribution for both increasing and decreasing temperature and
supply voltage, as the center of distribution shifts to far left or right. However, our designed
TRNG almost show zero change.

3.3.6

Output Correction

Since our designed TRNG inherently has a small percentage of bias i.e. amount of 1’s and
0’s in the output are not equal even in ideal condition, some form of post-processing could
be very useful to improve the quality of TRNG output. Therefore, we suggest to use simple
Von-Neumann correction which can be easily implemented in circuit with minimum hardware
overhead. Von-Neumann correction discards when two consecutive TRNG output bits are
either both ‘1’ or both ‘0’. But if the sequence of consecutive bits is ‘10’ then the output
becomes a ‘1’, and if it is ‘01’ then the output becomes a ‘0’. It helps remove any small bias
and reduce correlation between consecutive stream of bits. XORing of two TRNGs is another
technique. If outputs from two TRNGs are not correlated, then XORing them could help
improve randomness in the output. Another technique is whitening, which XORs the output
of a TRNG with a cryptographically secure PRNG to improve the statistical properties of
output bit stream.
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Figure 3.23: Histogram of bit bias with process variation for (top) existing single memristor
design and (bottom) proposed twin memristor design [67]

Figure 3.24: Histogram plot showing the trend for shift in distribution with temperature
and voltage variation for both single memristor TRNG (left two figures) and our designed
twin memristor TRNG (right two figures). Top two figures represent variation due to
temperature for single and twin memristor TRNG, respectively while bottom two figures
are for voltage variation. Existing single memristor TRNG displays a large variation while
our design almost unchanged [67].
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Chapter 4
Design and Robustness Analysis of
XbarPUF
4.1
4.1.1

Design Analysis of XbarPUF
Noise Margin Analysis

The parameters that we have used in this work are listed in table 3.1. We have experimented
with four different crossbar sizes, 4×2, 8×2, 16×2 and, 32×2, all XORed XbarPUF. We have
not considered larger crossbar due to huge simulation time and memory requirement. For a
32×2 XORed XbarPUF, it takes more than a week just to generate a single security metric
using a 40-core server. That’s why it was impractical to use larger circuits than those used
in this work. We have used the same set circuit and device level parameters to get a fair
comparison across different crossbar sizes. The read and write voltages are chosen to be 0.6V
and 1.3V, respectively for this simulation.
Noise Margin vs. Load Resistance
We have already evaluated the best load resistance for maximum noise margin for the
XbarPUF in equation 3.8. However, we have also performed a sweep of the load resistance,
Rld for a 4×2 XORed XbarPUF using equations 3.7, 3.5 and 3.6 where the HRS and LRS
values can be found in table 3.1. This is shown in Figure 4.1. The noise margin is plotted
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between noise margin and the load resistance [69].

as a percentage of read voltage and thus one can achieve a maximum of around 40% noise
margin for a 4×2 XbarPUF with HRS = 300kΩ, LRS = 30kΩ. With 0.6V or 600mV read
voltage, this translates to a 240mV noise margin voltage.
Noise Margin vs. Crossbar Size
We have also plotted the relationship between noise margin and no. of crossbar rows in
Figure 4.2, again using parameters listed in table 3.1. As expected, the peaks of each of the
curves for different crossbar sizes in Figure 4.2 are the same (at around 40%) which means the
maximum achievable noise margin only depends on the memristor itself (HRS/LRS ratio)
and does not change with a change in crossbar size. However, it is important to note that
each curve in this figure gets narrower around the peak as the number of rows increases. This
is because with increasing number of rows, more memristors are in parallel with each other
which lowers the total effective memristance of a column and thus demands lower and more
finer resolution for load resistance. Thus if the crossbar is too large, then a small deviation
of load resistance from its optimum value due to process variation might reduce the noise
margin considerably. This is an important result since this imposes an upper limit on the
size of crossbar for a particular memristor device.
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between maximum achievable noise margin and the number of
rows (N) [69].

Noise Margin vs. Memristor Device Properties
We have analyzed to see if an improvement in device characteristics result in an improvement
in the maximum noise margin achievable for the same crossbar size. Fig 4.3 shows the result
for this where the read cross mark in the plot shows the current situation with the memristor
parameter set that we have used (OFF/ON ratio of 10). In all the data points in this figure,
LRS was kept at 30kΩ while HRS was increased. It is clear that using a memristor device
with higher OFF/ON (or HRS/LRS) ratio would give increasingly better noise margin.
Thus if we want to use large crossbars with reasonably good noise margin, we should look
for memristors with high OFF/ON ratio.

4.1.2

Security Analysis of the XbarPUF

There are four primary security metrics that are often used to evaluate a strong PUF. These
metrics are uniqueness, uniformity, bit-aliasing, and reliability. To evaluate the uniqueness
and bit-aliasing, we have run 100 Monte Carlo simulations using Cadence Spectre for a
set of several different PUF challenges. To evaluate uniformity, 100 unique challenges were
applied over several different chips. To evaluate reliability, different challenges were applied
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Figure 4.3: Relationship between the maximum achievable noise margin and HRS/LRS
ratio [69].

for 10 different chips for 100 clock cycles each. Each challenge vector is randomly chosen
and unique.
Security Metrics vs. Crossbar Size
First we have evaluated all the four security metrics for different crossbar sizes and
represented in Figure 4.4. The uniqueness almost remains at its ideal value of 50%, uniformity
and bit-aliasing are near 50% for all crossbar sizes. Reliability is near its ideal value of 100%
for larger crossbars while being over 90% for smaller crossbars. This may seem counterintuitive at first because with an increasing number of rows, the equivalent memristance
drops further and thus should decrease noise margin. However, for a 32×2 XORed XbarPUF,
the load resistance is found to be 2kΩ using equation 3.8. This is not too low so that wire
resistance and other peripheral resistance would influence and worsen noise margin. However,
it can be inferred that with an increasing number of rows the effect of cycle-to-cycle variation
for each individual memristor to the overall equivalent memristance of the crossbar is reduced.
Therefore, during different cycles, the probability of getting different responses for the same
challenge is reduced and thus reliability is improved. However, at some point this would
not be the case for very large size crossbar sizes since the equivalent memristance would be
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Figure 4.4: Security performance of XORed XbarPUF for different crossbar size [69].

comparable with any changes caused by environmental variation or noise. Having high HRS
and LRS values would help reduce this effect and improve scalability, which is shown later
in this section.
Security Metrics vs. Memristor Device Properties
Uniqueness and bit-aliasing with respect to different HRS/LRS (OFF/ON) ratios are shown
in Figure 4.5. The LRS was kept at 30KΩ while HRS was varied to obtain all the data
in these two plots. From Figure 4.5, we can see an improvement in both uniqueness and
bit-aliasing (moves toward 50%) with increasing HRS/LRS ratio, which is expected since an
increase in HRS/LRS ratio provides a better noise margin. It is also evident that even at
a smaller HRS/LRS ratio (leftmost point on the plots in Figure 4.5) and with 10% cycleto-cycle variation, good values for both uniqueness (≈47%) and bit-aliasing (≈48%) can be
observed. This is expected from any PUF consisting of nano-materials such as memristors.
Since memristors display much higher process variation compared to CMOS devices, it is
statistically intuitive that memristor based PUFs would also exhibit near ideal uniqueness,
uniformity and bit-aliasing in hardware implementation.
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Figure 4.5: Dependence of uniqueness (left) and bit-aliasing (right) with HRS/LRS ratio
and the absolute values of HRS and LRS. The base LRS was 30KΩ for both of these plots
[69].
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Security Metrics vs. Process Variation of Load Resistance
We have also performed a small corner analysis by including CMOS variation. Since the
variation of peripheral circuitry would only affect slightly the read/write voltage and thus
does not change the overall performance of the circuit we have used higher than minimum
read/write voltages to obfuscate any such changes with 2% variation for load resistance.
The security metrics either do not change or show only minuscule change and, therefore, the
results is not explicitly provided here.
Uniformity is also relatively constant across different load resistances as it is a property of
challenge. The other two metrics, uniqueness and bit-aliasing also remain effectively constant
for up to 32×2 XbarPUF, which is shown in Table 4.1.

4.1.3

Detailed Reliability Analysis

Reliability is the most frowned upon security metrics of a PUF and in this work, we have
evaluated reliability of our proposed XbarPUF against varying memristor device parameters
i.e. HRS and LRS, against varying temperature and aging. Because of the high cycle-tocycle variation present in memristors and other emerging nano-devices, they tend to show
slightly different behavior across different cycles. Thus, the stability or reliability of the
circuit is hampered with increasing cycle-to-cycle variation. Temperature also changes the
memristor parameters and thus can potentially affect reliability. The reliability results for our
XORed XbarPUF with and without temperature variation along with two sets of variation
are presented in Table 4.2. As expected, reliability is improved, from 80% to 90% for a 4×2
XbarPUF, if the variation decreases from 10% to 2%. We have not found any change in
reliability with changing temperature. However, it is expected to have some adverse effect of
changing temperature in any circuit. But since in XbarPUF, instead of measuring absolute
voltage/current, the relative differences between adjacent columns voltages of the XbarPUF
are measured and, therefore, any environmental change should affect both the physically
nearby columns almost equally, thereby preserving the original relative differences.
Reliability is also presented for different LRS (and HRS) values in Figure 4.6. There is
little dependence on reliability with LRS values. However, if the LRS is too low, then the
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Table 4.1: Impact of 2% variation of load resistance on the security properties of a 32×2
XORed XbarPUF [69]
Metric
Uniqueness (%)
Bit-aliasing (%)
Uniformity (%)

Min. Rld
50.17
51.00
53.00

Nominal Rld
50.40
51.50
56.50

Max. Rld
50.12
50.25
47.50

Table 4.2: Performance of the XORed XbarPUF with variable temperature (10o C- 100o C)
and with different cycle-to-cycle variation for the memristor parameters [69]
XORed XbarPUF
Fixed/room temperature
Variable temperature

Reliability (%)
(10% variation)
80
80

Reliability (%)
(2% variation)
90
90

equivalent memristance of the crossbar would be very low, thus decreasing noise margin and
reliability. Therefore, on the left side of Figure 4.6, we see that reliability tends to decrease
with decreasing LRS.
We have also measured reliability over 100 cycles for the XbarPUF consisting of fresh
memristors and memristors aged over many set-reset cycles. With aging, the HRS/LRS ratio
drops as shown in Figure 3.3. Therefore, the reliability of the XbarPUF also decreases as
illustrated in Figure 4.7, as is expected. To tackle this situation, memristors with much higher
HRS/LRS ratio should be used so that even after a few million cycles, a good separation
between HRS and LRS values exists to differentiate. Besides, there are also memristors
where HRS and LRS do not change much with time and thus their relative difference is still
intact after many cycles.
In addition, there are no floating rows as the read voltage is applied across all rows
simultaneously and each column is measured using a load resistance, unlike in a crossbar
memory where a single memory element needs to be read. Therefore, there is no negative
impact of sneak-path current [12] in our crossbar circuit implementation as there are no
unselected cells.

For these reasons, we expect the reliability of the fabricated XORed

XbarPUF also to be very close to its desired value if the variation is improved.
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Figure 4.6: Reliability of the XbarPUF with respect to increasing LRS [69].

Figure 4.7: Reliability of the XbarPUF with age [69].
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4.1.4

Performance Overhead Analysis

Change in power consumption for the circuit with respect to LRS and HRS values are
shown in Figure 4.8. We have simulated and evaluated power for six different HRS/LRS
ratios, each with five different sets of HRS and LRS values. The leftmost and topmost
point in Figure 4.8 represents the power consumption with the current HRS and LRS values
considered achievable for HfOx memristors. Therefore, it is evident that there is room for
further reductions in power consumption by improving device characteristics, something we
expect to occur as the technology matures. Both an increase in HRS/LRS ratio and any
increase in LRS (and HRS to keep the ratio same) result in a reduction in power. However,
larger reductions are found at HRS/LRS ratios less than 100, beyond which the power curve
tends to flatten out. With increasing LRS, the advantage in power reduction with increasing
HRS/LRS ratios also reduces.
Memristors are very small compared to CMOS transistors and can be placed at each
cross-points of a crossbar array. Therefore, the crossbar representation requires minimal
area from the perspective of CMOS. Since the XORed circuit generates one response bit
from four columns instead of two as was the case in XbarPUF without XORing, its area
is double in size compared to an XbarPUF with no XORing. Only a few transistors are
added to the whole circuit if column shuffling is used. Figure 4.9 shows the area comparison
between XbarPUF and CMOS-based arbiter PUF (APUF) in terms of transistor count. The
area of the memristive XbarPUF increases linearly with an increase in rows and/or columns
while in the case of the APUF, the increase in area is exponential.
The delay of this circuit is the minimum clock cycle time that can be used to sample the
response bits faithfully. This minimum clock cycle time is constrained by the longest time
needed for a memristor to switch to either the high or low resistance state. In our model the
switching time is 1µs. There is also a time needed to apply a challenge to the crossbar PUF
and then get a valid response. From the simulation, we find this delay to be 25.2ns which
includes the sampling time using another clock. Thus, the delay of our XbarPUF circuit
would be a function of the switching times of memristors and the time required to apply a
challenge and get a valid response. It is worth noting that other memristor material stacks
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Figure 4.8: Dependence of average power on HRS/LRS ratio and the absolute values of
HRS and LRS [69].

(such as [80]) have exhibited faster switching times so the delay of the XbarPUF is expected
to improve as technologies mature.

4.1.5

Overhead analysis for Other Memristors

Since we have created an abstract high level model of the XbarPUF, we have also performed
overhead analysis which otherwise would take a really long time to simulate and generate
these different versions of XbarPUF for different memristor materials from a transistor
level simulation. To measure power consumption, we have also modeled current and power
consumption in our high-level XbarPUF model. First, we have computed the approximate
power consumption of our proposed design and evaluate its applicability as a lightweight
hardware security primitive. Since memristors are basically resistive devices, static current
flows through the circuit. All the memristors and series transistor in these current paths
consume static power. Moreover, the peripheral CMOS digital gates consume dynamic
power. To verify our high-level power model of XbarPUF, first we have calculated power
consumption of different sized XbarPUF from both transistor level simulation (from Cadence
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Figure 4.9: Area comparison of XbarPUF with Arbiter PUF [69].

Spectre) and from our high-level abstract model (from MATLAB). The results are shown in
Table 4.3. Values obtained from MATLAB model are slightly lower than power consumption
from transistor-level simulation as we have neglected dynamic power consumption for some
control logic. However, as we can see from this table, the estimated power consumption
values are consistently close to values from transistor simulation and follow the same trend.
Thus we have used our approximate high level power model for the rest of our experiment
to get a sufficient amount of data in a relatively short period of time.
So far in this work, HfOx memristor has been used for all simulations. Now, we have also
evaluated the XbarPUF performance for two other memristor materials too. Parameters

Table 4.3: Power estimation of a HfOx memristor based XbarPUF from MATLAB and
cadence [71]
Crossbar size
(chall×resp)
4×2
8×2
16×2
32×2

Average Power (mW)
(MATLAB)
0.25
0.51
0.98
2.07
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Average Power (mW)
(Cadence Spectre)
0.26
0.61
1.01
2.22

used for three memristors, HfOx , TaOx , and TiOx (hafnium, tantalum, and titanium oxide)
are listed in Table 4.4. Next, we have estimated the static power consumption of a 32×2
XbarPUF in its three different phases of operation for these three different memristors. The
results are shown in Table 4.5. The RESET phase consumes the most amount of power as
all the memristors are reset to HRS during this time. Although, the overall memristance
might be lower during READ and CHALLENGE phases, since higher reset voltage is applied
during RESET phase, the power consumption is also the highest. Our designed PUF stays
most of its time in READ and RESET phase and thus these two phases dominate the
overall average power consumption. As the crossbar size increases, the static power of the
memristors dominates the overall power consumption.
Static power is directly dependent on the memristance and applied voltage magnitude.
Because of its much higher HRS and LRS values, XbarPUF based on TiOx memristor as
listed in Table 4.4 consumes the least amount of power among these three memristors.
Moreover, from Table 4.4, we can also see that TaOx and TiOx memristors have smaller
threshold voltages which facilitates the use of lower read-write voltages. Thus the read-write
voltages of HfOx memristor are 0.6V and 1.3V, respectively while they are 0.3V and 1.0V,
respectively both both TaOx and TiOx memristors. Because of its very small LRS and HRS
values, TaOx memristors consume much larger amount of power compared to the other two.
When LRS/HRS values are small, with increasing crossbar size, the equivalent memristance
or resistance of a crossbar column would become comparable to the on resistance of the
peripheral CMOS transistors and thus CMOS would also contribute to a larger amount
of static power consumption. Finally, since the values in Table 4.5 are heavily influenced
by the choice of read-write voltage and memristor’s parameters especially memristance and
threshold voltages, these numbers are not the only representative of these types of memristors
materials. Rather, each should be analyzed separately depending on the application.
We have also shown how the power consumption changes with a change in crossbar size.
Figure 4.10 shows the relationship between static power consumption with increasing number
of response bits (and hence number of crossbar rows) for all three memristors. XbarPUF
with TaOx shows a faster increase in static power compared to the other two memristors,
HfOx and TiOx due to its small LRS and HRS values. It also limits the scalability of the
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Table 4.4: Switching Parameters for Metal-Oxide Memristors [71]
Parameters
HRS
LRS
Vtp
Vtn
tswp
tswn

HfOx [72]
300KΩ
30KΩ
0.7V
-1.0V
10ns
1µs

TaOx [80]
10k
2k
0.5V
0.5V
105ps
120ps

TiOx [48]
2M
500k
0.5V
0.5V
10ns
10ns

Variation
±20%
±10%
±10%
±10%
±5%
±5%

Table 4.5: Power Consumption during different phases of a 32×2 XbarPUF [71]
XbarPUF
Phase
RESET
CHALLENGE
READ

HfOx
(mW)
3.20
2.10
0.60

TiOx
(mW)
0.27
0.007
0.014

TaOx
(mW)
51.40
42.20
1.10

crossbar for any memristor with smaller memristance values. Added mitigation technique
would increase power consumption for the same number of challenge-response bits. Column
shuffling block would increase the power consumption slightly where the XORing technique
would double it because the effective number of response bits decrease by a factor of 2
with XORing. However, still XbarPUF displays a relatively much low power consumption
compared to most lightweight hardware security primitives.
In previous chapter, we have presented area vs crossbar size results for an XbarPUF
based on HfOx memristor and it is shown again. All memristors considered here are very
small and can fit in each cross-points of two metal layers, thus effectively requiring zero
area. Therefore, changing memristors wouldn’t ideally change the required area although
the peripheral size is affected by the memristor’s parameters. Thus, the only area overhead
is the peripherals, where the area increases with increasing number of crossbar size. The
XbarPUF with added mitigation technique requires larger area but still the overall area
should be much smaller compared to a CMOS PUF like arbiter PUF or RO-PUF.
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Figure 4.10: Relationship between average static power consumption and size of the
XbarPUF [71]

4.1.6

On-Chip Design

To evaluate how the HfO2 memristor based crossbar PUF behaves, we have designed small
test structures to measure its performance. We have implemented a 1-bit memristor crossbar
PUF in 65nm CMOS technology along with HfO2 memristor. The schematic and layout for
this circuit are shown in Figure 4.11 and 4.12, respectively. The schematic is not very clear
from this image, but four memristors, their read-write-form circuitry, row and column logic
of the PUF, and a sense amplifier at the bottom are clearly detectable. The layout dimension
is 19.59µm × 33.63µm (excluding the metal layer extension for routing).

4.2

Robustness Analysis Against ML (Machine Learning) based Attacks

As stated, a PUF response results from a complex function dependent on internal process
variations inherent to specific chip implementations. Therefore, it is very difficult and time
consuming to predict a PUF response based only on the challenges provided. However, if
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Figure 4.11: Schematic of the designed 1-bit memristor crossbar PUF

Figure 4.12: Layout of the designed 1-bit memristor crossbar PUF (19.59µm×33.63µm)
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the internal functionality of a PUF is not complex enough, then using a machine learning
approach such as any classification algorithm, it is possible to model a PUF and predict
the response with high accuracy. In [62], a modeling attack on an arbiter PUF was shown
to achieve 99% accuracy with sufficient CRPs. A modified APUF with XORing, although
requiring a higher number of CRPs, was also shown to be modeled very accurately. High
modeling accuracy was achieved for an APUF due in part to the fact that an APUF can be
expressed with a linear additive delay model and a linear classifier can be used for modeling
purposes.

Since a PUF response is binary, individual PUF responses can be modeled

with a binary classifier. XbarPUF is very similar in behavior to the APUF, because like
APUF, XbarPUF also consists of a number of delay elements, implemented by leveraging
the memristors’ switching rates. Thus, it is also expected that XbarPUF would be vulnerable
against these machine learning based modeling attacks. We have used most commonly used
machine learning algorithms already implemented and optimized for data analysis problems
by researchers and computer scientists.
We have created an equivalent behavioral model of a memristor and XbarPUF in
MATLAB. It is much faster to simulate a high level behavioral model than simulating a
large circuit at the transistor-level. Therefore, it’s easy to construct large crossbar arrays
and generate responses. However, it is essential that our MATLAB model imitates the
actual transistor-level (Cadence Spectre) model accurately. Therefore, we have verified
our MATLAB model by simulating several different circuits in Cadence to compare their
performance and verifying that they behave similarly.

In our previous work [72], the

memristor crossbar size was only 4×2. It is impractical to use such a small circuit for
any kind of machine learning based modeling attacks as the total number of possible inputs
is only 24 = 16. Therefore, we have used XbarPUFs with larger numbers of CRPs so that
only a small subset of all possible combinations of CRPs are used in our experiments.

4.2.1

Development of High Level Behavioral Model of Memristor

In prior work demonstrating the XbarPUF [72], we have used a Verilog-A model for a
hafnium-oxide memristor adapted from a model presented first in [47]. For this work, we
have also created an equivalent high level model of a memristor to use in MATLAB based
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Figure 4.13: Simulated IV characteristics of a metal-oxide (HfOx ) memristor for 200
set/reset cycles for a 100kHz clock. [71]

simulations. At each simulation time step, memristance at the next step is calculated from
the memristor’s current state based on the time duration and magnitude of an applied
voltage bias. Details of this switching operation can be found in [72]. As mentioned before,
there are six primary parameters in our memristor model, specifically: HRS, LRS, Vtp , Vtn ,
tswp , and tswn . As necessary, parameter values are recalculated on each iteration using their
mean and cycle-to-cycle variations for any particular memristor. Figure 4.13 shows the IV
characteristics of a memristor for 200 set and reset cycles. All parameter values are allowed
to vary from one cycle to another, even for a single memristor. The various hysteresis loops
in Figure 4.13 demonstrate cycle-to-cycle variations for a single modeled device.

4.2.2

Development of High Level Behavioral Model of XbarPUF

The memristor crossbar PUF circuit consists of two main components, a memristor crossbar
array and peripheral read-write circuit. A crossbar is simply a 2-D array with memristors at
each crosspoint. A matrix of size row ×col is created where each component is represented
with a memristor ‘class’ in MATLAB. Using respective means and standard deviations for all
the memristor parameters, and assuming a Gaussian distribution function, each memristor
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is assigned to different random initial values for its parameters. This is the step where
die-to-die variations of memristors are mimicked in the simulation.
As mentioned, three phases of operations are performed on the memristor crossbar. A
vector with its length equal to the number of rows in the crossbar is created to represent
the voltage applied to each row. During RESET, all these voltages are equal to -Vwr . Each
memristor is reset to HRS and, therefore, the effective memristance across an entire column
is at its maximum value. The load resistance is chosen such that it has minimum drop during
this reset period and maximum drop during the challenge. During the CHALLENGE phase,
either a positive Vwr or zero voltage is applied to each row depending on the state of the
corresponding challenge bit. If the challenge bit is high, then memristors in that row start
to set toward LRS and the voltage drop across the load starts to increase. Otherwise, any
corresponding memristor is kept at HRS since the applied voltage is 0V. In the READ phase,
all the memristors in a column are in parallel with the applied voltage Vrd . This effective
column memristance is in series with the column’s corresponding load and a simple voltage
divider determines the load voltage. The load voltage from two side-by-side columns are
compared to generate a response with ‘0’ for one column and ‘1’ for the other. Which
column first hits the ‘1’ state determines the column that “wins” the race, thus generating
the corresponding response bit. For an XORed XbarPUF, two response bits (generated from
2 column pairs) are logically XORed to determine one final bit.

4.2.3

Introduction to Machine Learning Attack Models

We have used python’s scikit-learn package [54] to implement several different machine
learning models. Specifically, we have performed classification or modeling of PUF responses
using logistic regression, support vector machine (SVM) with different kernel functions
(linear, polynomial, RBF (radial basis function), and sigmoidal), k nearest neighbour (kNN),
Naive Bayes (Gaussian, and Bernoulli), stochastic gradient descent, random forest, ensemble
methods (bagged tree, and AdaBoost), and neural network (perceptron). All of these are
very standard machine learning techniques and details about their theory, mathematics, and
algorithms can be found in [54] and, thus, skipped here for brevity. Only the results from
best few models are provided in this work.
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4.2.4

Experimental Setup

We need a large enough crossbar with a sufficient number of challenge response pairs (CRPs)
to build an attack model. For this particular work, we are only interested in the final
CRPs, not the actual internal structure of the XbarPUF itself. We have experimented on an
XbarPUF of size 32×2 in terms of CRPs for this work which contains 64×4 memristors. The
idea is that an adversary would gain access into the system and can collect a small subset of
all available CRPs. For the most part of the experiment, we have kept the number of CRPs
to 5000 which is small compared to the total number of possible combinations of input (232 ).
The read, write voltage and clock frequency are constrained by the particular memristor
technology. In this work, we choose the read and write voltage to be 0.6V and 1.3V,
respectively because the HfO2 memristor that we have considered has threshold voltages of
0.7V and -1V in positive and negative switching direction, respectively. The clock frequency
should be kept higher than the memristor’s switching time so that a memristor require
multiple clock cycles to switch from one state to another. This would ensure that little
differences in switching speed between two memristors due to process variation could be
detected with more confidence. For this work, the memristor’s switching time is considered
to be 1µs and we have used a clock with clock period of 100ns (10 times faster).
Before the beginning of each CRP dataset collection, the memristors are instantiated
randomly. First using the statistical mean and variance for each memristor parameter, a
full crossbar of memristors are generated from a normal random distribution. Then a set of
random challenges are applied and 2-bit responses are collected for all different versions of
XbarPUF, without any mitigation technique and with different mitigation techniques applied
as presented next. CRPs are saved in a database file with each row represents one data-point
or CRP containing all challenge and response bits.

4.2.5

Modeling Attack on an XbarPUF

Table 4.6 shows the success of modeling attack against an XbarPUF without mitigation. As
suspected, it is very much vulnerable against such attacks with a modeling accuracy of over
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Table 4.6: Results from modeling attacks on basic XbarPUF (no mitigation) for different
machine learning algorithms
M.L. models
Accuracy (%)

SVM (RBF)
Train Test
80.09 79.10

L. R.
Gauss. N. B.
Train Test Train Test
99.96 99.33 91.29 90.45

AdaB. Ensem.
Train
Test
98.55
97.99

99%. Thus, next we are going to design some mitigation techniques to increase resiliency
against these attacks and reduce the accuracy.

4.2.6

Mitigation of ML Attacks

We have proposed techniques to mitigate these attacks by introducing some form of nonlinearity in the circuit. The first and well-known technique to XOR the responses with each
other to produce different responses. However, this is not sufficient against stronger attack
model with larger number of training data. That’s why we proposed another mitigation
technique called ‘column shuffling’ which shuffles the connection between top part of a
crossbar to its bottom part based on some selector challenge input. In this particular work, we
have proposed a four column shuffling or swapping block with three selector bits controlling
the shuffling logic. An example implementation of such shuffling logic block is provided in
Table 4.7.
There are some restrictions on the way this shuffling block to be implemented. Boolean
logic minimization without keeping an eye on these requirements would change the XbarPUF
behavior unexpectedly. Because these shuffling blocks are used directly in path of response
generation, they can not introduce any uneven delay on these paths. Because that would
introduce bias and could deteriorate the security properties. TO ensure, memristors, not
these blocks are the only source of entropy for the XbarPUF, we have designed the logic
in such a way that the logic path delay introduced by these blocks are equal on all four
crossbar columns. Thus we have only used a subset of all possible combinations of 24 = 16
for 4-columns. Moreover, current flows in both directions in the crossbar and thus these
logic should be symmetric over both directions of current flow. Keeping all these in mind,
we have implemented the shuffling operation as shown in Table 4.7. Figure 4.14 shows one
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Table 4.7: Column swapping logic implemented in this demonstration [71]
S1
0
0
1
1

S0
0
1
0
1

y3
x3
x3
x2
x2

y2
x2
x2
x3
x3

y1
x1
x0
x1
x0

y0
x0
x1
x0
x1

S2
0
1

z3
y3
y1

z2
y2
y0

z1
y1
y3

z0
y0
y2

Figure 4.14: An implementation of column swapping circuit [71].
possible implementation. Three selector bits are needed as control input for this block and
can be considered as extra challenge bits for the PUF. For an M ×N XbarPUF in terms of
no. of rows and columns, it would require M/4 number of column shuffling blocks. All of
these blocks can have different selector inputs or they can all share the same selector bits
as well. For simplicity and to reduce pin count, we have only considered the case when all
these 4-column groups share the same selector bits for their column shuffling block as shown
in Figure 4.15. Adding this column shuffling or mixing block with additional challenge bits
would increase the complexity of any learning algorithms considerably and in next sections,
we’ll analyze the impact of this modification.

4.2.7

Results and Discussions

Table 4.8 presents the modeling attack results for all different XbarPUF versions i.e.
XbarPUF with no mitigation, XOR mitigation, column shuffling, and XOR+column shuffling
mitigation. This table lists the four best modeling attack results from several different
machine learning/classification algorithms found in scikit-learn [54]. As mentioned earlier,
basic XbarPUF with no mitigation technique is very vulnerable and can be modeled with
more than 99% accuracy with logistic regression. As we add non-linearity in the design,
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Figure 4.15: XbarPUF with the inclusion of column swapping logic [71].
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Table 4.8: Results from modeling attacks after mitigation techniques applied for different
machine learning algorithms
Mitigation
Technique
None
XOR
Swap
XOR+Swap

SVM (RBF)
Train Test
80.09 79.10
66.29 63.82
77.97 71.81
52.50 49.64

L.
Train
99.96
78.30
66.93
54.62

R.
Test
99.33
77.01
64.38
49.19

Gauss.
Train
91.29
76.87
66.63
54.59

N. B. AdaB. Ensem.
Test Train
Test
90.45 98.55
97.99
75.68 76.84
75.70
64.64 66.71
64.37
49.20 54.56
49.18

this accuracy should drop. Thus both XORing and column shuffling technique reduce the
modeling accuracy, with column shuffling presenting a higher resiliency against modeling
compared to XOR. However, as we can see from the last row of this table, when we
incorporate both of these mitigation techniques together in the XbarPUF design, the
modeling accuracy drops to almost the probability of a random coin flip (50%).
So far we have evaluated the robustness of the regular XbarPUF and its 3 variants with
different mitigation techniques against four different modeling attack for 5000 data-points.
Now, we have performed experiments to observe how much the modeling accuracy changes
with increasing number of data-points. Figure 4.16 and 4.17 show the modeling accuracy
vs no. of data-points for LR and Gaussian NV (Naive Bayes) model, respectively for all
four versions of the XbarPUF. We picked these two algorithms as representatives of linear
and non-linear classification algorithms. Both of these models achieve very good accuracy
with a small number of data-points (and features), its accuracy doesn’t change or change
slowly with increasing number of data-points. In [62], modeling accuracy of LR model vs.
dataset size was analyzed against arbiter PUF and was shown to vary very slowly which
further justifies our findings here. Since GNV uses a non-linear kernel with large number of
features, its accuracy is expected to increase with increasing no. of data-points. It is evident
from the first three lines of Figure 4.17. However, from Figure 4.17, for the combined
mitigation technique of XOR+column shuffling, the accuracy of bot LR and GNV model do
not improve at all with increasing no. of data-points and stay near random probability of
near 50%. This proves that the XbarPUF with our designed mitigation technique is robust
against both of these modeling algorithms.
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Figure 4.16: Modeling accuracy of LR vs. the size of dataset [71].
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Figure 4.17: Modeling accuracy of Gaussian Native Bayes vs. the size of dataset [71].
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Chapter 5
Lightweight Security for
IoT/Embedded System
5.1

Motivation

In the era of connectivity and smart technology, there is a plethora of small devices that
connect to the Internet and other networking sources with very limited security features.
Many of these devices may contain time-sensitive data. Most of these devices run on battery
with very limited power available to them and some are even batteryless, dependent on
harvested energy alone [38]. Therefore, to save as much power as possible and also due to
their intermittent nature of data sensing operation, they often go to sleep or ultra low power
mode before backing up their sensitive states and other information for data forwarding
[37]. Now, these backup data are usually saved in NVM and are vulnerable to probing and
malicious read. In this work, we are mainly focused on providing a security for the backup
data in these resource constraint devices. Now, since the data in an IoT device are mostly
temporary, the information is no longer useful after a certain period of time. Therefore, their
security requirements are relaxed in terms of complexity of code-breaking algorithms but has
to be very lightweight in terms of area occupied, power consumed and delay introduced. In
this work, we have focused our attention on developing an ultra lightweight security for the
backup data of these devices.
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5.2

Security vulnerability of IoT processor

We have considered two types of resource-limited embedded processor, typically common in
an IoT system, as shown in Figure 5.1. First, a regular battery-operated or very low power
processor may employ very aggressive power power saving technique and often go into ultra
low power mode, before backing up necessary data in an unprotected NVM. Second, for
energy-harvesting devices, since they lose all information when there is a power failure, they
back-up their necessary information for computation in an unprotected NVM as well. Our
idea to secure this unprotected NVM so that an adversary can not gain any information by
reading this data or any illegal modification is detected by the processor. Therefore, a secure
restore and back-up protocol has been developed.
First, a random vector is generated from a TRNG and used as a challenge to an on-chip
PUF. The PUF can generate a unique random response which is used as a cryptographic
to encrypt the data before back-up into an NVM. The challenge is also saved in the NVM
and read again during wake-up to generated the same PUF response or cryptographic key
again. This key is used to decrypt and restore the data. This is illustrated in Fig, 5.2.
Since the same PUF can generate different keys in different devices, our design also provides
device-specific security.

5.3

Our Security Solution

Since we are concerned about providing security for a non-volatile memory which may contain
time-sensitive data, we need to provide some form of encryption which would provide good
security as well as be lightweight in nature. For that purpose, a lightweight PUF based
encryption is designed. We have considered the memristive crossbar PUF or the XbarPUF
for this purpose which would provide the cryptographic key. At the beginning of each backup
operation, a random challenge is applied to the XbarPUF. Then it generates a random
response depending on the challenge which is used as the encryption key. To reduce heavy
overhead of complex encryption engine, we are only proposing to use an XOR block which
would XOR the data to backed up with the PUF key. Then this XORed or encrypted data is
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Figure 5.1: An embedded processor (either regular or energy harvesting) backs-up data for
data-forwarding but the data left on NVM is unprotected.

Figure 5.2: A unique random challenge is applied to a PUF to generate a cryptographic
key for secure back-up and restoration of data in an embedded processor.
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saved in an RRAM or memristor based memory. On each back-up, a new PUF key would be
generated by applying a new challenge and thus essentially implementing an one time pad
(OTP) system. Since OTP is theoretically the most secure, our system is also very secure.
During a wake-up, the same challenge is applied to the XbarPUF again to generate the same
key which is then XORed with the encrypted data to regenerate the original data.
Since reliability is issue for all PUFs and an IoT employed in the field might subject
to larger temperature change, rail voltage and other noise, the reliability is even a bigger
concern where the PUF response is used as the key. Thus the PUF must be improved
to have a close to ideal reliability and also some kind of error correction needs to be
implemented. Since traditional error correction code (ECC) introduces a large overhead,
employing those would defeat the purpose of using PUF for its low overhead compared to
traditional cryptography. Since XbarPUF is robust against environmental changes due to its
relative nature of computation, it is very useful in this type of IoT system. However, because
of memristor’s cycle-to-cycle variation, there would be some unreliable bits in the response
depending on the challenge applied. To overcome this, we have used a simple majority
check to discard these erroneous bits for a particular challenge. Our idea is to use two small
SRAM blocks for this purpose as seen in [cite]. First, a random challenge is applied to the
XbarPUF and the response is saved in an SRAM. Then the same challenge is applied again
(and maybe in a different environmental condition) and the response is saved in another
SRAM with same location for a particular bit position. Then the contents from these two
SRAMs are compared by a simple XOR/XNOR function. If two bits from the two SRAMs
are the same, then it is a valid response bit and used as one bit of the encryption key. If the
bits are different, then it is discarded. This system is thus not exactly an error correction
method, rather a simple error minimization system.
During wake-up, when power is available for a resource-constraint system, the same
challenge as before is applied to the XbarPUF twice to generate a fresh response key again.
Then encrypted data from the RRAM is read bit by bit while contents of the SRAMs are
read and checked for valid key bit and XORed with the encrypted data for decryption and
then saved back to appropriate registers again to resume normal processor operation.
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This whole PUF key generation, data encryption and decryption can be incorporated
in a interrupt routine with a processor. Specifically, we can tie these operations with the
highest level interrupt of a processor, like the low power/voltage warning. Thus for a energy
harvesting system, when the power is unavailable or for a battery powered device, when the
system wants to go to sleep mode, the low power warning interrupt might be enabled to
perform all these operations before power failure or sleep. During wake-up, the decryption
process is done first before resuming regular processor operation again. The different key
components of this system are discussed in the following sections.

5.4

Our Security Protocol

The purpose of this design is to provide security for the unprotected persistent or nonvolatile memory of any low power embedded systems or edge devices. During a sleep or
low power mode or during a power failure for energy harvesting processors, this memory is
vulnerable and our designed security architecture is active during this time. This security
mechanism depends heavily on the XbarPUF based cryptographic key generator and a
reliability enhancement block. Our idea is to generate a reliable and unique cryptographic key
each time a backup operation is needed, thereby our system, effectively, is an implementation
of one-time pad. We have some basic assumptions or criteria for our design. First, the key
should be random. Since the response of a PUF is random by definition, the key extracted
from it is expected to be random as well. Second, even with the same PUF circuit, different
devices would produce unique keys compared to each other. This is the beauty of a PUF
based system is that they are unclonable and unique by nature and an adversary won’t be
able to break the security of another chip even if he gains access to all the keys from one
chip. This is very helpful for IoT domain since there are billions of devices out there and
with traditional cryptography, breaking one device would compromise the security of these
devices. Third, during each back-up, a new key is needed. A strong PUF with sufficiently
large CRPs can provide unique keys throughout the lifetime of a device. Besides, since we
only want to use one key once per encryption and generate a new key during another time,
the reliability requirement of the PUF can be relaxed in this application. PUF response only
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needs to be stable during one cycle of encryption and one cycle of decryption. Moreover, if
a response remains stable during one encryption-decryption and changes over long time due
to aging or other factors, it would actually increase the possible number of unique responses
even for the same challenge over time, thereby increasing available number of keys over the
lifetime of such devices. To fulfill the requirement of OTP, the key should be as large as the
data itself. This is usually difficult to meet for larger systems, however, could be practical
for small IoT systems needing to only back-up states and other information. If a single PUF
response is not large enough to generate a big enough key for the data, then we can generate
multiple much responses to create a key as large as the data itself.
We are also assuming that data is only valid and important for a short period of time
for the type of system that we are targeting. When the processor wakes up from a sleep
mode or when an energy harvesting processor resumes working on its stored data after a
power failure, previous data like program states, temporary data, and other information
are no longer useful. Thus we only need to provide security for the time being when data
is left unprotected on the NVM during a sleep or power failure. Therefore, any rigorous
cryptographic solution which can theoretically be unbreakable for hundreds or thousands of
years is not essential in this case. Thus our goal to provide security for a practical time limit
for such devices. Hardware security is the preferred choice because of its lightweight nature
which is a must in this domain.
We have shown in this work how we meet all of these aforementioned requirements for an
IoT system. Since the RESET phase of an XbarPUF consumes relatively much large amount
of power compared to other states in the security architecture, multiple smaller XbarPUFs
are used and activated one by one in a time-multiplexing fashion and their responses are
augmented together to create a large enough response. Since some bits of this response
vector might be unreliable and prone to flipping, a reliability enhancement block is used to
get only the clean bits which forms the final cryptographic key. As mentioned before, the
challenge to the XbarPUF circuit is generated from a TRNG before each back-up operation.
For reliability enhancement purposes, same challenge is applied to the PUF multiple
times to detect which bits are prone to flipping and can cause bit-errors. For an XbarPUF,
the main source of producing bit-flips is the case when memristors’ cycle-to-cycle variation
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overtakes the variation caused by their chip-to-chip or device-to-device variation. During
device testing, severely unreliable bits cane be detected and eliminated totally while other
bit-flips can be detected run-time. Probability of bit-flips also depend on a particular
challenge and thus it is useful to find bit-flips run-time rather than making a large table
of them beforehand to act as a helper data. Different bits of the challenge vector cause
the PUF responses to depend on different memristors in the crossbar and thus, locations of
bit-flips are highly depend on particular bit values of challenge vectors. The key generation
process including TRNG, XbarPUF, and reliability enhancement operation are described in
algorithm 1 [70].
After generating a secure and reliable cryptographic key, the data is then being encrypted
and save in a persistent memory or NVM. In the simplest case, XORing is performed as the
encryption operation while the key is changed every time to maintain perfect secrecy. A
secure tag or hash is also generated from data integrity verification purposes using sneakpath based tag generation method [40]. This is also a hardware security module which helps
to validate the integrity of data during restore. The tag is saved in the NVM as well. The
sequence of operations when there is low power warning or when a power failure occurs are
described in algorithm 2 [70].
The duration of power failure or energy-saving mode can be long and depend on particular
device and its power/energy source. We have used memristors as NVM in our design and
they can have long retention time without any power source [80], data can be retained for
a sufficiently long duration of time for a particular IoT. When the power comes back onto
the processor based system, the system first checks if there is enough power to resume the
operation or not. If enough power is available, a new tag is first generated from the backup data and compared with the stored tag. If they do not match, the data is said to be
corrupted by either illegal modification, data-error, or key-error and the processor simply
flushes all the data and restarts operation. If the tags match, then key generation protocol
is activated again to generate the same key as before and decrypt the data into the processor
memory. The sequence of operation for secure restore when there is available power in the
system is described in algorithm 3 [70].
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Result: Cryptographic key: KEY; status: VALID KEY ;
Initialization:
T ← no. of samples for reliability enhancement ;
m ← no. of parallel small PUF blocks ;
n ← no. of response bits from each small PUF block ;
resp ← m×n ;
// total response
Function Key Generator():
Enable(PUFs) ;
C = TRNG() ;
// random challenge
for i ← 0 to T do
for j ← 0 to m do
Ri,j = apply challenge to PUF(C) ;
save in SRAM(Ri,j ) ;
end
end
for k ← 0 to resp do
if bit error then
discard bit(R[k]) ;
else
KEY.append(R[k]) ;
end
if length(KEY)==nKey then
VALID KEY ← TRUE ;
break ;
end
end
if length(KEY)<nKey then
VALID KEY ← FALSE ;
end
return KEY
End Function ;
Algorithm 1: Designed secure and error-free key generation method from PUF [70]
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Data: States and other data to be backed-up, DAT
Result: Encrypted data, enc dat, and tag in NVM
Secure backup:
if Low-power-warning is asseted then
Enable(HS block) ;
KEY = Key Generator(C) ;
// XOR(KEY ,DAT )
enc dat = Encrypt(KEY, DAT) ;
write in NVM(enc dat) ;
tag = gen tag(enc dat) ;
save(C, tag) ;
Disable(HW block) ;
else
Continue regular operation ;
end
Algorithm 2: Designed secure data back-up operation

Data: Encrypted data: enc dat, and tag
Result: Restored data, DAT back in registers
Restore data:
while Pavailable < Pthreshold do
wait ;
end
Enable(HS block) ;
enc dat = read from NVM(stored data) ;
C = read from NVM(stored challenge) ;
old tag = read from NVM(tag) ;
new tag = gen tag(enc dat) ;
if new tag = old tag & VALID KEY = TRUE then
KEY = Key Generator(C) ;
dec dat = Decrypt(KEY, enc dat) ;
// XOR(KEY ,enc dat)
write back in registers(dec dat) ;
else
flush data() ;
restart processor() ;
end
Disable(HS block) ;
Algorithm 3: Designed secure data recovery operation [70]
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Figure 5.3 connects all of these three key generation, secure backup, and restore
algorithms and shows the overall working mechanism of our designed security protocol. Key
generation algorithm is a part of both secure and restore operations and produces a run-time
unique random key from the XbarPUF. The secure back-up is activated when there is a low
power warning and can be designed to be activated by an interrupt of the IoT processor. The
secure restore is activated when the available power is greater than the minimum required
power. This whole control flow graph is illustrated in Figure 5.3.

5.5

System Implementation

To get a very accurate idea about the actual real-world implementation, we have designed
our whole security protocol at transistor level with 65nm technology on Cadence Virtuoso
platform. We have used RRAM as the NVM and simple D flip-flop based registers as the
processor memory which needs to be backed-up. We have calculated all our security metrics,
overhead analysis from this low level implementation. In this particular prototype, our
system generates uses a 32×32 XbarPUF to generate a reliable 16-bit cryptographic key.
Figure 5.4 displays the system block diagram of this system and its different components are
described next in this section.

5.5.1

One Time Pad Implementation

The one time pad (OTP) or also often called the Vernam cipher is the perfect cryptographic
algorithm providing maximum security [24]. In this cryptosystem, the plaintext is paired
with a random secret key and that key is changed every time a new encryption is needed,
thus theoretically ensuring the best security. However, this one time pad or OTP is not used
much in practice due to difficulty in its requirements. The key must be (1) truly random,
(2) as long as the plaintext, (3) cannot be used more than once. The distribution and
secure storage of the key are also big issues. However, here the requirements are fulfilled or
relaxed. First, in embedded system or IoT domain, the plaintext or the data to be backed
up is small and, therefore, the key can actually be made as large as the data. Second, in
theory, PUFs can produce true random number as responses if it receives pseudo-random
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Figure 5.3: Control flow graph for our secure back-up and restore protocol [70]
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Figure 5.4: System block diagram showing different components of our designed security
protocol [70]
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number as challenges and thus no need to provide truly random number separately. Third,
the key need not to be stored since PUF can generate the key anytime if the same challenge
is applied. By ensuring different challenge input, the requirement of producing different key
can be fulfilled.

5.5.2

True Random Number Generator (TRNG)

To generate a unique key during each back-up operation, we need to provide the PUF
with a unique challenge. We can use a TRNG to produce that random challenge from the
hardware itself. This would also help avoid repetition of generating the same challenge and
same key in an unpredictable fashion, thereby fulfilling the requirement of an OTP system.
TRNG output should be independent of any external influence like temperature, supply
voltage noise and should be robust against process variation. Specifically, IoT device can go
through extreme environmental changes and thus robustness against such changes is even
more important in this domain. Researchers have successfully built TRNG from memristive
devices [26]. In this work, we are using our custom-designed designed TRNG [67] which
is expected to be very robust against environmental and process variations unlike existing
designs. During each back-up, TRNG would produce a random challenge vector which is
applied to generate the response from a PUF during both back-up and restore. Therefore,
TRNG output is saved in the NVM during back-up to be used during data restore.

5.5.3

Redesigned XbarPUF for IoT

The memristor crossbar PUF or the XbarPUF is the heart of operation of this system. In a
regular XbarPUF [69], challenges are applied for a very short period of time, much smaller
than the actual switching time of a memristor, to nudge the memristance towards HRS or
LRS depending on the magnitude and direction of applied challenge voltage. Then a small
read voltage pulse is applied to read the memristance of both crossbar column memristors.
This whole process is repeated until one of the columns reach to either HRS or LRS first and
thus declared the winner. This is the so-called read-monitored-write approach [42] where
knowledge of precise switching time is not important. The problem with this approach is
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that the time to get a valid response is not predictable and thus not suitable to use within
a processor based system.
To overcome these issues, we do not use the gradual read-monitored-write approach and
use a single fixed pulse to nudge the memristors midway between HRS and LRS. Although,
it requires prior knowledge of exact switching time of memristors, it makes the input-tooutput sample time fixed and predictable and thus useful to incorporate in any processor
based system. The memristor switching time can be determined beforehand from fab or we
can change the clock period to try with different frequencies and select whichever gives the
most stable output. We choose the clock period to be around half the switching time of the
memristor. Choosing a fixed low frequency could make both the column memristors reach
to either LRS or HRS and thus eventually having little difference between them. Choosing
very high frequency could make the change in memristance very small and thus could be
impractical to differentiate in a circuit. For the switching time on the range of 50-100ns,
we have chosen the pulse width of the clock to be 25ns. This technique doesn’t require the
use of arbiters or flip-flops and sense amplifiers are used instead to generate responses. The
design of the sense amplifier is presented in this next subsection.

5.5.4

RRAM for Non-Volatile Storage

Memristor based memory or RRAM is used as the NVM of our designed system. As we’ll
later in this chapter, we have implemented a prototype system with 16-bit data and thus we
require minimum a 16-bit storage to store the encrypted data. To account for bit-errors, we
have designed the XbarPUF to have a 32-bit response. However, to keep a generic design,
and also that NVM would also store challenge, tag, and other necessary information, the
NVM is sized 5×12. The LRS of the memristor is considered as logic ‘1’ while the HRS is
considered as logic ‘0’. Each cell of the RRAM is a 1T1R logic element where there are one
large access transistor in series with a memristor. The HRS/LRS ratio and the dimension of
the overall RRAM determine the size of the transistor to minimize area and power overhead
while maximizing noise margin between two logic levels. More details i.e. address decoder,
column decoder, counter etc. designs are skipped for brevity.
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5.5.5

Time Multiplexing of PUF to Lower Power Consumption

The first phase of XbarPUF requires a complete reset of all the memristors of the XbarPUF.
Since this involves states change of around half of all the memristors, this requires a lot of
static power. For any small system, this would mean a much higher peak power demand
during this time which might not be feasible. Therefore, we have decided to use time
multiplexing to reduce the peak power demand and distribute energy over several cycles.
But we can not distribute this indefinitely since that might increase the overall energy
requirement considerably because some logic blocks would need to activated all the time and
this also adds additional delay. To trade-off between peak power demand and delay, we have
to choose an optimal PUF size with required no. of multiplexing unit. For our prototype
design, we have decided to divide our 32×32 XbarPUF to four 32×8 XbarPUF which adds
3× additional delay but also reduces the peak power by a factor of almost 4. For system with
different circuit configuration, size and different application requirements, further research
is needed to find a optimum power-delay point.

5.5.6

SRAM as Part of Reliability Enhancement Block

As mentioned earlier, any PUF is prone to errors which limit their usage as a key generator.
Thus there needs to be some form of error correction so that the key can be considered
stable over one cycle of encryption and decryption. The current idea is to use a pair of
SRAMs to hold two sets of the same response and then compare to find any errors. These
two SRAMs are custom designed and to hold two sets of temporary 32-bit response of the
XbarPUF, two 4×8 SRAMs (32 bits each) are used. The SRAMs can be written with 8 bits
at a time. Each SRAM cell is a standard 6-T cell, with PMOS and NMOS transistors sized
accordingly to ensure fast write as well as reliable read operation. Each pair of bit-lines
(regular and complimentary line) contains one custom designed fast and high resolution
9-T sense amplifiers to detect bit-line voltage differences, 3-PMOS bit-line precharge and
equalization circuit, and 2-inverter 2-NMOS input logic circuit. Address decoders, MUXes,
and counters are also designed to be integrated with each SRAM as well for proper addressing
and data input-output.
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5.5.7

Sneak-Path based Integrity Checking

If an adversary tries to alter any data stored in the back-up non-volatile memory, then
to detect that unauthorized change, a sneak-path based tag generation is also employed.
The details of the sneak path of a memristor crossbar and how to generate tag from it is
discussed in [41]. After each backup operation, a tag is made and saved in a secure nonvolatile memory. During a wake-up, a new tag is generated from the encrypted data and
compared with the stored tag. If the two tags are different from each other, then an error/
alteration of data is found and instead of using the back-up state information, the processor
flushes all the data and restarts the whole process. This system would also detect if there
is any mismatch due to the PUF’s reliability issues since if the two response keys generated
during back-up and wake-up are different, then processor would simply discard that data
and restart everything. In this way, although the forward progression of processor is halted,
any kind of these errors would not make their way into the processor data to result in an
faulty calculation.

5.5.8

Control Circuit Design

We have also designed control circuits for our security protocol so that it can be ”plugged-in”
to any processor based system. This whole security protocol would be activated once where
is a low power warning (e.g. for batteryless systems) or once the system decides to go in a
low power mode i.e. sleep or hibernation. In both cases, data may be left on a unsecured
memory and our goal is to secure this data while the processor is in a low power state and
load data back into registers and other memory locations when it wakes up. We design and
implement all required state machines at transistor level for the prototype system that we
are building here. To accommodate various power/energy, area, and speed requirements of
different devices, we can do simple overhead analysis to find the best sets of parameters for
a particular application.
When a low power warning is issued, a random challenge is generated from a TRNG. A
low power and robust TRNG design using memristive technology is discussed in a previous
chapter. This challenge can also be generated beforehand to reduce the time and energy it
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would take during this low power mode. This challenge is then applied to an XbarPUF block
which would generate the responses required to create the secret key. The XbarPUF requires
a RESET phase where all memristors are reset from their LRS to HRS. Thus during this
phase, static current flows through the whole crossbar, consuming a large amount of power.
This even though the overall system may have a low average power, this phase would demand
a large peak power demand, making it impractical for many systems. That’s why we are
diving the whole crossbar into multiple smaller crossbars to reduce this peak power demand
during RESET phase. The number of smaller crossbar PUFs and their individual sizes can be
determined based on a particular memristive technology along with circuit level parameters
and design requirements. For this work, we envision memristors to have very high LRS and
HRS values along with low threshold voltages to reduce the amount of energy required to
switch their states. For this reason, we have decided to use the TiOx memristor shown in
[48] as the example memristor to build this system. The parameters for this memristor is
given in 4.4 and again shown in here in Table 5.1.
To reduce this peak power demand, we have divided our 32×32 XbarPUF into four 32×8
XbarPUF, thus effectively reducing the static power by a factor of 4. However, this increases
the delay in producing responses from each of these four separate PUFs with some added
area because of their peripheral circuitry. Each PUF is activated one by one, as they each
generates one portion of the final response vector. These partial responses are written into a
temporary memory as soon as they are available. For this particular design, we have designed
an SRAM to act as the temporary storage. During each cycle, one XbarPUF is active while
the other remains disabled, and one row of the SRAM is written by this XbarPUF. Here,
our designed SRAM is sized 4×8 so that each row can hold 8-bit response that each smaller
(32×8) XbarPUF produces. This makes their control circuit neat and easier to decode. The
SRAM is custom designed too, with the same 65nm technology like the rest of this security
architecture. Now, we have implemented an all-agree voting or majority voting (discussed
in a later section) as reliability enhancement technique here where a response bit is taken
as a valid key bit only if that bit doesn’t change among a certain number of measurements.
More measurements increase the accuracy of the reliability enhancement technique but it
also adds delay and energy overhead. As for this system, we are implementing the simplest
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Table 5.1: Switching Parameters (mean value) for TiOx Memristors [48]
HRS
2M Ω

LRS
500kΩ

Vtp
0.5V

Vtn
0.5V

tswp
10ns

tswn
10ns

2-vote all-agree voting scheme. To implement this, PUF responses are generated twice and
saved in two different SRAMs. After comparing the contents of these two SRAMs and
removing erroneous bits, each key bit is XORed with data bit and saved in an RRAM bit
by bit. This phase is long in terms of delay but the average power required is very small
compared to PUF response generation steps. We can reduce the time required by storing
multiple bits at once (e.g. byte access or word access). It could also increase the required
number of response bits for a particular size of key, however.
We have used standard Johnson counters and ring counters to implement state machines
in our circuit design. In the first state after security blocks are enabled, a complete response
vector is generated from all four 32×8 XbarPUFs. Thus, there are four sub-states under this
first state too. A single 32×8 PUF is activated during sub-state. This involves resetting all
the memristors, applying a random challenge to the PUF, and reading the response. Clock
pulses with the same period but smaller duty cycles with different phases are used to control
these operations. Moreover, during each sub-state, response from each PUF is saved in one
row the first SRAM. Thus at the end of first state, this SRAM-1 contains 32 response bits
from four XbarPUFs. The second state is very similar to the first state, when responses
are generated from these four PUFs and saved in an SRAM. Little difference is that now
the responses are saved in a different SRAM. In the third state, contents from these two
SRAMs i.e. saved responses are compared against each other by XORing and only valid or
unchanged response bits are considered as a part of the final key. Each key bit is XORed
i.e. encrypted with one bit from the data and written in an RRAM. Thus depending on the
number of key/data bits, this state can be long. In our designed state diagram, this state
is actually much longer than the first two states to account for the errors in in the response
vector. Each erroneous bit means one clock cycle lost as it is discarded. For this system, we
need a minimum of 16 cycles to read 16 correct response bits or keys. To account for the
maximum number of errors, we make this state 32 bits long as the whole response is 32 bit
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itself. State 1 and state 2 are 4 cycles each, where each clock cycle is used to generate one set
of response from each individual PUF. The clock period, pulse width, supply voltages etc.
are chosen to minimize the power consumption while ensuring a good window of operation
for the particular types of memristors that we have chosen. Specifically, we have chosen a
VDD of 0.85V with a clock period of 1µs for this simulated design. The analog MUXes,
buffers, and other components are sized accordingly to minimize power consumption and
voltage drop across them.
At the last step before the power is turned off during a power failure or low power mode,
a tag is generated from the stored memory content. This tag along with the PUF challenge
is saved in a secure small memory. When power comes back on or when the processor starts
to get out of low power mode its wake-up protocol takes place. First, a new tag is generated
from the stored (and encrypted) data. Then the old stored tag is read and compared with
the new tag. If they do not match, then the data is considered to be corrupted or altered
illegally and the processor restarts its operation, flushing all the data. This way any illegal
modification of data or any key or data error won’t propagate their way into the processor.
If both tags match, then key generation and reliability enhancement processes take place.
Just like before, the PUFs are activated one by one to generate and store a 32-bit response
into the SRAMs. Then erroneous key bits are discarded to get a clean 16-bit key. Finally,
encrypted data from the RRAM is read bit by bit and XORed with the corresponding key
bit for decryption and then saved back into registers again. Except for the tag generation
and matching part, all the other operations are done at the same sequence during wake-up
as in during back-up.
It is very important that no states are active at the same time i.e. there are no glitches at
all, especially for time-critical time-multiplexing of PUFs to generate responses. To ensure
that no two consecutive states have glitches, two phase non-overlapping clock generators
are used. They are used at the outputs of state decoders between two successive states to
prevent any metastability. Moreover, due to the presence of different clocks (e.g, SRAM
clock, RRAM clock, PUF RESET and READ signals), synchronizers are needed to ensure
reliable capture between two different clock domain. As the clock frequency is known and
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all these clocks share the same frequency with just different phases, a simple two-phase
synchronizer based on two flip-flops are used.

5.6

Initial Design without Reliability Correction

Initially we have developed a small prototype without the error correction or tag generation
method, only to demonstrate PUF based key generation and encryption-decryption technique
[74]. Figure 5.5 shows the conceptual block diagram of this small system. The secret key
generation block of this figure is essentially a PUF. Before each power down or sleep phase,
a random challenge is applied to the PUF to generate a unique random response. Then the
data to be backed up can be encrypted with any very lightweight cryptographic technique and
saved in a non-volatile memory (NVM). This way the data would be safe against malicious
read. For this demonstration, we have used a simple bitwise XOR to encrypt the data. To
restore the data, the same challenge is applied to the PUF again to generate the key. In
this case, simply XORing the encrypted data with the PUF key would give back the original
data. The idea is to provide robust security like an one time pad where they key is random
and changed on each encryption-decryption operation. The added benefit of using a PUF
is that the key is inherently random with pseudo-random challenge input, need not to be
stored physically and can be generated on demand.

5.6.1

Overview

For this demonstration, we have implemented a 4×4 modified XbarPUF which takes 4
challenge bits as input and produces a 4-bit response as the cryptographic key. This is
shown in Figure 5.6 In the first phase of operation, this PUF takes one cycle to generate
the 4-bit key and that key is saved in a register. In second phase, key is XORed with the
data register and this encrypted data is written in an RRAM one bit at a time. Thus this
phase takes 4 clock cycles for a 4-bit key. During decryption, the PUF is provided with
the same challenge to produce the same key and encrypted data is read from the RRAM
bit by bit. Decryption is done by XORing the encrypted data with the register again and
the decrypted data is saved back in the original data register. Here, the encryption and
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Figure 5.5: High-level conceptual block diagram of the initial security system [74]

Figure 5.6: Block diagram of the initially designed prototype system [74]

decryption operation are symmetric and share the same XOR block to reduce area. The
idea of this security design is to try to implement as close as possible to a hardware one time
pad [24]. If the PUF is provided with pseudo-random challenges as input, the responses
would be random. Each time a power-down occurs and backup operation is needed, the
PUF is provided with a new challenge and thus the resulted response or the key would be
new too. Therefore, just like an one time pad, the cryptographic key would be changed each
time it is used. Moreover, since the length of data to be backed up is not large in these IoT
devices, the key can actually be made as large as the data and thus any repetition based
attack would not reveal the key.

5.6.2

Results for Initial Prototype

First, we have evaluated our PUF by running Monte Carlo statistical analysis. The results
for important PUF metrics are listed in Table 5.2. Although, it is only a demonstration,
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Table 5.2: Performance of modified XbarPUF used in this design [74]
Security metrics Uniqueness(%)
Average
50.090

Bit-aliasing(%)
50.833

Reliability(%)
99.904

using Monte Carlo simulation, we have analyzed 500 chip instances, and each for 500 cycles.
As we can see, our XbarPUF shows excellent uniqueness and bit-aliasing which indicates the
random nature of the response bits. Reliability is also very good, although not 100% as a
typical cryptographic algorithm demands. However, in this system, the PUF only needs to
be reliable in a single set of encryption and decryption cycles and causes no problem if the
PUF produces different response in a completely different time and can actually increase the
entropy of the PUF this way.
Table 5.3 shows the overhead of this initial design. The encryption and decryption
phases involve a lot of memristor read-write operations and consume larger amount of power
compared to write-only and read-only stages for the ReRAM. Also, we have used HfO2
memristors for this design which have relative lower HRS and LRS values. Later we have
switched to TiO2 memristors with much higher HRS and LRS values to reduce the power
consumption significantly. Each of the key generation phase has just a single cycle delay.
Where for an N-bit key and thus N-bit memory, it takes N cycles each to write and read all
the bits.
The total GE (gate equivalent) count compared to a unit-sized NAND of our whole
system is approximately 547. Majority of this number comes from the large pass-gates used
for read-write control circuits of RRAM. Fortunately, these control blocks can be shared
among many row-columns and thus GE count won’t increase much with increasing RRAM
sizes. There are also a total of 64 memristors in the XbarPUF (4×4) and 4 memristors in
the ReRAM(2×2). Memristors in crossbar architecture takes very little area compared to
even a single transistor and thus they contribute to a large reduction in overall area.
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Table 5.3: Overhead in different phases of the system [74]
Overhead
Power (µW)
Delay (clock cycles)

5.7

Enc. key
generation
24.61
1

Memory
write
0.79
4

Memory
read
0.44
4

Dec. key
generation
24.96
1

Reliability Enhancement Technique

After designing and demonstrating the low overhead with security properties of our design, we
have worked on improving the reliability of the PUF for practical key generation applications.
Since a PUF’s response depends on tiniest manufacturing process variation which can be
affected by noise or other environmental effects, and we have already seen that our XbarPUF
doesn’t have ideal 100% reliability. As traditional error-correcting methods can huge area,
delay, and power overhead, we have considered two fast, low overhead and run-time reliability
enhancement techniques in our work. First one depends on isolating and eliminating bitflips from the PUF response to determine the final key and we call it all-agree or veto-voting
technique. The second approach is well-known majority voting technique. Both of these are
described below.

5.7.1

All-Agree Voting/Veto Technique

All-agree voting or veto technique depends on finding and eliminating bits which flips between
multiple responses of a PUF even for the same applied challenge. To implement this, the
same challenge is applied for an ‘N’ number of times to produce ‘N’ sets of responses. Ideally,
without any bit-error, all of these should be the same. However, in practice, there would
be some unstable bits which would flip among these evaluations. In this all-agree voting
technique, we only consider bits that do not flip even once in ‘N’ evaluations to be a part of
the final cryptographic key. This technique, therefore, requires the no. of bits in response
to be longer than the key to accommodate for bit-flips. This number of additional bits and
the optimal number of evaluations (‘N’) are determined experimentally.
In this all-agree voting technique, a bit would be only be considered as part of the key if
that bit remains stable during both encryption and decryption, resulting in a different key.
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Suppose, the probability of a particular bit being stable at a particular logic value (either
at ‘1’ or ‘0’) is p. Thus the probability of that bit being the opposite value (not stable) is
1-p. Thus for an ‘N’ of evaluations, the probability of a bit being stable is pN while the
probability of bit flips at least once is (1-pN ). Now this bit-flip would propagate to cause an
error without being detected by this voting technique is given by equation 5.1. PE denoted
probability of error.

P E1 = pN ∗ (1 − pN )

(5.1)

There is another less-likely way of an error being propagated into the system with
detection. This is when a bit remains stable in its less-stable state during encryption but
flips during decryption. The probability of that happening is given by equation 5.2.

P E2 = (1 − p)N ∗ (1 − (1 − p)N )

(5.2)

Now in both cases (equation 5.1, 5.2), we consider that a particular bit remains stable
during encryption but flips during decryption. These same two equations hold for a case
where a bit can flip during encryption but remains unchanged during decryption. Thus the
probability of an bit-flip being propagated, and resulting in a part of the cryptographic key
is given by the following equation 5.3:

P E1,2 = 2 ∗ [(pN ∗ (1 − pN )) + ((1 − p)N ∗ (1 − (1 − p)N ))]

(5.3)

However, we need slight modification as this equation counts two special cases twice.
This situation happens when the PUF produces all ‘1’s during encryption, but all ‘0’s during
decryption for a particular bit and vice-versa. The probability of such a case is:

P E(allzeros + allones) = 2 ∗ [(pN ∗ (1 − p)N ))]

(5.4)

Both equations 5.1 and 5.2 take this situation into account and thus this is being
considered twice while finding out the overall error propagation probability of the all-agree
voting technique as given by equation 5.3. Thus by subtracting this case from equation 5.3,
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we get the final expression for a bit-flip being undetected and propagated into the final key
with all-agree voting system and is shown shown here.

P E(all-agree voting) = 2 ∗ [(pN ∗ (1 − pN )) + ((1 − p)N ∗
(5.5)
(1 − (1 − p)N )) − (pN ∗ (1 − p)N ))]
For a few different suitable numbers of evaluations, ‘N’ and for different probability
values of ‘p’ (denoted the probability of a particular bit being stable at a fixed binary
logic i.e. represents bit-flipping probability), we have used equation 5.5 to show a bit-error
probability plot in Figure 5.7.
In any PUF, there could be some bit positions in the response where there is a high
bit-flipping probability while most of the other bits in that response remain stable at a
particular logic value for the same challenge. In our XbarPUF, as we have shown later from
exhaustive simulations that on average there are less than only 2 bit-flips out of the 32-bit
PUF response over a long period of time with the same challenge being applied. Thus if it is
possible to eliminate these few bits having high bit-flip probabilities, then the system would
have overall a smaller probability of generating different keys between a pair of encryption
and decryption cycles.
From Figure 5.7, it is evident that with larger number of samples or evaluations (N), allagree voting scheme is more efficient at eliminating highly flipping bits. Its implementation
is also simpler with just XORing to find detect bit-flips and two separate storage to contain
both actual response and bit-flip information.

5.7.2

Majority Voting

Majority voting scheme is a very well-known and established error correction technique. To
implement this technique for PUF error correction, the same challenge would be applied to a
PUF for a fixed number of times and a bit would be considered either a ‘1’ if it produces ‘1’
more than ‘0’ among those evaluations or ‘0’ where it produces more ‘0’. Thus unlike all-agree
voting technique, no response bits are not discarded here, rather majority voting is used to
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Figure 5.7: ‘All-agree’ reliability enhancement technique for different number of evaluations
for different bit-flip probability. It is more efficient at detecting highly unstable bits with
increasing number of evaluations [70]

determine their more stable or prominent binary value. The probability of determining the
correct binary value of a response bit using this technique with ‘N’ number of evaluations
are given by the following equation:

 
N
X
N r
p (1 − p)N −r
P (majority voting) =
r
N
r=

2

+1

N
2

(5.6)

X N 
(1 − p)r pN −r
=⇒ P.E. = 1 −
r
r=0
Derivation of this equation is provided in Appendix E. Figure 5.8 shows a plot using this
equation for different number of samples (‘N’) and for different bit-flip probability ( ‘p’).
With larger number of ‘N’, the curve gets narrower around the center i.e. it can detect bitflips more effectively. This technique, however, is not effective for bits which already have
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Majority Voting
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Figure 5.8: Effectiveness of majority voting for reliability enhancement technique for
different number of evaluations and with different bit-flip probability [70]

very high flipping probability, p = 0.4-0.6 as it is evident from the figure since the peak of
the curve remains the same for any number of evaluations.
One of the other things for consideration of majority voting technique is the overhead.
The overhead could be high for larger number of evaluations, ‘N’. For example, for an Nsample majority voting, we would need counters that can count up to N for each response
bit, and memory capacity of log2 N bits to store the results for each bit of the PUF response.

5.7.3

Chosen Reliability Enhancement Technique

If we look carefully at both Figure 5.7 and 5.8, we see that all-agree voting is more effective
at detecting (and eliminating) high bit-flips while majority voting is better at detecting
bits with smaller bit-flipping probability. Delay and area overhead increase with increasing
number of evaluations for majority voting where all-agree voting can be implemented simply
with using XORs and one extra bit per response bit for any number of evaluations. To reap
the benefit of both of these techniques, one idea is to use all-agree voting with large value of
‘N’ during chip functionality testing to eliminate bits with high flipping probability (0.4-0.6)
and only use majority voting with small ‘N’ during run-time to reduce bit-error. If all-agree
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voting can eliminate highly unreliable bits before regular operation, then majority can be
used with only a few samples during run-time, thereby also ensuring lightweight operation.
The choice of reliability enhancement technique heavily relies on the bit-flipping profile
of all the response bits of a PUF. Other factors include the overhead associated with the
implementation i.e. allowable power, area, delay constraints and security requirements of
a system. Depending on all of these, we can choose to implement a particular reliability
enhancement technique and not the other. One key thing to remember is that we are not
implying to eliminate all bit-errors altogether, but to reduce its probability to such extent
that the cost or associated overhead when there is a key error (i.e. when the processor
restarts) would be insignificant compared to the total savings in overhead associated with a
particular reliability enhancement technique.

5.8

Working Principle

We have designed the whole system at transistor level in Cadence Virtuoso with 65nm CMOS
technology and memristive technology. Figure 5.9 shows the waveform for different signals
of this design. The X axis shows time in microseconds (µs). As mentioned before, each clock
cycle is 2 µs long. Asserting signal ‘EN’ starts the sequence of back-up operation maintaining
our security protocol. When the control signal ‘state1’ of Figure 5.9 is high, XbarPUF
block and SRAM-1 are enabled. Signals ‘en0’ to ‘en3’ indicates activation of four different
smaller XbarPUFs one by one. Thus in this state, each of the four XbarPUFs are reset,
challenge is being applied, and read with the help of signals ‘CLK’, ‘Reset’, ‘Challenge’, ‘WE’
(write enable). During ‘state2’, almost exactly the same thing happens as these XbarPUFs
are activated once more to generate responses. However, unlike ‘state1’, the responses are
now saved in the second SRAM. Signals ‘en0’ to ‘en3’ also enable different rows of these
two SRAMs to help writing PUF responses there. The next state is large and we call it
‘state3to10’. During this state, contents from the two SRAMs are read and compared to
find valid key bits, data is encrypted and then written into the RRAM. Signals ‘dout-a’ and
‘dout-b’ denote the output from SRAM1 and SRAM2, respectively. Without any error, they
should display exactly the same values. However, for the purpose of demonstration, we have
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intentionally produced 8 bit errors as shown in Figure 5.9. The signal ‘MATCH’ also show
when there is a mismatch among these two SRAM output i.e. among key bits. By counting
the occurrence of such events during this state (‘state3to10’) from Figure 5.9, we can also
verify that the total number of bit error is indeed 8. Now as mentioned before, this demo
design would use a 16-bit key. Thus we only need to extract first 16 ‘good’ bits from the 32
bit PUF response. Since there are 8 erroneous bits, added intentionally, the system would
read from SRAMs 16+8 = 24 times to get 16 ‘good’ bits. Signals ’count0’ though ‘count4’
represent the number of bits read from SRAM. From these signals, if we notice in Figure
5.9, we can see the count is ‘11000’ or 24 at the end of this state which validates our claim.
The signal ‘stop-count’ also shows when the counter is being paused i.e. when there is a
bit-error. The signal ‘key15’ shows the key bit used for encryption in different clock cycle.
The bottom three signals of Figure 5.9 are used for controlling the RRAM write. The signal
‘valid-writ’ is high only when there is no bit-error and if it is high, either ‘reset-on-0’ or
‘set-on-1’ signal is activated to write either a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ in the RRAM, respectively. Back-up
data is represented using a 16-bit register which is XORed with the key and then written
in the RRAM. Tag generation is done as soon as the system finishes writing 16 bits to the
RRAM. During decryption, the XbarPUF blocks and SRAMs are activated again to generate
the same valid key as before and RRAM is read bit by bit this time to XOR with the key
and then write back in data and state registers.

5.9
5.9.1

Possible Attack Scenarios
Malicious read

The main motivation behind this designed security protocol is to prevent an attacker from
reading out the contents from the backup NVM, thereby gaining sensitive information about
the overall system. Our PUF-key based one time pad (OTP) encryption scheme encrypts
the data before doing backup to prevent direct readout of sensitive information. As we have
explained before, we are effectively implementing an OTP here. OTP is theoretically the
most secure encryption system if we can fulfill its three main requirements: (1) random key,
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Figure 5.9: Waveform for a complete secure backup and restore cycle showing how different
states control different operations of the system. Counter keeps track of the number of valid
or legal key bits and stops each time a bit error occurs

(2) unique key during each operation, and (3) key being as large as the data. Our generated
key is random as it comes from a strong PUF and in the expected embedded or IoT system
where the amount of backup needed is small, the key can actually be made as large as the
data. Moreover, since the backup operation could be infrequent and the overall state-space
of a strong PUF could be very large, a PUF key is unlikely to be repeated predictably in
a practical time-frame of an IoT device and thus replay attack should be improbable. Key
sharing is another weakness of an OTP, however, this is not a concern here as the key is
only used in-place within a same device. Therefore, we are fulfilling all the requirements of
an OTP and ensuring maximum security with a unique random key.

5.9.2

Malicious Write

An adversary might try to illegally modify the contents of the backup NVM arbitrarily,
thereby creating an erroneous calculation in the processor. An error in original data or key
itself can also result in an erroneous backup, especially during power failure or sleep and time
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sensitive back-up operation. A memory integrity checking based on the sneak-path currents
of an RRAM crossbar should be able to detect any kind of data alteration. During wake-up,
this system calculates a tag from the backup memory and verify against its saved tag. If
they do not match, the processor simply rejects all backup data and restarts its operation.
This would result in an increase in overhead as the processor can’t use previous states and
backup data, but this makes the overall system robust against any errors or harmful injection
of information.

5.9.3

Readout or Alteration of the PUF Challenge or Secure Tag

Since we need to produce the same response during encryption, the random challenge to
generate the PUF response during back-up is also saved in the NVM, to be used during
restore operation. The tag generated for integrity verification purpose is also save in a
secure NVM. Here, we assume that attacker would have more difficulty to access these small
bits of secure memory. If the PUF is robust against machine learning based modeling attack
for XbarPUF [71], just getting access to the challenge shouldn’t compromise the security.
Moreover, continuous access to the PUF is not permitted in this system as the PUF is
only used at some certain stages. Finally, illegally modifying the saved PUF challenge
would almost definitely change the PUF response as well as the encryption key, which would
inevitably result in an erroneously restored data. Pre-computing a tag or hash with the
encrypted data during backup and restore would help to prevent such scenarios and detect
such illegal modifications.
The tag is calculated from the sneak-path currents of the memristor crossbar [40], i.e. this
is similar to an analog in-memory computation. Because of the analog nature of memristor’s
switching itself and its die-to-die and cycle-to-cycle variations, it should be very difficult,
if not impossible, to repeat exact resistive states of a crossbar of memristors to regenerate
the same sneak-path current and the same tag. Thus once the encrypted data and tag are
written into NVM, any attempt of further modification should corrupt the data and the
tag and thus processor would be able to detect it by doing an integrity verification during
restore.
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5.9.4

Modeling Attacks

Machine learning based modeling attack is one of the primary concerns of a strong PUF,
especially PUFs which can be modeling using linear additive linear delay model as shown
in [62]. The idea is to gather a subset of CRPs of a strong PUF and build a model using
machine learning (classification) algorithms to predict responses for unknown challenges.
This effectively reduces the randomness of PUF responses. We have shown in Chapter 4
that XbarPUFs are also vulnerable to modeling attacks while mitigation techniques are also
developed. However, it is not possible to apply continuous challenges to the PUF in this
system, unlike authentication applications. In our system, the only way to build a database
for modeling attack is to observe many cycles of backup and restore and perform illegal read
of PUF challenges and responses, thereby increasing the timeframe of the attack considerably.
In an extreme case, what an adversary can do is to gain control of a device, causing
continuous back-up and restore with known data value so that it can gather information
about the responses by doing malicious read of the encrypted back-up data and challenge.
To prevent this from happening altogether, our XbarPUF should be able to resist modeling
attacks. A simple and lightweight modification which was introduced in [71] is to add
response bit XORing in combination with column shuffling/swapping technique which can
drastically reduce the accuracy of modeling the XbarPUF, thereby increasing the robustness
against such attacks. These techniques are analyzed in details in [71]. Moreover, in any
sensitive IoT device could also have a tamper detection mechanism to keep an eye on the
expected number of back-ups in a given time-frame and make sure that number doesn’t
exceed a certain value. This would considerably increase the time it takes an attacker to
build a database.

5.10

Results: PUF Security Analysis

As we already mentioned, we have implemented a 32×32 XbarPUF as the key generator for
our designed security architecture. Since PUF is the key component and basically the heart
of operation of this security architecture, we have evaluated XbarPUF first in terms of these
security metrics listed below.
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• Uniqueness

• Bit-Aliasing

• Reliability

• Uniformity

• Diffuseness

• Steadiness

All of these metrics are defined and explained elaborately in [39, 23].

The formal

definition, the characterizing equations are also presented in Chapter 2. Uniqueness measures
the degree of variation among responses produced by different chips for the same challenge.
Bit-aliasing determines how random the distribution of 1’s and 0’s for each bit position of
a response of a PUF for different chips. Thus these two metrics define the randomness
of PUF response across different devices.

We have performed Monte Carlo simulation

for 500 different chips, each with 25 different challenges to evaluate uniqueness and bitaliasing. Figure 5.10 shows the uniqueness results for 25 different challenges. As evident
from this figures, our designed XbarPUF displays almost ideal (50%) uniqueness for all these
different challenges which strengthens the claim of this PUF based security architecture as
an unclonable hardware security module. Bit-aliasing results for each of the 32 bits of the
response vector of the XbarPUF for different challenges are shown in details in Figure 5.11.
For each of the 32 bits, the bit-aliasing value is within the range of [0.45 0.55] and the average
bit-aliasing value is 0.5 for all these bits, very close to the ideal.
Uniformity and diffuseness metrics measure a PUF’s performance across the challenge
space. For a single chip, if different challenges are applied, the responses should be different
from each other so that ideally these metrics becomes equal to 0.5. Steadiness is another
metric that evaluates the stability of a PUF’s response over multiple challenges. It represents
bias of individual response bits of a PUF on average. Specifically, it measures the degree
of bias of a response bit towards either a ‘1’ or ‘0’ over many cycles as defined in [39]. We
have run Monte Carlo simulations for 500 different random challenges, and for 25 different
chips to evaluate uniformity and bit-aliasing. Steadiness is evaluated for 25 different chips
for 500 cycles each. Uniformity, diffuseness, and steadiness results are shown together in
Figure 5.12. Although for different chips these numbers deviate from this ideal value, they
do not show very large deviation from their average values and display an average uniformity
and diffuseness of near 0.5 as can be seen from this figure. All of these metric prove the
applicability of this XbarPUF as a strong PUF, capable of generating unique and random
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Figure 5.10: This figure shows average uniqueness results for 500 different chips [70]. Even
for different challenges, this value is very close to ideal value of 0.5.

0.65
Average
Maximum
Minimum

0.6

Bit-Aliasing

0.55

0.5

0.45

0.4

0.35
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Response bits

Figure 5.11: Summary of results for bit-aliasing for all 32 bits from 500 different chips.
The minimum and maximum value for each bit are also shown [70].
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Figure 5.12: Summary of results for average uniformity, diffuseness and steadiness from
500 different challenges and for 25 different chips [70].

keys for different challenges and different chips. Also from the figure 5.12, it can be seen
that steadiness value is very close to the ideal value of 1.
Reliability is one of the major concerns around PUF to justify their applicability in
practical designs. As PUF depends on tiniest process variation to produce device-specific
signature, any small change in environment or the presence of noise can make a PUF’s
response prone to change undesirably. Reliability, somewhat similar to stability (distinction
is explained in [39]) is used to describe how reliable or stable a PUF’s response is when the
same challenge is applied again and again [39]. Because, reliability could be the most crucial
metric to evaluate a PUF’s practicability, we have performed a detailed reliability analysis
using Monte Carlo simulations for 500 different clock cycles each, for 25 different challenges,
and each for 25 different chips. This result is shown in Figure 5.13. This 3-D plot shows
that for all different challenges and for all chips, the XbarPUF shows a minimum of 92% and
on average 98% reliability. However, it is to be noted that this result is obtained from the
regular XbarPUF directly, before applying any error correction technique. Using our chosen
reliability enhancement technique, the idea is to eliminate unreliable bits from the response
and only take the error-free bits to form a cryptographic key.
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Figure 5.13: Detailed reliability results generated from 500 different cycles for 25 different
chips and 25 different challenges [70]
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After analyzing the security of the XbarPUF based key generation, we are now interested
in evaluating the security of our sneak-path based tag generation method. This sneak-path
based tag generation method is specific to memristive memory or RRAM and corresponding
details can be found in [40]. Three metrics for the evaluation of any tag generation or hashing
method are: uniformity (different than PUF’s uniformity), diffusion, and avalanche effect.
Uniformity dictates that the probability of a tag bit being either a ‘0’ or ‘1’ should be equal
to each other. To fulfill the diffusion property, if a single bit of the data is changed, each bit
of the tag should have an equal probability (0.5) of being flipped. Avalanche effect is another
property that defines that the tag would be very different even for two very similar data,
maybe differing by just a single bit. This means even if just 1-bit of data is changed, around
half of the tag bits should be changed. Table 5.4 presents the results for this sneak-path tag
generation method used in this work. This result is a little different from the one presented
in [40] as this is regenerated for the memristor type and crossbar used for this work.

5.11

Overall Security Evaluation

5.11.1

Malicious Read

The goal of this attack is to read stored back-up data and gain sensitive information. Since
we encrypt the data before backup, this would increase the complexity of learning anything
from the data. As mentioned before, we use OTP based encryption. Since in an OTP based
encryption, the key is random, has the same size as data, for a 16-bit data, any of the whole
possible space of 216 combinations are equally likely to be a key. Thus OTP is considered
to not vulnerable against brute force attacks because the attacker doesn’t gain any new
information from the data encrypted using OTP. This is explained in [77]. For example,
with an N-bit key, the possible number of key combinations, Nkey , before and after brute
force attacks are:

Nkey (bef ore) = 2N
N

Nkey (af ter) = 2
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(5.7)

Table 5.4: Security properties of the tag generation method
Tag size Uniformity
6
8

Avalanche

0.9869
0.9637

0.4953
0.4951

Diffusion
0.4971
0.5062

Thus for any two different input data or plaintext, d1 and d2 in data space D, the
probability of any ciphertext, c being equal to either d1 or d2 the same as shown in this
equation 5.8.

P [(d1 D] = c) = P [(d2 D) = c]

(5.8)

Since brute force across the key or data space doesn’t add any new information to an
attacker which wasn’t already available to him, OTP is said to be able to maintain perfect
secrecy.

5.11.2

Malicious Write

Verifying the integrity of the backup data before restore is another security feature of this
work. An attacker might launch a spoofing attack by connecting the NVM from a different
power source in the network in order to perform malicious write. However, our sneak-path
current based integrity checking method described earlier should be able to detect such
offline modifications to this memory by generating a secure tag. The goal of the attacker
thus should be to modify the memory in a way that it would produce the same tag. The
success rate of this attack depends on the uniformity property of the tag and the number
of trials the attacker can perform during this power failure duration. Since we have already
shown that the tag generation method exhibits a good uniformity, we have have analyzed
the probability of successful spoofing attack in terms of number of trials. This is shown
in Figure 5.14. With increasing number of trials, the probability of finding a tag match
increases. For a given number of trials, the tag match probability depends on the tag size.
A hypothetical scenario that an attacker may leverage is that the backup data stored in
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Figure 5.14: Probability of success in a spoofing attack with number of trials. The more
trials an attacker can perform, the higher the chance that the data matches the tag. No. of
effective trial is 1 in this protocol since the tag is updated on each cycle [70].

the NVM was unchanged for a few cycles of backup and restore. In that case, an attacker
can perform multiple numbers of spoofing trials on the data in order to be successful where
the data matches the tag. However, our tag generation protocol randomly reconfigure its
reserved bits [40] as a timestamp before every backup stage and generate a new tag even if
the data remains the same. Therefore, in our security protocol the effective number of trials
to perform a spoofing attack is 1. The success probability for a 8-bit tag with a single trial
is nearly 1/28 = 1/256. This is sufficient due to the consideration that the tag is updated
on each backup and restore cycle regardless of the data and the attacker cannot perform
multiple trials on guessing a data-tag pair. For the the same reason, this protocol can also
prevent replay attack where an attacker remembers a previous data and tag and replace the
present (data, tag) pair with that. Since each data has a large number of variants for the
tag depending on the timestamp, a tag from a data at one time would be very different than
the tag from the same data at a different time.

5.11.3

Modeling Attacks

In this work, we are assuming that the attacker can read anything from NVM which means he
can gain access to the stored PUF challenge as well. Researchers have already shown strong
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PUFs can be modeled using only a subset of the total CRPs [62, 25]. We have also shown
before (in Chapter 4) how a 32×2 XbarPUF (with HfO2 memristors) can also be modeled
and predicted with high accuracy and also developed mitigation techniques to reduce that
accuracy significantly [71]. Here, we recreate the work with the TiO2 memristor models and
circuit parameters used to design this whole security architecture. We have used python’s
machine learning toolbox, the scikit-learn [54] and presented the results using four different
classification models in Table 5.5. We have collected 5000 CRPs from an abstract model of
the XbarPUF, developed beforehand in [71] and then used 2/3rd of the data for training
and the rest for testing. It is clear from Table 5.5 that the accuracy is almost like a random
guess of a coin flip (50%) for all of these models, namely support vector machine (SVM)
with Gaussian or radial basis function (RBF) kernel, logistic regression (LR), naive Bayes
with Gaussian kernel, and AdaBoost ensemble.

5.11.4

Readout/Alteration of Secure Information

The random challenge to generate PUF response and the tag generated from the backup
data are also saved in NVM. Here we pessimistically assume that an attacker can also gain
access to these sensitive information from the NVM. Now without a good prediction model,
knowing the PUF challenge wouldn’t compromise the PUF response. We already know that
the prediction accuracy using modern modelings models against our XbarPUF is almost
like a random guess and thus wouldn’t reveal any information to the attacker. Moreover,
changing the challenge itself would change the PUF response significantly which can be
inferred from the very good uniformity and bit-aliasing values of this PUF. Also, because of
the good collision property of the tag using our tag generation protocol, it is very difficult
to find the data that produces the same tag even if an attacker can read the stored tag from
the NVM. Finally, because of good avalanche property of the tag, even if a single tag bit
is changed, almost half of the data bits would change, thus making it resilient against such
adversarial modifications.
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Table 5.5: Results from modeling attacks using different machine learning algorithms
against TiO2 memristor based XbarPUF [70]

Accuracy (%)

5.12

SVM (RBF)
Train Test
51.27 49.48

L. R.
Train Test
56.17 50.16

Gauss. N. B. AdaB. Ensem.
Train Test Train
Test
56.31 50.25 56.16
50.24

Overall Performance Analysis

Generating a reliable key from the partially-reliable XbarPUF response is one of the most
critical components of this design. We are accepting the fact that there would be some
unreliable PUF response bits and we size the XbarPUF to get at least the required number of
reliable bits (16-bit here) for the key from the PUF response (32-bit). These extra bits present
an overhead to our design. To determine and predict the minimum required number of extra
bits, we have run Monte Carlo simulation. For our XbarPUF, we know that memristors’
cycle-to-cycle (C2C) variation is the root cause of producing unstable bits or bit-flips. The
bit-flipping probability would be higher in cases where a pair of memristor’s C2C variation
dominate over their process variation. Moreover, since our target application here is deployable embedded system or IoT, we also need to consider drastic environmental changes. To
emulate this situation, we have considered the case when temperature changes rapidly from
room temperature to 500 C above room temperature between successive clock cycles. A
change in supply voltage changes the switching speed of memristors but since we are using a
large enough switching time to ensure complete state transition, this voltage change shouldn’t
an effect on the final memristive states and thus the PUF response. Therefore, we have only
considered C2C variation and temperature change for this analysis.
The average numbers of response bits it takes to produce 16 ‘clean’ key bits are shown in
Figure 5.15 for three different C2C variation parameter of memristors. As we have already
discussed, C2C variation is the main culprit behind producing unreliable responses from our
XbarPUF, we have used three different sets, 2%, 5%, and 10%. From Figure 5.15, we can
see that with increasing number of C2C variation, the minimum number of required bits
increases. However, because of the resiliency of our XbarPUF design against environmental
changes, the amount of extra bits needed is small (≈0.8) even for a 10% C2C variation, with
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Figure 5.15: Figure shows the average number of bits to produce 16 ‘good’ bits from 50
different chips. The results are generated for three different cycle-to-cycle variations and a
500 C temperature change [70].

500 C temperature change. The goal of our design is to produce 16 error-free bits in two
consecutive cycles of encryption and decryption in one back-up and restore session.
After getting an idea about the minimum number of extra response bits, we are now
interested in learning about bit-flipping probabilities of all the response bits. We have
applied multiple different challenges in the same chip, each for 500 cycles using Monte Carlo
analysis. The percentage of time that the response bits flipped are shown in Figure 5.16
for 10 different challenges and for a particular chip. As we can clearly see, there are only
one or two bits per challenge which have a significantly large bit-flip probability which can
be identified and discarded during functionality testing of the chip. The purpose of our
all-agree voting based reliability enhancement technique is to mitigate the impact of bitflips that remain undetected during device testing and later cause a bit-flip during run-time,
resulting in a key error. From this figure, we can also see that our key generation method
is capable of producing 30 ‘clean’ key bits on average from a 32-bit response. To account
for higher bit-errors/bit-flips in some chips, the ratio of number of required key bits with
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Figure 5.16: Probability of bit-flip for a same chip for 10 unique challenges. Plots showing
the bit-flip probabilities for all 32 bits from a PUF response, evaluated for 500 cycles.
Different challenges cause different bits to flip i.e. there is no single set of globally unreliable
bit [70].

number of response bits may be decreased which would help increase the yield of the design,
at the expense of extra overhead.
The area, power, and delay overhead for in different phases and different blocks of our
security architecture are shown in Table 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8, respectively. From table 5.6, one
can think the required area overhead of our designed system is large. However, if we take
a closer look, we can see that except for XbarPUF, most other circuit blocks like SRAM,
decoder, RRAM, counters etc. are actually common parts of any regular processor and
memory and thus can be reused for our security implementation. We have designed all these
blocks in CMOS 65nm technology where the minimum length and width of a transistor are
chosen as 60nm and 120nm respectively. All digital circuits are sized to have minimum area
while buffers are added to match their drive strengths with corresponding required loads.
Analog circuits like sense amplifiers, pass-gates, analog MUXes etc. are sized accordingly,
usually larger than digital circuits, to minimize the impact of mismatch and noise. Table 5.7
presents the power consumption in different phases of the security system in terms of overall
current. As we have mentioned before, XbarPUFs have large static power consumption in
the state where all the memristors are reset to HRS from LRS. Therefore, during state 1
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Table 5.6: Total area in terms of transistor count for different components of our security
architecture [70]
Design block

Component

Count

Comment

XbarPUF
×4

Memristor
Sense amplifier
Row controller
Column controller
XOR
MUX2to1 (regular)
MUX2to1 (wide)
Sense Amplifier
Resistor
Memristor, NMOS
Differential op-amp
1T1R
Sense amplifier
Pass gate
Decoders
SRAM cell
Pre-charge
Sense Amplifier (SA)
Column buffer
Address decoder
Basic gates
Counters, Buffers, flops,
Non-overlapping clock generator,
state decoders, basic gates etc.

64×16
×8
×64
×8
× 16
3×12
3×12
×12
×12
×2
×1
5×12
×12
×12
×1
×32
×8
×8
×8
×8
×8

10nm × 10nm
9-T cell (base width 1.2 µm) [73]
8 pass-gates
10-T 2-R

Enc.-Dec.
Tag gen.

memTRNG
RRAM

SRAM
×2

Others

120nm NMOS and PMOS
12µm NMOS and PMOS
9-T cell (base width
√ 1.2 µm) [73]
load resistor = HRS ∗ LRS
(10nm × 10nm)
5-T cell (base width 1.2µm)
1 memristor, 1-NMOS (4.8µm)
9-T cell (base width 1.2 µm) [73]
large (12µm) NMOS & NMOS
4to16 & 2to4 decoders
6-T cell (120nm,240nm)
3-PMOS (1.2µm)
Current Latched SA (9-T) [29]
4-T (1.2µm), 2-NOT
2to4 & 3to8 decoder
(AND, OR, NOT); min. width

Table 5.7: Power consumption of the security architecture in different stages (State 1 and
2 involve a reset of the whole memristor crossbar, 64×64 at once and thus have large static
current) [70].
State

Average current (µA)

State 1

143.9

State 2

151.8

State3to10

0.143

State11
Total

3.28
24.80

Comment
PUF response generation
+ SRAM-1 write
PUF response generation
(again) + SRAM-2 write
Both SRAM read
+ RRAM write
Tag generation
Overall average current
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Table 5.8: Delay overhead of the system in different stages of operation
State

Clock cycles

PUF RESET
PUF challenge
PUF read
SRAM write
RRAM write
RRAM read

0.5
0.25
0.25
4
16+x
16

Comment
8×
8× short spike
8×
overlapped with PUF read
for 16 clean bit + ‘x’ bit error
for 16 bit

and 2, the power consumption of the overall system is high but it is fairly low during other
times. Thus, the average current of the whole system is roughly 24.80µA overall with a 0.85V
supply voltage (VDD). We can further reduce this current by utilizing a dual or multi-voltage
scheme, with very small VDD for digital circuits and separate sufficiently larger VDD for
analog and memristive components.
The required delay of our security protocol is shown in Table 5.8 in terms of clock cycles.
We already mentioned there are four XbarPUFs in our prototype design and each one is
activated twice during both encryption and decryption. Thus it takes m×4×2 clock cycles
to generate responses from these XbarPUFs where m is the number of clock cycles required
to generate a response from one XbarPUF which has a design delay of 1 clock cycle ( reset,
challenge, and read are done in one clock cycle). Each row of SRAM (8 bits) is written in
one cycle and thus our 4×8 SRAM requires 4 clock cycles for a complete write. Since this is
overlapped with the XbarPUF response generation, this doesn’t incur any additional delay.
The slowest operation of our design is when the encrypted data is written one bit at a time
into the RRAM. For a ‘n’-bit key, it would require n clock cycles (‘n’ is 16 for this prototype
system). In practice, this operation would require more than n clock cycles as ‘x’ number of
unreliable or noisy bits would add ‘x’ extra clock cycles. However, this delay can be reduced
further by allowing to write multiple bits together into the RRAM. Tag generation unit takes
3 clock cycles. During decryption, RRAM is read one bit at a time, resulting in a total of
exact ‘n’ clock cycles (again n=16 here). The time required during decryption thus would
be almost the same (minus ‘x’ clock cycles to account for bit errors) as the encryption as
both operations are very similar.
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We have also compared the resource overhead of our designed security protocol against
several traditional and lightweight security mechanisms suitable in embedded system domain.
Table 5.9 lists the resource overhead for several such encryption algorithms, AES [51],
nanoAES [44], SIMON [6] and, PRESENT [10]. To calculate the area overhead, we have
omitted typical circuit blocks that would already be present in a processor (e.g. counters,
SRAMs, registers etc.). However, the delay and power consumption from these blocks are
taken into consideration. Although our designed system can generate 30 clean bits (out of 32)
on average, one can easily generate a larger key by applying more challenges and appending
the responses together. This would inevitably increase the delay and energy requirement
while the overall area and average power consumption would be the same. Alternatively,
each individual PUF block can be made larger to generate a larger key with no little to no
additional delay at the expense of larger area and power overhead.
It is important to note that the overhead for existing cryptographic techniques reported
in Table 5.9 are without the overhead associated with generating and storing the key. Thus
their actual implementation in a real hardware can be expected to have even larger resource
overhead than in Table 5.9. However, this key generation is one of the main contributing
factor to overhead in our designed security architecture. This comes at the special advantage
of random unique keys for each system while the key doesn’t need be stored physically.
Overall, our designed security protocol with implemented architecture provides a very secure
and lightweight way of performing data backup and restore in the NVM of a resourceconstrained IoT system.

Table 5.9: Performance comparison with state-of-the-art lightweight hardware security
techniques [70]
Overhead

Encryption-Decryption
AES [51]

Avg. Power (µW)
Delay (clk. cyc./bit)
Area (NAND G.E.)

18.5
1.75
2400

nanoAES [44] SIMON [6]
170
2.62
2090
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6.67
763

PRESENT [10]
0.5
1570

Ours [70]
21.08
0.27
856

Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Plan
6.1

Future Works

I have designed and improved hardware security primitives like PUF and TRNG built from
emerging memristive technology. Then a novel security vulnerability for IoT devices is shown
and a complete security protocol as well as security architecture built from these pieces
of hardware security is proposed. Different devices with different security requirements,
resource limitation, and application space would require different ways of implementing
security. Our security protocol is designed in such a way which is, however, can be easily
modified to fit into different such systems. Finally, characteristics and security properties of
hardware security modules could depend heavily on a particular circuit design and fabrication
technology and only after actual physical implementation, we’ll be able to test, verify, and
explore the full benefits and shortcomings of our design. It would also be interesting to
see how this designed security architecture actually performs when added to any existing
embedded process in an IoT device. That way, we can also get a real sense of the security
benefit as well as performance overhead of our system. Depending on the availability of
power source, resource limitation, and required level of security, a lot of research can be
done on how to better fit our design into various systems.
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6.2

Summary

I have identified a security vulnerability of resource constrained IoT device in this work
and designed a very lightweight security protocol using hardware enabled security primitives
with emerging memristive technology. Starting from device modeling improvement to circuit
design and analyses, I have built a complete security architecture for this domain as well
to get a realistic idea about real-world implementation difficulties. The several different
components of my work are listed below:
• A memristor model is improved to add environmental impact on the device. Specifically
temperature dependence on HRS, LRS and threshold voltages are introduced in the
device model as well as LRS and HRS aging. Aging is also added. Data for these
relationships are collected from literature for HfO2 memristors.
• A crossbar memristor PUF is redesigned to improve its performance and to comply
with the updated memristor model. A detailed analysis of this PUF is then presented
where the security and performance of the design against process variation and
varying operating condition are analyzed. Scalability of the circuit, choice of different
circuit parameters are explored and improvement of the design with different device
parameters are also analyzed to give device engineers a possible future direction.
• Abstract high-level abstract models for the memristor and memristor crossbar PUF are
developed. Then machine learning algorithms are used to perform modeling attacks
on this PUF. Circuit design of the PUF is also proposed to improve robustness against
these machine learning attacks.
• A practical sense amplifier suitable for memristive crossbar circuits is proposed. The
circuit topology is first compared with other topology to show its effectiveness in these
applications. Then a detailed Monte Carlo yield analysis along with power, delay and
area estimation are used to choose the best transistor size for this analog component.
• A comprehensive theoretical analysis of memristor based true random number
generator (TRNG) is provided and how randomness is affected by the presence of
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process variation and temperature, voltage variation and aging is also discussed using
statistical mathematics. Finally an improved twin memristor based TRNG is proposed
which works better in varying environmental condition and even where large process
variation is present.
• A run-time reliability enhancement algorithm for PUFs is shown as well. Circuit
implementation for such technique is also shown. Moreover, detailed analyses are
provided on to choose the best of parameters to get a balance between resource usage
and reliablity of operation.
• A complete security protocol based on hardware security for resource-limited IoT
systems is provided. The architecture is also designed at transistor level to get an
accurate overhead estimation and practical implementation difficulties. Our designed
security protocol provides a practical level of security which is lightweight as IoT
domain requires. Detailed security and overhead analyses are performed and compared
with existing lightweight security techniques to show its advantages as well.
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A

Calculation of Optimal Load Resistance for XbarPUF

We already know these relations from Chapter 3.
R1 =

Veq,R1 =

HRS LRS
HRS
, R2 =
k
.
2N
N
N

Rld
∗ Vread ,
R1 + Rld

Veq,R2 =

Rld
∗ Vread
R2 + Rld

Rld
Rld
−
) ∗ Vread
R2 + Rld R1 + Rld
R2
R1
=(
−
) ∗ Vread
R2 + Rld R1 + Rld

(1)

(2)

∆VR = Veq,R2 − Veq,R1 = (

(3)

By differentiating ∆VR from equation 3 with respect to Rld and setting the expression
to zero, we get the equation for optimal load resistance.

d
(∆VR ) = 0
dRL
d
R2
R1
=⇒
(
−
) ∗ Vread = 0 [f rom equation (3))]
dRL R2 + Rld R1 + Rld
−R2
R1
+
= 0 [af ter dif f erentiation]
=⇒
2
(R2 + Rld )
(R1 + Rld )2
R1
R2
=⇒
=
2
(R1 + Rld )
(R2 + Rld )2
R2
=⇒ (R2 + Rld )2 =
(R1 + Rld )2
R
r1
R2
=⇒ R2 + Rld = ±
(R1 + Rld )
R1
r
p
R2
=⇒ Rld (1 −
) = R1 R2 − R2
R1
√
√
p
p
p
R1 − R2
√
=⇒ Rld (
) = R2 ( R1 − R2 )
R1
p
=⇒ Rld = R1 R2
By substituting R1 and R2 from equation 1, we get

159

(4)

r
Rld,best =

B
B.1

p

R1 .R2 =

HRS LRS
HRS
∗(
k
)
2N
N
N

(5)

Memristor (HfO2) Model Used in This Work
Verilog-A Model for HfO2 Memristor:

// bipolar model for HfOx memristors
// Adapted from MATLAB
// written by: Nathan McDonald, AFRL/RITB, Rome, NY
//
// Adaptation to Verilog-A:
// Garrett S. Rose, AFRL/RITA, Rome, NY
// 30-May-2014
//
// contribution:

2014_06_03 1704est Nathan McDonald, AFRL/RITB

// contribution:

2014_08_04 1515est Jillian Hallak, Univ. of Rochester

// mod.: 2014_08_05 0930est Garrett S. Rose, Univ. of Tennessee
// mod.: 2014_09_03 1540est Garrett S. Rose, Univ. of Tennessee
// mod.: 2015_09_03 1110est Harika Manem, CNSE, SUNY Polytechnic Institute
//

-- Adaptation to Hafnium Oxide ReRAM from CNSE

////HfO2 Memristor model. This model includes HRS Aging
////

‘include "constants.vams"
‘include "disciplines.vams"

module memr_hfox(p, n);
inout

p;

//positive pin

inout

n;

//negative pin
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electrical

p, n;

parameter real HRS

=

1.5e5;

// high resistance state

parameter real LRS

=

1e4;

// low resistance state

parameter real Vtp

=

0.75;

// positive threshold voltage

parameter real Vtn

= -1.0;

// negative threshold voltage

parameter real tsw_p

=

1e-8;

// time to switch under +V bias

parameter real tsw_n

=

1e-6;

// time to switch under -V bias

parameter real Rinit

=

1e4;//1e6;

parameter real HRS_rate

=

2e6;

parameter real HRS_nom_spr

=

0.001;

parameter real THRS_sp_rel

=

0.1;//0.01;

parameter real TLRS_sp_rel

=

0.1;//0.01;

parameter real Ttsw_n_sp_rel =

0.05;//0.01;

parameter real Ttsw_p_sp_rel =

0.05;//0.01;

parameter real TVtn_sp_rel

=

0.1;//0.01;

parameter real TVtp_sp_rel

=

0.1;//0.01;

parameter real LRS_Aging_Rate = 0.25e6;
parameter real LRS_nom_spr = 0.001;

//Aging rate of LRS....should be a paramet
//this also should be a parameter

// local variables
real delR;

// resistance spread (HRS - LRS)

real delt;

// simulation time step

real HRS_rnd;

// ith HRS
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real LRS_rnd;

// ith LRS

real Rm;

// memristance

real Rm_tmp;

// temp memristance variable

//real switch_val;
real time_last;

// denote state of memristor switching
// previous simularion time reading

real tsw_p_rnd;
real tsw_n_rnd;
real Vtn_rnd;

// negative th voltage for ith switch

real Vtp_rnd;

// positive th voltage for ith switch

real Vwr;

// input voltage

real HRS_nom;

// nominal high res, trends down w/ time

real LRS_nom;
real tsw_p_nom;
real tsw_n_nom;
real Vtn_nom;
real Vtp_nom;

real HRS_spread;
real LRS_spread;
real tsw_p_spread;
real tsw_n_spread;
real Vtp_spread;
real Vtn_spread;

real HRS_min_after_Aging;
real HRS_after_Aging;

// impose a lower bound on the HRS due to the Aging rate
// value of HRS after Aging phenomena

real LRS_max_after_Aging;
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real LRS_after_Aging;

//value of LRS after Aging phenomena

//temperature parameters
real temp_room;
real HRS_temp_change_rate;
real LRS_temp_change_rate;
real HRS_spread_temp_change_rate;
real Vt_temp_change_rate;
//
real HRS_spread_rate_temp;
real temp_curr;
real deltemp;

integer rnd;

// temp storage for random number seeds

analog begin
@ ( initial_step or initial_step("dc") ) begin
delt

= 0;

time_last

= 0;

//switch_val

= 0;

rnd

= $random;

HRS_nom

= HRS;

LRS_nom

= LRS;

HRS_rnd

= HRS_nom;

LRS_rnd

= LRS;

tsw_p_rnd

= tsw_p;

// generate random number for seed
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tsw_n_rnd

= tsw_n;

Rm

= Rinit;

delR

= HRS_rnd - LRS_rnd;

HRS_spread

= abs(HRS * THRS_sp_rel);

LRS_spread

= abs(LRS * TLRS_sp_rel);

tsw_p_spread

= abs(tsw_p * Ttsw_p_sp_rel);

tsw_n_spread

= abs(tsw_n * Ttsw_n_sp_rel);

Vtp_spread

= abs(Vtp * TVtp_sp_rel);

Vtn_spread

= abs(Vtn * TVtn_sp_rel);

HRS_min_after_Aging = 4*LRS; //arbitary choice for minimum HRS
LRS_max_after_Aging = 3*LRS; //arbitary choice for maximum LRS
//LRS_Aging_Rate = 0.25e6; //Aging rate of LRS...should be slower then HRS aging
//LRS_nom_spr

=

0.001;

//initialize the parameters
temp_room = 300.15;
HRS_temp_change_rate = -0.1; //negative temperature coefficient of HRS, slower than
LRS_temp_change_rate = 0.3;

HRS_spread_temp_change_rate = 0.02; //HRS variance increases with increasing tempera

Vt_temp_change_rate = -0.01; //threshold voltage decreases with increasing temperatu

temp_curr = $temperature;
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Vtp_nom = Vtp;
Vtn_nom = Vtn;
Vtp_rnd

= Vtp_nom;

Vtn_rnd

= Vtn_nom;

HRS_spread_rate_temp = THRS_sp_rel;
//$display("\n\nbefore s\ntemperature=%3.2r vtp= %r vtn= %r hrs spr= %r hrs_sp_rate

////////////////// nominal threshold voltage changes for different temperature...Lat
Vtp_nom = Vtp_nom + Vtp_nom * Vt_temp_change_rate * ($temperature-temp_room);
Vtn_nom = Vtn_nom + Vtn_nom * Vt_temp_change_rate * ($temperature-temp_room);
Vtp_rnd

= Vtp_nom;

Vtn_rnd

= Vtn_nom;

//////change in nominal value of HRS and LRS
HRS_nom = HRS + HRS * HRS_temp_change_rate * ($temperature-temp_room);
LRS_nom = LRS + LRS * LRS_temp_change_rate * ($temperature-temp_room);

//////change in nominal value of HRS spread rate

HRS_spread_rate_temp = HRS_spread_rate_temp + HRS_spread_rate_temp * HRS_spread_temp
HRS_spread

= abs(HRS * HRS_spread_rate_temp);

//$display("\nafter s\ntemperature=%3.2r vtp= %r vtn= %r hrs spr= %r hrs_sp_rate = %

end

delt

= $abstime - time_last;

time_last

= $abstime;
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Vwr

= V(p,n);

///// for temperature changes that occurs within a simulation
deltemp

= $temperature-temp_curr;

temp_curr

= $temperature;

Vtp_rnd

= Vtp_rnd + Vtp_rnd * Vt_temp_change_rate * deltemp;

Vtn_rnd

= Vtn_rnd + Vtn_rnd * Vt_temp_change_rate * deltemp;

HRS_spread_rate_temp = HRS_spread_rate_temp + HRS_spread_rate_temp * HRS_spread_temp_c
HRS_spread = abs(HRS * HRS_spread_rate_temp);
HRS_nom

= HRS_nom + HRS_nom * HRS_temp_change_rate * deltemp;

LRS_nom

= LRS_nom + LRS_nom * LRS_temp_change_rate * deltemp;

//$display("\nnow V=%r \ntemperature=%3.2r vtp= %r vtn= %r hrs spr= %r hrs_sp_rate = %
//

Rm

= Rm;

delR

= HRS_nom - LRS_nom;

if (Vwr >= Vtp_rnd && Rm != LRS_rnd) begin
// this is unbounded! Rm can go negative if delR is small enough!
//switch_val = -1;
Rm_tmp = Rm - ((delR * delt * abs(Vwr)) / abs(tsw_p_rnd * Vtp_rnd));
if (Rm_tmp <= LRS_rnd) begin
rnd

= $random;

// generate random seed

////////impose a upper bound of LRS aging factor
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LRS_after_Aging = LRS_nom + LRS_Aging_Rate*time_last;
//$display("age = %r\n",LRS_after_Aging);
if(LRS_after_Aging>LRS_max_after_Aging)
LRS_after_Aging = LRS_max_after_Aging;

// update trending upward (Aging) nominal low resistance value
LRS_nom

= $rdist_normal(rnd,LRS_after_Aging,LRS_after_Aging*LRS_nom_spr);

LRS_spread = abs(LRS_nom * TLRS_sp_rel);

if (LRS_nom >= LRS_max_after_Aging)
LRS_nom = LRS_max_after_Aging;

// regenerates LRS, Vtn and tsw_n ONLY when switching complete...
LRS_rnd

= $rdist_normal(rnd,LRS_nom,LRS_spread);

Vtn_rnd

= $rdist_normal(rnd,Vtn,Vtn_spread);

tsw_n_rnd

= $rdist_normal(rnd,tsw_n,tsw_n_spread);

// update parameters, set switch_val to stop switching
delR

= HRS_rnd - LRS_rnd;

Rm_tmp

= LRS_rnd;

end
end
else if (Vwr <= Vtn_rnd && Rm != HRS_rnd) begin
Rm_tmp = Rm + ((delR * delt * abs(Vwr)) / abs(tsw_n_rnd * Vtn_rnd));
if (Rm_tmp >= HRS_rnd) begin
rnd

= $random;

// generate random seed

//impose a lower bound of HRS aging factor
HRS_after_Aging = HRS_nom - HRS_rate*time_last;
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if(HRS_after_Aging<HRS_min_after_Aging)
HRS_after_Aging = HRS_min_after_Aging;

// update trending downward (Aging) nominal high resistance value
HRS_nom

= $rdist_normal(rnd,HRS_after_Aging,HRS_after_Aging*HRS_nom_spr);

HRS_spread = abs(HRS_nom * HRS_spread_rate_temp);

if (HRS_nom <= HRS_min_after_Aging)
HRS_nom = HRS_min_after_Aging;

// regenerate HRS, Vtp and tsw_p ONLY when switching complete...
HRS_rnd

= $rdist_normal(rnd,HRS_nom,HRS_spread);

Vtp_rnd

= $rdist_normal(rnd,Vtp,Vtp_spread);

tsw_p_rnd

= $rdist_normal(rnd,tsw_p,tsw_p_spread);

// update parameters, set switch_val to stop switching
delR

= HRS_rnd - LRS_rnd;

Rm_tmp

= HRS_rnd;

end
end
else begin
Rm_tmp = Rm;
end

Rm = Rm_tmp;

//$display("\nRm = %r\nasdfsadf\ntemperature=%3.2r vtp= %r vtn= %r hrs spr= %r hrs_sp_

I(p,n) <+ Vwr / Rm;
end

// end analog
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endmodule

B.2

// memr_hfox

MATLAB Model of a Memristor for Quick Behavioral Simulation:
function [I,Mout] = memristor(Vmag, delt,Minit)
%% no aging, temperature dependence
%% Major parameter list, mean (default)
u_Vthp =

0.7;

u_Vthn = -1.0;
u_HRS = 300e3;
u_LRS = 30e3;
u_tswp = 1e-8;
u_tswn = 1e-6;

Vthp = u_Vthp;
Vthn = u_Vthn;
HRS = u_HRS;
LRS = u_LRS;
tswp = u_tswp;
tswn = u_tswn;

%% cycle-to-cycle distribution parameter list(default value) in percentage
Vtp_sp_rel_time = 0.005;
Vtn_sp_rel_time = 0.005;
HRS_sp_rel_time = 0.2;
LRS_sp_rel_time = 0.02;
tswp_sp_rel_time = 0.01;
tswn_sp_rel_time = 0.01;
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%% creating parameters using the mean and distribution with a normal
%%%distribution function
Vthp = normrnd(u_Vthp,abs(u_Vthp*Vtp_sp_rel_time));
Vthn = normrnd(u_Vthn,abs(u_Vthn*Vtn_sp_rel_time));
HRS = normrnd(u_HRS,abs(u_HRS*HRS_sp_rel_time));
LRS = normrnd(u_LRS,abs(u_LRS*LRS_sp_rel_time));
tswp = normrnd(u_tswp,abs(u_tswp*tswp_sp_rel_time));
tswn = normrnd(u_tswn,abs(u_tswn*tswn_sp_rel_time));

%%
delR = HRS-LRS;

Mout = Minit;
%
%
%

if Vmag <Vthp && Vmag>Vthn

% won’t switch

Mout = Minit;
else

%% Switching logic of memristor
if Vmag >= Vthp && Mout > LRS
Mout = Minit - abs(Vmag)*delR*delt/abs(tswp*Vthp);
if Mout < LRS
Mout = LRS;
end
elseif Vmag <= Vthn && Mout < HRS
Mout = Minit + abs(Vmag)*delR*delt/abs(tswn*Vthn);
if Mout > HRS
Mout = HRS;
end
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% didn’t consider magtitud

end

%%
%Mout;
I = Vmag/Mout;
%I = Mout;
end

C

Behavioral XbarPUF Model Used for Response
Generation and Power Calculation

%% Mesbah Uddin, UT

June,2016

%% To measure uniqueness, you have to measure the same response for same challenge acros
% variable ’MC’ and keep Ncycle = 1 and ’C’ constant to calculate uniqueness.
% MC=1, Ncycle variable and ’C’ fixed for reliability.
% MC=1, Ncycle fixed and ’C’ variable for uniformity
% MC variable and others fixed for bit-aliasing

clc;clear all;close all;

directory = ’C:\Users\muddin6\Documents\machine-learning-ex2\ex2\testResult_new’;
extension = ’.csv’;
avgunif = 0;

%% Global memristor parameters
%% cycle-to-cycle distribution
var_in_time = [.02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02]; %in percentage

%var_in_time = [HRS_sp_rel_time LRS_sp_rel_time Vtp_sp_rel_time Vtn_sp_rel_time tswp_sp_
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%% mean of major parameters
mean_param = [300e3 30e3 0.7 -1.0 1e-6 1e-6];
% mean_param = [u_HRS u_LRS u_Vtp u_Vtn u_tswp u_tswn];

%% Statistical variations for mean of major parameters

stat_memr_param = [.2 .1 .1 .1 .05 .05]; % in percentage, same order as cycle-to-cycle v

%%
RROW = 32; CCOL = 0; %extra 3 bits for column swapping
ROW = 32; COL = 4;
row = ROW*2;
col = COL*2;
dim = row*col;
Rmem = zeros(1,dim);

%% monte carlo run
%C = randi([0 1],RROW,1); %same challenge for all PUFs
MC = 3;
totResp = zeros(MC,COL);
for run = 1:MC
custom_mean_param = mean_param;
%k=1;j=1;
%% generating the crossbar matrix by using instances of randomly created memristors
rng(’shuffle’);
for k=1:dim
if rem(k,4) ==0
rng(’shuffle’); % to seed different numbers
end
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custom_mean_param = create_statistical_distribution(mean_param,stat_memr_param);
Rmem(k) = custom_mean_param(1);

%set to HRS initially

mem(k) = Memristor(custom_mean_param,Rmem(k),var_in_time);
end
mem = reshape(mem,[row col]);
Rmem = reshape(Rmem,[row col]);
%[I, Mout] = memristance(mem(1,1),Vmag,step)

backup_mem = mem;
%% Start applying challenge
C = randi([0 1],ROW,1);

NCycle = 2;
totResp2 = zeros(NCycle,COL);

bigcsv = zeros(NCycle,RROW+CCOL);

%extra 1 column for saving the response bits

bigcsv_cm = zeros(NCycle,RROW+CCOL); % cm = column mix
bigcsv_xor = zeros(NCycle,RROW+CCOL/2);
for iter = 1:NCycle %increase this number to calculate uniformity, reliability

mem = backup_mem;

%C = []
%C = input(’’);
C = randi([0 1],RROW,1);
%disp(C’)
% save challenges to a big matrix to write in a csv file later
bigcsv(iter,1:end-CCOL) = C’;
bigcsv_cm(iter,1:end-CCOL) = C’;
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%% %%%%%%%%%%% Beginning of experiment
%% Major circuit parameter
Vwr = 1.3;
Vrd = 0.60;

%% voltage applied across the row and load resistance
v = zeros(row,1);
Rload = zeros(1,col);
Rload(Rload==0) = calcRload(mean_param(1),mean_param(2),ROW);
Vresp = zeros(1,col);
Resp = zeros(1,COL);
Resp2 = zeros(1,COL);
%%
tper = 1e-6;
points_per_cycle = 50;
step = tper/points_per_cycle ;

%50 points per cycle

%% RESET
TReset = 2e-6;
no_reset_cycle = 1;
t_res = step:step:TReset*no_reset_cycle;
v(v==0) = -Vwr;

reset_time = length(t_res);

for k=1:reset_time
for rr = 1:row
for cc = 1:col
[I, Rmem(rr,cc)] = mem(rr,cc).memristance(v(rr),step,Rmem(rr,cc));
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mem(rr,cc).Mout = Rmem(rr,cc);
%Rmem(rr,cc)
end
end
end

%% CHALLENGE
TChallenge = 0.6e-6;
no_chal_cycle = 1;
t_ch = step:step:TChallenge*no_chal_cycle;

%%choose a random challenge
%C = zeros(row,1);
%C = randi([0 1],row/2,1); used as input
Cb = C;%zeros(row/2,1); %minus 3 cause of control challenges
%size(Cb)
C(C==1) = Vwr;
Cb(C==0) = -Vwr;
%disp(’here’)
v = zeros(row,1);
%size(Cb)
v(1:2:row) = C(1:end);
v(2:2:row) = Cb(1:end);

C;
Cb;
v;
%C = [0;0;0;0]

%%apply challenge
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chal_time = length(t_ch);
%fprintf(’\n---\n\n\n’);
for k=1:chal_time
for rr = 1:row
for cc = 1:col
[I, Rmem(rr,cc)] = mem(rr,cc).memristance(v(rr),step,mem(rr,cc).Mout);
mem(rr,cc).Mout = Rmem(rr,cc);
%Rmem(rr,cc)
end
end
end

%% READ
vr = zeros(1,col);
vr(vr==0) = Vrd;
v = vr;

TRead = 1e-7;
t_rd = step:step:TRead;
format short
Rmem;
Req = 1./sum(1./(Rmem));
%fprintf(’Req = %3.3f \n’,Req);
%Req = 1./sum(1./([Rmem;Rload]));
% fprintf(’Req = %3.3f\n’,Req);
Vresp = Vrd*Rload./(Rload+Req);
for k=1:COL
Resp(k) = Vresp(2*k-1)>Vresp(2*k);
end
%fprintf(’%d’,Resp);
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%fprintf(’\n’);

%% perform swap

Req2 = columnSwap(logical(C(end-3:end)),Req); %last 3 bits of challenge for swap control
Vresp = Vrd*Rload./(Rload+Req2);
for k=1:COL
Resp2(k) = Vresp(2*k-1)>Vresp(2*k);
end

totResp(iter,:) = Resp;
for i=0:CCOL-1
bigcsv(iter,end-i) = Resp(i+1); %Resp;
end

totResp2(iter,:) = Resp2;
%fprintf(’%d’,xor(Resp(1),Resp(2)));
for i=0:CCOL-1
bigcsv_cm(iter,end-i) = Resp2(i+1); %Resp;
end

fprintf(’%d iteration finished...\n’,MC*(run-1) + iter);
end

totResp(run,:) = Resp;
%fprintf(’\n-------------%3.2f%% complete-------------\n’,run*100/MC);

csvfile = strcat(directory,MC+’0’,extension);
csvwrite(csvfile,bigcsv);
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csvfile2 = strcat(directory,MC+’0’,’swap’,extension);
csvwrite(csvfile2,bigcsv_cm);

%avgunif = avgunif + uniformity(totResp2)
end

178

D

How to Perform Tests on the Chip

We have fabricated a complete chip with 65nm CMOS technology containing HfO2
memristors. There are several stand-alone ‘test structures’ on this chip that can be probed
and tested separately. For example, we have single memristor circuit, forming and set-reset
circuit, sense amplifier circuit, 1-bit PUF circuit, and so on. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of
the layout of our designed chip where some of the test structures are clearly visible. There
are several things that we need to setup correctly to properly test and verify functionality
of any of these circuits. Taking the sense amplifier circuit as an example, the different steps
of testing are described in this section.

D.1

Setting up the Probepad Connection

Each of the individual stand-alone test structures contain 24 pads, arranged as two faceto-face rows of 12 pads each. The dimension of each of these pads are 60µm × µm while
having a 40µm gap between consecutive pads. These are landing pads, pure chunks of metal,
meaning a 12×2 probepad can be connected directly to these pads to apply different input
patterns and also get the output from the underlying test circuits. After inserting a test chip
into the probe station and after setting up all 24 probes, they are moved slowly to be just on
top of the desired test structure and then pushed down until the probes slightly touch the
landing pads on the chip to form electrical connections. Figure 2 shows one such connection.

D.2

PSOC Microcontroller and Source Meter to Generate Inputs

We have used a PSOC (programmable system on chip) microcontroller board and a source
meter to apply different input patterns and connected them with the probepad connecting
wires. The PSOC microcontroller that we have used for our experiment has quite a few
input/output (IO) pins, more than the maximum 24 that a probepad might need. Moreover,
the PSOC board provides multiple direct connections to 1.2V, 3.3V, and many connections to
GND, thereby easing the need to produce these signals separately from the microcontroller.
The digital I/O pins of the microcontroller use 3.3V as the VDD so any digital pulse can be
produced using these pins. The number of available analog pins, however, is limited as at
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Figure 1: Partial snapshot of the layout of the chip where it contains a 12×2 probepad for
the sense amplifier circuit.
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Figure 2: 12×2 probepad connection to a test circuit inside of a probe station, the image
is taken from a microscopic view.
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most four analog signals can be generated at the same time. The voltage range for analog
signals can be between 0 to 4V. Moreover, since 65nm technology only allows maximum
1.2V VDD, these digital signals can not be produced using the regular digital I/O pins of
the PSOC as those I/O can only use 3.3V as VDD. Thus we need to use the on-chip DAC
(digital-to-analog converter) to generate these pulses with 1.2V VDD similar to any analog
signals.
Most of our circuits are designed to have much smaller number of pin counts than the
maximum of 24 for each test structure. For example, an SA test circuit only need 7 pins,
VDD, GND, sense enable or ‘SE’, two inputs B and Bbar, two outputs O and Ob. GND
and VDD pins can be directly connected to the on-board GND and 1.2V, respectively. The
output pins can be connected directly to display instruments like the oscilloscope. The
analog voltages B, Bar and digital SE (wih 1.2V) signal can be generated using the DAC
and analog I/O of the PSOC.
The source meter that we have used has two separate channels, capable of providing
arbitrary input voltage while it can also measure the current drawn from this two voltage
source. Thus if we need to provide accurate analog fixed DC voltage input, we can use
this source meter. Since this also measures the current supplied by the voltage as well, this
is very useful to detect state change in memristors by observing the current. That’s why
the source meter was specifically useful at setting up different input voltages to test the
memristor read-write-form circuit.

D.3

Setting up the Connection with Probepads

Only the minimum required number of pins out of 24 from probepad are connected to the
PSOC board. A snapshot of this is shown in Figure 3.

D.4

Performing Simple Functionality Test

The detailed results from testing of the SA circuit are provided in Chapter 3 and we skip that
here. Because of the very limited frequency range of DAC of the PSOC, we have performed
very slow signals. For example, the SA is tested at only 10Hz frequency. The DC voltage
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Figure 3: Connection between the inputs generated by the PSOC microcontroller and wires
coming from the probepad
level generated by PSOC has a noise of around 50-100mV and thus the voltage difference
between two bit-line inputs are kept around 200-400mV. This doesn’t provide a full testing
capability but ensures the electrical connection and the circuit itself work properly.

D.5

Oscilloscope to View and Collect the Output

The SA circuit has two inverting outputs. They have basically the same node as the inputs,
but they are asserted when the ‘SE’ signal goes to high. They are shorted with the two
inputs in other times. The outputs are connected directly to two channels of an oscilloscope
and a snapshot is shown in Figure 4. Both the outputs are found to be correct all the times
in this test setup. These waveforms are also saved and exported as CSV files in a computer
to perform data analysis later on.
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Figure 4: Output shown on a oscilloscope during testing of a sense amplifier circuit from a
fabricated chip.
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E

Probability of Error with Majority Voting Technique

In majority voting technique, suppose a response bit is evaluated ‘N’ number of times. Also
let’s consider the probability of producing a stable output of a particular response bit is p.
Thus the probability of being unstable is (1-p). Now the probability of a particular response
bit to produce its valid logic state r times during N evaluation is:

Prob = pr (1 − p)N −r

(6)

The number of ways to produce the stable response of a particular bit ‘r’ times during

N evaluations can be expressed as Nr . Thus the probability of producing a valid response
by producing its valid binary state exactly ‘r’ times among N evaluations is:
 
N r
Prob =
p (1 − p)N −r
r

(7)

Now depending on the value of this ‘r’, the response cane be either valid or erroneous.
This bit would be considered logic ‘0’ if it produces ‘0’ more than half (r>N/2) of the time.
Thus ‘0’ would be the valid state for this particular response bit. However, an error would
occur if this bit fails to produce ‘0’, its valid state N/2 or more number of times. Thus there
would be error when it produce its valid state 0 times, or 1 times, or more upto less than
N/2 number of times. Therefore, the probability of errors (P.E.) can be found by adding all
the situations where ‘r’ is not greater than N/2 and is expressed here:
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(8)

The probability of producing a correct output with majority voting on the other hand
can be expressed similarly as:
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(9)
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